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Abstract 
In any act of household migration, there are movers (the migrant) and stayers (those left behind), 
and both of these two groups have expectations. The movers expect to make some benefits at the 
destination while the stayers expect the migrant to send or do something at home of origin. Some 
work, though limited, has been done to improve our understanding of how potential migrants form 
their expectations of what they can get from the destination country in studies involving 
determinants of individual migration.  But for those left behind very little is known about how they 
form their expectations of what they can get from the migrant. The few studies that have been 
done on this have only used observed flow of remittances to estimate what people left behind 
expect from migration. Hence these studies equate observed flow of remittances to expected 
flows.  And by this equation, these studies also assume perfect information flow between migrants 
and relations left behind as well as perfect knowledge to help those left behind to form realistic 
expectations: expectations that reflects exactly what can be sent to them. Obviously these 
assumptions are not tenable.  These untenable assumptions also leave a hole in our ability to 
explain why a household will choose to either continue supporting members for migration or not. 
This is because we cannot tell from observed data alone whether or not the desire to continue to 
support migration of a household or a family member is as a result of well-informed subjective 
expectations or not. The crust of the problem here is therefore that by relying on observed data 
alone we fail to account for the important role subjective expectations or beliefs of those left 
behind play in decisions for further migration movements, especially within the family.  
   
 To be able to unravel this problem we need elicitation of subjective expectations of remittance 
flows from those left behind. Using data from a specially designed survey in two districts in Ghana, I 
construct time-adjusted subjective remittance expectations of migrant families at home of origin 
and analyse the factors that determine the formation of these expectations and how formation of 
these expectations can help us explain perpetuation of migration within a household. The key 
analytical models employed in these investigations are summarised below 
 
In order to understand the exogenous determinants of remittance expectations of migrant 
households, I first of all estimate factors that influence performance of migrant at home of origin 
and general flow of information between the migrants and the household members left behind. In 
order to see the effect of remittances on formation of subjective expectations, remittance flow was 
measured in terms of migrant performance by adjusting the flows to the time period during which 
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the migrant could do what he or she has done. The items were limited to the popular ones people 
receive: money for living expenses, establishment of a house and business investment. The 
theoretical explanation for this adjustment is that if the observed trend in remittance flow has any 
effect on expectations it would be through individual household’s evaluation of what migrants have 
achieved within a certain number of years. In other words, all things being equal, families whose 
migrants took much longer period to achieve certain things would have lower levels of expectations 
than a comparable family whose migrant took relatively shorter period. This is because taking a 
long time to achieve something at home of origin would breed some kind of skepticism and 
uncertainty among those left behind as to what they can get from migration. And this skepticism 
can lead to low levels of expectations.  This is also in line with the reference people left behind 
often make when talking about achievements of migrants at home of origin as they always point to 
what XYZ has done. Ordinary least squared regression is then used to estimate factors determining 
level of migrant performance at home of origin after the transformation of the dependent variable: 
migrant performance. Heckman selection model is also applied to control for possible effect of bias 
since some households have migrants who have done nothing at home.   Kinship ties are the major 
factors under this investigation.  
 
To determine the main factors influencing information flow, ordinary least squared estimates are 
used while a generalised ordered logit model, with maximum likelihood method, is used to 
estimate the factors influencing the likelihood of a household getting higher categories of 
private/dedicated information from the migrant. Major factors for this investigation are kinship ties 
and performance of migrant at home of origin.  Since information flow and remittance flows are 
suspected to have endogenous relationship, instrumental variables (IV) technique is employed to 
estimated impact of remittance flow on both private and public information flows. This is important 
for us to understand how information flow act as  exogenous determinant of subjective remittance 
expectations, and resultant effect on perpetuation of migration.  
 
Once current information flow and performance of migrants have been examined and effects of 
their exogenous factors estimated, the next stage of the analysis is the examination of effects of 
these past performance and information flow on household subjective remittance expectations 
while controlling for other major exogenous factors such as kinship ties, level of education and 
household wealth.  Ordinary least square regression technique is used to estimate major 
determinants of these levels of expectations. However, to control for possible bias resulting from 
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the fact that a select group of households may not expect anything, Heckman selection model is 
applied.  
 
The final analysis is the estimation of impact household subjective remittance expectations on 
migration-support intentions. Due to the problem of endogenous relationship between 
expectations and migration decisions, ordinary maximum likelihood estimates would not be very 
effective in identifying the real impact expectations have on migration decisions.  Hence I use 
maximum likelihood with endogenous repressors to estimate or identify the influence of 
expectation on potential migration decisions, applying the probit model with selection model 
(heckprob) technique. Ordered probit analysis is also used to investigate what determines 
household’s desire to support more than one person for migration. The results are summarised 
below.  
 
 
Summary of Findings  
Economics and sociology literature makes us aware that in order to understand formation of 
expectations of any kind we first have to investigate two important factors: past events and current 
information flow, because these are the two factors that hugely influence expectations. Hence, for 
us to understand remittance expectations, we first have to understand two issues: observed past 
flows of remittances and current flow of information between the migrant and relations left behind 
at home of origin.  
 
If remittance flows should influence household or family’s (including the extended family members) 
subjective expectations and the support to move abroad, it should largely do so in terms of what 
has been observed in the past.  In Chapter Six, I investigated the influence of kinship ties on receipts 
of remittances. As expected, closer migrant relations such as spouse and head of family stand a 
much better chance of having better performance from migrant than distant kinship ties such as 
friendship.  However when it comes to performance in individual items such as house or business 
investment, a household cannot rely only on kinship ties with migrant. It should also have some 
wealth. Specifically, among the kinship ties only spousal relationship was found to have positive 
effect on migrant performance in areas such as housing and business investment. Thus the 
influence of kinship ties on observed flow of remittances is mostly limited to money for living 
expenses, unless the family left behind is wealthy enough to enable allocation of what is sent into 
other things such as investment in housing and business. 
vii 
 
 
With kinship ties being very influential in the determination of past performance of migrants one 
would expect that these ties would also influence information flow if the assumption of remittance 
and information flow being together holds.  It has always been assumed by cumulative causation 
theories of migration that together with the flow of remittances from migrant to relations back at 
home is the flow of information that connects migrant, potential migrants and those left behind 
(Massey et al, 1993).  If this is the case then relationship should be a key factor in determining 
information flow from the migrants, because these ties influence flow of remittances.  Results from 
the 2SLS model show that remittance flow has impact only at the lower levels of private 
information flow, reinforcing the point that information that comes with remittance flow may just 
be social issues such as size of family, marital status, and not economic ones.  In spite of their 
strong effect on remittance flow or migrant performance, all the types of kinship ties generally have 
negative effects on private information flow. Thus kinship ties are not enough for those left behind 
to get more private information from the migrant relations residing abroad.  
 
It should not be surprising that remittance flows do not lead to higher levels of information flow 
from the migrants to those left behind. This is because remittances are mostly made up of 
monetary transfers for living expenses which may not carry much information with it as, in most 
cases, migrants do not require monitoring.  And with electronic transfers of these days, it becomes 
more implausible to assume that remittance flows, which are mostly limited to monetary transfers, 
would generate private information as the interpersonal exchanges in these transfers become more 
and more reduced. But since the lower levels of private information flows only contain pieces of 
information such as marital status, household size and education levels, it follows that remittance 
flow may not be the best channel through which relations get important information about the 
socioeconomic conditions of the migrant. Perhaps this assumption was more plausible about 30 
years ago when migrants mostly relied on methods such as using other migrants going home.  
Families left behind have to rely on their wealth or good level of education to be able to source 
information from the migrants.  
 
 On the other hand, remittance flow or migrant performance has highly significant and positive 
influence on public information flow, suggesting that what migrants do at home influence some 
perceived knowledge of the migrants’ socioeconomic conditions. It is also interesting to note that 
factors such as average household education and wealth that have significant positive effect on 
private information flow have negative effect on public information flow. One can therefore deduce 
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that the more families are able to access information from the migrants themselves, the less they 
rely on migration information from nonmigrant sources or the general public in the community of 
origin. Unfortunately remittance flow is unable to help those left behind to get more information 
from the migrant. Hence most of them will have to rely on public information.  
 
With the flow of crucial information such as economic conditions of migrants lacking or being 
inadequate, it can be concluded that there would be some level of uncertainty about conditions. 
And this level of uncertainty may lead to some guess-work or reliance on information from other 
sources in the formation of remittance expectations. That is, would their inability to access crucial 
information on economic conditions of the migrants “push” them to rely on information reaching 
them from other sources in the formation of expectations?  Also if the wealthy and the more 
educated families are more likely to know more about the migrants, and if knowing more about the 
migrant is most likely to temper high expectations with realism as hypothesized in this study, would 
it be fair to conclude that wealthier and more educated families may have ambivalent, if not 
negative expectation levels?   
 
Results from Chapter Seven show that families would use their experience of what migrants have 
done at home of origin as a starting point in the formation of their remittance expectations in terms 
of whether or not they should expect something. But once their expectation status is assured, 
families are much more influenced by other factors than migrant performance in the formation of 
their subjective remittance expectation levels. In other words at lower levels of information, 
remittance expectations seem to be more adaptive to past trends of observed remittance flows.  
Kinship ties become very significant in this respect in spite of its insignificant influence on 
information flow.  This raises a question of whether or not the effect of kinship ties on formation of 
remittance expectations is informed by information from the migrants. All the results point to the 
contrary. The effects of kinship ties on subjective remittance expectations are informed more by 
past experience of remittance receipts than current dedicated/ private flow of information 
between the families and the migrants. When kinship ties are interacted with private information 
their effects on remittance expectations are, however, significantly reduced, indicating that when 
people take private or dedicated information into consideration their high expectations are very 
much checked.  
 
What are the implications of subjective remittance expectations form under low levels of dedicated 
information flow for migration decisions? Chapter Eight sought to provide the answer to this 
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question. The results confirmed the hypothesis that subjective remittance expectations formed 
under inadequate flow of dedicated information would lead to increasing desire to support more 
migration from the family and the opposite should also true. That is under inadequate information 
flow, subjective remittance expectations have highly positive effect on desire to perpetuate 
migration more than the demonstrative effect of migrant performance, emphasizing the 
importance of expectations in perpetuation of migration.  
 
However, the strong effect of expectations and kinship ties on desire to support migration could be 
reduced if high levels of dedicated information are taken into consideration. Further investigation 
into why some families with remittance expectations would still not want to support members to 
migrate revealed that, in addition to private or dedicated information flow, average household 
education level is a major factor that discourages families with remittance expectations from 
further supporting members to migrate. This is in sharp contrast with the generally accepted view 
that education selects families and individuals into migration, especially international migration. 
This is true in the general population. When only migrant families are sampled, as in this study, the 
effects of education on migration are tempered with information flow.  Education allows the family 
to access more and more of private/dedicated information which has negative effect on remittance 
expectations. It is therefore not surprising that education may discourage families with 
expectations to continue supporting migration. But since most people do not get the private 
information or do not even consider it as, expectations which are hugely informed by past 
performance, public information and mere kinship ties would continue to drive perpetuation of 
migration, at least, at the household level.  
 
 
  
x 
 
DEDICATION  
To my mother, Helena Amoah 
 
In memory of my father, Joseph  
 
And  
 
My wife, brothers and sisters, uncles and aunts, nephews and nieces, who though ‘scattered’ 
around the globe, make me feel as though we all live under one roof. You nurtured this idea with 
the strong ties that bind us together.  
 
xi 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  
It was a slow beginning with some uncertainties as to where the thesis was going. But you 
were patient with me and gave me assurance in a very calm way. Many thanks to you, Prof. 
Charles Simkins. Thank you for your vision, your unconditional support and the critical 
discussions we had about the contents of this thesis. Through the challenges you gave me, I 
have learnt a lot.  I remember you once told me “Don’t allow any statistical technique to 
control you; you must control them.”  Thanks, Prof for that piece of advice; it has become a 
valuable tool for me – to have control over challenges.  I would also like to thank Dr. Loren 
Landau for his insightful suggestions to this thesis. Loren took keen interest in reading 
through the papers and offered me valuable comments that have helped shape the study.  
 
The hurdles that one runs into during dissertation process are too many to fully narrate. I cannot 
thank Flora and Hewlett Foundation enough for the fellowship they gave me to pursue the PhD at 
Wits University. Without you there was no way I could pursue one of my boyhood dreams. Your 
financial support gave me conducive atmosphere to do this study. I am also grateful to the 
management of the Growth Laboratory (G’Lab) for their generous financial support for the 
fieldwork in Ghana.  In particular, my sincere thanks go to Peter Adams (the CEO) and Cecil 
Macheke (Director) for going out of their way to make sure that I was comfortable on the field in 
Ghana.  Thanks a lot, Peter and Cheeks.  
 
I owe many debts of gratitude to the staff of the Demography and Populations Studies Programme 
of the University of the Witwatersrand. You gave me immense support when things were going 
tough. I thank Prof. Clifford Odimegwu for the confidence he has in me and continuous push for me 
to get the study done. Many thanks also go to Prof. Tollman and Kahn for their supports. I will like 
to give special thanks to Julia Mamabolo, the administrator of the programme for making the 
offices available and attending to my numerous administrative requests. May God bless you Julia, 
for the patience and smile you put on my face anytime I entered the office. 
 
I reserve my deepest gratitude to Jaki Odwara who sacrificed his precious time to go through the 
whole thesis for corrections. Thanks Jaki, for doing this time-consuming exercise wholeheartedly.  
Also, special thanks go to the teaching staff of the Population Studies Programme of the University 
of Cape Coast, Ghana, especially Prof. Awosabo-Asare and Dr. Augustine Tanle for the valuable 
pieces of advice you gave me as regards the strategy for the fieldwork. Without knowing much 
about me, Augustine went out of his way to give me contacts of his friends in Berekum who gave 
xii 
 
me great help in the execution of the fieldwork. I cannot forget you, Mr. Edward Anderson. Like 
Augustine you also gave my contacts of your friends in Sunyani to help me. Through this, both of 
you made me do the fieldwork in a comfortable and a friendly atmosphere in these two places I had 
never been until then.  I appreciate the friendships I had in these two towns; thanks to you all.   
 
I am also grateful to my family and friends.  My wife, Lizy,  you officially became part of this journey 
in a much later stage. But your support in this last, but crucial stage has been quite immense. I 
thank you for being by my side in these final stages.  To my brothers and sisters, aunts and uncles, 
nephews and nieces I say Thank You. The close ties, and all its benefits we share, were the 
inspiration that propelled this investigation. Thanks to you all friends – Tony Essien, Patrick 
Gyefour, Boniface Paaga, James Arthur, etc, for the moral supports.  And to you, Tsikata, the man, 
whose article on Ghanaweb  gave me continuous  energy to do this study, I say THANK YOU.  
  
xiii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENT  
      TABLE OF CONTENTS          
                    
Declaration                 ii 
                    
Abstract                 IV 
                    
Dedication                 VI 
                    
Acknowledgement               VIII 
                    
Content                 IX 
                    
                    
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION              
1.1 Introduction  1 
1.2 Objectives of the study  4 
1.3 Research questions            5 
1.4 Significance of the study  6 
1.5 Background and Scope  8 
1.5.1 Traditional lineage and extended family system  8 
1.5.2 Changing structure and functions of the Ghanaian family  9 
1.5.3 Migration in Ghana           12 
  1.5.3.1 Any Peculiar factors?  13 
  1.5.3.2 Inter- and intra-family transfers  15 
1.5.4 Conclusions and implications of Ghana family and migration systems  19 
1.6 Definition of concepts 
 1.7 Outline  of the rest of the study 21
xiv 
 
                    
CHPAPTER 2:  THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL  LITERATURE  24 
2.1 Introduction               24 
2.2 Expectations as part of family migration decision  24 
  2.2.1 Migration and different types of expectations  25 
  
2.2.2                        Theories of remittance and their implications for remittance 
expection         
27 
  2.2.3 Information flow and formation of remittance expectations  29 
  2.2.4 Relational composition of remittance expectations  34 
2.3 Expectations and perpetuation of migration  37 
  2.3.1 Insights from studies using observed data     37 
  2.3.2 Insights from studies using stated preference data   40 
2.4 Conclusions from the literature review  43 
2.5 Theoretical framework: Actors and processes of remittance expectations  44 
2.6 Hypotheses           48 
                    
                    
CHAPTER 3:METHODOLOGY - DESCRIPTION OF FIELDWORK 50 
3.1 Introduction              50 
3.2 Choice of study area           50 
3.3 Migrant family            51 
3.4 Sampling strategy           53 
  3.4.1 Problems with sampling procedure    52 
3.5 Questionnaire design           56 
3.6 Implementation of fieldwork 56 
xv 
 
  3.6.1 Recruitment and training  56 
  3.6.2 The universe            58 
                    
CHAPTER 4: KEY CONCEPTS AND ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES  60 
4.1 Introduction              60 
4.2 Construction of Indices  
     
60 
 
4.2.1    Household wealth index    60 
 
4.2.2    Household human capital index    64 
 
4.2.3    Measuring migrant performance at home of origin  66 
 
4.2.4     Computing information index  71 
 
4.2.5      Measuring remittance expectations    75 
 4.2.5.1    Internal and external validity of remittance expectation index  80 
4.3 Analytical techniques          82 
 
4.3.1     Model specifications for migrant performance   
 
83 
 
4.3.2     Model specifications for information flow  
 
85 
 
4.3.2.1  Instrumental variable (IV) techniques 
 
86 
 
4.3.2.2   Generalised ordered logit  model for information flow 
 
87 
 
4.3.3      Estimating determinants of remittance expectations –Heckman  model  
 
91 
  4.3.3.1  Dealing with effect of selectivity  93  
 
4.3.4      Determining effect of remittance expectations intentions to            
perpetuate migration  
 
95 
 
4.3.4.1   Probit with Heckman selection model 
 
96 
 
4.3.4.2  Ordered Probit  model 
 
98 
 
4.3.4.3   Multinomial logistic  model 
 
100 
4.4 Variable definitions 
   
102 
4.5 Limitations of the study 
   
103 
xvi 
 
CHAPTER 5: DEMOGRAPHIC ANDSOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF HOUSEHOLDS  
104 
5.1 Introduction              104 
5.2 Characteristics of Remittance recipient and nonrecipient households  104 
5.3.1 Characteristics of households with private  information flow    106 
5.3.2  Descriptive statistics of households with public information flow 
 
109 
 5.4        Characteristics of families with remittance expectations  111 
 5.5 Remittance expectations and household migration support intentions  113 
         CHAPTER 6: REMITTANCE AND  INFORMATION FLOW BETWEEN MIGRANTS AND RELATIONS LEFT 
BEHIND                                                           116                                                                                  
6.1 Introduction              116 
6.2.1 Exploring determinants of individual migrant performance in key items  
 
117 
 6.2.2    Determinants of migrant performance at home of origin 121  
6.3.1     Remittance and information flows  
   
123 
 6.3.2 Determinants of higher levels of private information flow  125 
                    
CHAPTER 7: FORMATION OF  REMITTANCE EXPECTATIONS AND        FAMILY   MIGRATION 
INTENTIONS                                                                          129  
 
  
 7.1 Introduction             129 
7.2.1 Exploring expectations of individual items  130 
   
 7.2.2   Determinants of expectation levels without interaction effects  of information flow 
132
 7.2.3 Determinants of remittance expectation levels with interaction effects 135 
 7.3.1 Family intentions to support migration of members 137 
7.3.2    Factors influencing the strength of household migration intentions   140 
xvii 
 
                    
CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  146  
8.1 Introduction              146 
8.2 Discussions           147 
8.3 Subjective remittance expectations: the centre of migration decision theories        155 
8.4 Recommendations              157 
                  
 APENDICES                159
                    
REFERENCES              194 
 
  
xviii 
 
TABLES  
                    
TABLE                PAGE  
                    
1.1 Household structure in Ghana between 1991/1992 and 2005/2006 11 
1.2 Annual income transfers by type of household  17 
1.3 Recipients of annual income transfers  18 
1.4 Definition of concepts 20 
3.1 Sample design              54 
3.2 Number of migrant relations per household  55 
3.3 Some basic characteristics of respondents  59 
4.1 Wealth quintile of households          63 
4.2 Human capital quintiles of households  64 
4.3 Weighting migrant performance          68 
4.4 Relationship between migrant performance and its components          71 
4.5 Information items for construction of knowledge/information index  72 
4.6 Access to private and public information about migrants  75 
4.7 Weighting expected items            79 
4.8 Status of household expectations and past receipts of remittances  81 
4.9 Comparing average expected and realised items  81 
4.10   Descriptive statistics of information flow quintiles 82 
4.11 Intended number of potential migrants  within five years 99 
4.12     Four groups of  expectation- migration-intention choices  100  
4.13 Variable definitions 102 
5.1 Descriptive statistics of remittance recipient and nonrecipient households  105 
   
xix 
 
5.2     Descriptive statistics of households that have low and high private   information 
flows 107 
5.3     Descriptive statistics of households that do or do not source public     information  110 
5.4 Descriptive statistics of expectant and non-expectant families  111 
5.5 Descriptive statistics of households’ expectation-migration-intention  choices 114 
6.1 Result from probit model estimating probability of receiving key items        118 
6.2      Determinants of migrant performance at home of origin 121  
6.3 Impacts of remittance flow on private and public information flow  124 
6.4 Determinants of higher levels of private information flow  126 
7.1 Estimates of expectation probabilities of the key items 132 
7.2      Determinants of remittance expectations from OLS and selection models 133 
7.3 Comparing determinants of remittance expectations with and without interaction  136 
7.4 Determinants of family intentions to support migration of a member 138 
7.5       Results from goprobit estimating strength of migration intentions  141 
7.6        Choices of Expectation-migration-support intentions –mlogit                                                      143 
  
 
            
  
  
xx 
 
 
FIGURES  
 
FIGURE                PAGE  
                    
2.1            Actors and processes of remittance expectations and implications for    further 
migration  45 
2.2 The role of information flow in remittance expectations  46 
4.1 Kernel density plot of household wealth  64 
4.2 Kernel density plot of household education level  65 
4.3               Percent of families that have received or not received items from migrant 
relations  68 
4.4               Relationship between unadjusted migrant performance and years of migration  69 
4.5               Relationship between adjusted migrant performance and years of migration   70 
4.6 Knowledge of migrant's socioeconomic conditions  73 
4.7a Access to private information. 74 
4.7b Access to public information. 74 
4.8               Kernel density estimates for expected items: business and housing investment. 
82 
5.1 Relationship between migrant performance and information flow. 107 
5.2               Relationship between information flow, years of migration and age of household 
head. 
109 
5.3 Migrant performance and remittance expectations  113 
5.4 Private information flow and remittance expectations. 113 
 
  
1 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction  
.... Back home, expectations are so high among family members, friends and 
relations that it does not matter whether these individuals are able to make it to the 
so-called ‘promise land’ or not. It does not matter whether they are employed or not. 
After all who cares to hear their stories? They are in America and Europe where milk 
and honey flows, so they have no excuses. The love of parents have grown cold 
towards their own progenitors and, in some cases, parents have denounced their 
sons/daughters and warned they should not even step foot at their grave sides when 
they pass away, because they have not been able to remit them as Johnny has been 
doing for his parents. Good friends have turned into bad guys and backbiters due to 
their friend’s - in America and Europe - inability to send a mobile phone, money or 
even assist them to secure a visa to also visit the ‘promise land’...... The thinking is 
that one may be the fortunate one to scale the barb fences successfully to the promise 
land where the pastures are green Tsikata, (2006)  
 
When migration involves households or families, there is always a relationship between the 
migrant and the members of the family left behind. And what mediates between the two 
groups is information flow.   The migrant is faced with a challenging task of managing 
information about his/her socioeconomic situation in the destination country which he/she 
has to share with those left behind. On one hand, a migrant would not want to be too 
negative about his/her well-being at the destination for two major reasons: firstly being too 
negative message may send a worrying message to relatives, especially parents. The parents 
may conclude that the migrant is lying about his/her circumstances, particularly if fellow 
emigrants from the community of origin are doing well. The migrant may not want this 
situation to arise as it may lead to some of the relations “growing cold.”  Secondly, being too 
negative about his or her socioeconomic conditions may also send a message to other 
relations and friends, and even the whole community of origin that he or she is a failure in 
the destination country.  On the other hand, being too positive and telling all your economic 
successes in the destination country may also create unnecessarily high remittance 
expectations not only from the close relations, but also friends and extended kin (Nyamnjoh 
2005). Thus information sharing becomes a crucial factor not only about the management of 
relationships with those left behind, but also the management of expectation levels.  
 
The other side of this dichotomous relationship, which this thesis is mostly about, is the 
relations left behind.  Since the capital market is poorly developed, access to loans for 
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investments from financial institutions in many developing countries is quite difficult for an 
average family. Hence those left behind expect that the migrant would contribute something 
to improving their livelihoods, especially in the areas of schooling, accommodation and 
business investment (Massey et al 1993; Adams, 2006; Mazzucato, 2005).  These remittance 
expectations are an extension of the social or cultural inter- and intra-family supports 
systems well embedded in many African societies. Sociological, economic and demographic 
literatures show that households support one another with financial transfers and remittances 
in times of social, environmental and health shocks (Rosenzweiger, 1988; Rosenzweig & 
Stark, 1989; Root & Jong, 1991). Studies in household migration have found that families 
participate in migration in order to spread risks among members in different locations. The 
implicit assumption in this behaviour is that people are to cooperate and live up to various 
expected responsibilities that come with this unwritten and informal agreement among 
family members.  Meeting these expected responsibilities is not only limited to times of 
economic shocks but also whenever those who are left behind feel that they are deprived of 
certain economic status compared to some households in their communities (Stark and 
Taylor, 1991).  The resultant attitude or perception of those left behind is the expectation 
that their migrant relative abroad has no choice but to help them in improving their 
livelihood.  The expected items may come in various forms, but the notable ones are money 
for investment in child education, business, housing and supporting migration of other 
members from the family.  In fact it is estimated that almost the entire housing industry in 
Ghana depends on international remittances (Diko and Tipple, 1992).   
 
Like any contract there is a need for family members left behind to monitor the situation to 
ensure that the expected flows of remittances are achieved. A major avenue through which 
this monitoring can be enhanced is information flow between the migrant and those left 
behind. Unfortunately due to the costs associated with distance and other factors such as 
migrant’s possible unwillingness to share more information as stated above, it becomes 
difficult for those left behind to know what is going on so as to form their remittance 
expectations. With a possibility of imperfect monitoring arising from inadequate information 
from the migrant, it remains to be explained how those left behind get to know about the 
socioeconomic conditions of the migrant member so as to monitor the cooperation of the 
migrant and achieve their expected benefits?  Some studies point out that in absence of 
geographical proximity, social norms, cultural values and kinship ties would guide the 
cooperation of the migrant (Jong, 2000; Mazzucato, 2009). Thus, based on the thrust of 
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kinship ties and social expectations, families members left behind would have no option but 
to rely on what the migrant members tell them.   However, other studies have found that 
norms and values are not enough to bring out important information needed to monitor the 
cooperation between the migrant and those left behind. Hence there is bound to be some 
information asymmetries (Morduch and Sharma, 2002; Chen, 2006; McKenzie et al, 2007).  
The problem of information asymmetries may be more complex when these subjective 
remittance expectations are not only from the immediate family members of the migrant, but 
also from the extended relations who also think they are relationally bound to benefit from 
the ‘fortunes’ of the migrant member.  The migrant is faced with the problem of managing 
information across family members in the extended kinship system some of whom might 
have played varied roles in his/her movement.   He or she has to negotiate his/her way 
through close relations, friends and extended relations with various levels of information 
about his socioeconomic wellbeing at the place of origin. In the same way, members of the 
extended family left behind also have to negotiate their ways in getting information about 
the migrant to help them form levels of their remittance expectations.  All this shows that 
there will be varied levels of information flow to the relations behind either through the 
migrant’s selectivity or unwillingness to share information.  It could also be through the 
inability of those left behind to access the information about the migrant due to costs of 
information.  Thus the problem may not only be that people left behind do not care to hear 
the stories of migrant members as Tsikata (2006) observes, but rather the crucial stories may 
not even come to them.    
 
 In both cases private or dedicated information flow from the migrant is most likely to be 
inadequate; hence, subjective remittance expectations of those left behind is also most likely 
to be heavily influenced by this inadequacy of dedicated private information flow.  
Consequently other factors such as past flow of remittances or what migrant families see 
happening in other migrant families in the community of origin become major reference 
points in the formation of remittance expectation levels.  It is therefore not surprising to find 
families expecting their migrant relations to remit as “Johnny has been doing for his 
parents.”  Does this mean that the only way people left behind could form their remittance 
expectations is to make reference to what other migrant families get? Or could their 
remittance expectation be formed on the basis of other factors such as relational bonds or 
contribution to cost of migration?  If remittance expectations are at the core of why families 
engage in migration, as rightly observed by Van Dalen et al (2005) and De Jong (2000), then 
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how these expectations are formed has some important implications for why families would 
either choose to continue or to discontinue perpetuating migration. Unfortunately, we have 
very limited scientific knowledge about how these expectations are formed and 
consequently how they influence perpetuation of migration within a family. 
 
 
1.2 Objectives of the study  
 In order to help address the problem elucidated above, it is the objective of this study to 
determine exogenous factors in formation of subjective remittance expectations and how 
these expectations influence family’s decisions to perpetuate migration. Specific objectives 
include the following.   
1. To determine the influence of kinship ties on migrant performance at home of origin. 
A major determinant of subjective expectations is past event of the subject about 
which the individual forms his/her subjective expectations. Past event here refers to 
migrant remittance flow. It is mainly about what the migrant has done at the home of 
origin.   
2. To determine the factors that influence flow of information (both general and 
dedicated). The main focus here will be to find whether or not migrant performance 
necessarily mean access to important information about socioeconomic conditions of 
the migrant in the destination country. It has been held by the new economics of 
labour migration network theory that kinship ties facilitate flow of information since 
kin, especially the close ones, are the main recipients of remittances.  The 
assumption here is that the flow of remittances comes with the flow of information as 
migrant would have to communicate with those to whom the remittances are sent.  It 
is the objective of this study to test this assumption and ascertain the main 
determinants of information flow, especially private information flow.  
 
3. To determine the main factors that people left behind consider when forming their 
remittance expectations. The focus here will be to see the relative importance of 
kinship ties, observed performance of migrant at the place of origin and information 
flow in the formation subjective remittance expectations.   
4.  The final specific objective is to determine the implications of subjective remittance 
expectations on decision to perpetuate migration in the household. 
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1.3 Research questions 
Operational research questions include the following: 
1. Do kinship ties influence migrant performance at home of origin the same way it 
does with receipt of remittances? In other words do closer relations have greater 
influence on what migrants are able to achieve at the home of origin than the distant 
relations? 
  
2. Do migrant performance at home and kinship ties have strong correlation with flow 
of dedicated private information (information from the migrant) to the relations left 
behind at home of origin?  That is does receipt of remittances necessarily mean 
receipt of information as the new economics of labour migration would want us to 
believe? How much can those left behind know about the socioeconomic conditions 
of the migrant through the latter’s performance at home? Would the effects of 
kinship ties and migrant performance be different on flow of public information 
(Information people get around through interaction with neighbours and friends)? 
 
3. What are the effects of migrant performance and the two sources of information 
flows on formation of subjective remittance expectations? Would ability or inability 
to access private information, for example, “push” those left behind to rely on 
alternative form of information when forming their subjective remittance 
expectations?  In other words, what are the relative importance of migrant 
performance, private information, public information and kinship ties on levels of 
subjective remittance expectations of those left behind at home of origin? Do these 
factors have the same levels of influence on formation of subjective remittance 
expectations on condition of high level of private information flow between migrants 
and family relations left behind? And finally are remittance expectations informed by 
adequate information flows between migrants and those left behind? 
 
4. How do subjective remittance expectations influence household decision to 
perpetuate migration?  For example do formed subjective expectations influence 
decision to perpetuate migration in the same way under the conditions of high private 
information flow and public information flow?  
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These questions, though not exhaustive, would guide study to find insights into 
understanding how members of the migrant family left behind form their remittance 
expectations and the effect these expectations can have on their future migration intentions. 
The significance of these insights are summarised in the next section. 
 
 
 
1.4 Significance/Justification of the study  
Many theories have been propounded in the context of some empirical work to explain why 
people migrate to other countries even when there are obvious dangers associated with the 
movement.  In Africa the most dominant of these are the economic theories such as new 
economics of migration and other micro economic theories. Together with some network 
models, these theories and empirical works based on them have projected economic reasons 
as the main factors behind voluntary international migration from and within the continent.  
Yet it is still difficult to deduce from all these studies the relative importance of these 
explanations.  Van Dalen et al (2005) concur that the drive to emigrate out of Africa 
especially from Ghana and Senegal can only be summarised in two words: “great 
expectations”.  Expectations of employment, good earnings among other reasons are the 
basis upon which people including families build their emigration intentions especially in 
times of uncertainties (O’Connell, 1997).  It is the contribution of this study to explain the 
exogenous determinants of these expectations in order to deepen our understanding of 
emigration movements within and from this continent.  
 
Expectations of future events such as remittance flows motivate present actions like 
migration and thereby influence observed social phenomenon. Thus knowing how 
remittance expectations are formed would help us to understand better why households 
would continue either to support migration of their members or not to do so. Knowing 
family’s expectations is therefore critical to making accurate inferences regarding the 
determinants of individuals’ migration behaviour (Delavande and Kohler, 2009). For 
example, some households may be receiving remittances from migrant relations abroad, but 
they dislike continuous participation in migration processes, while others may want to 
participate in migration even though they have not benefited from relations who are abroad 
to set as a signal for them. Observed choices of remittance flows alone without information 
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on subjective remittance expectations cannot help us to dissociate various competing 
explanations of these household migration behaviours. Hence we need to study formation of 
these expectations in order to fully understand household migration decision behaviour.   
 
Many young men and women travel on land and over the sea under harsh conditions, using 
their life savings and support from relations at home in order to get to the “promised land.” 
They do this not only because of their own expectations but also those of their kins and 
friends back home. Sometimes both academics and policy makers fail to understand why 
people would risk their lives under harsh conditions to migrate. This is because it is expected 
that people would learn from and behave accordingly to some of the observed outcomes, 
namely the stories or ordeals that other migrants go through before and upon reaching their 
destinations (Wainwright, 2006). But since individual and family decisions are driven by 
expectations, the formation of which may trivialise these stringent requirements, there is 
likely to be a gap between policies and expectations. Any gap found between realized 
outcomes for immigrants and expected outcomes for comparable would-be emigrants or 
households members left behind suggests that inference based on realized outcomes alone 
may be misleading (McKenzie et al, 2007). Given that individuals and families hold private 
and public information that determine their levels of expectations about future probabilities 
of migration, studying subjective remittance expectations of those left behind may provide 
additional information for policy makers and academics in our attempt to understand why 
households and individuals embark on migration even in dangerous circumstances. This 
study contributes to increasing need to study subjective expectations and incorporate them in 
decision-making models so as to get full understanding of why individuals and households 
would continue to support others to embark on migration. Investigating how remittance 
expectations are formed and how they influence further migration decisions would help us to 
come up with well informed measures to address this issue in developing countries. 
 
Existing theories of migration have not been able to explain why some initial migration 
moves do not lead to perpetuation of further movements. According to De Haas (2010), two 
main reasons could account for this: firstly empirical work samples only existing migration 
networks and leave out the failed ones. In so doing we are not able to explain what happen 
to the failed networks.   Secondly, according to De Haas, there is an absence of clear 
conceptual framework to guide research into why some initial migration processes fail to 
become full-blown perpetuation especially at the community level. He attributes the failure 
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to account for this to too much focus on existing networks. Migration will dry-up at the 
household level as only the privileged households, who can afford the cost, would migrate.  
Hence he advises that studies should incorporate failed samples in the whole community for 
full understanding of why some migrations fail to generate full-blown network or 
perpetuation.  But I want to add that even if samples include failed network, reliance on 
observed choices would not give adequate explanation about why some migration networks 
fail. And even though doing this at the community level, as conceptualised by Epstein 
(2009) and De Haas (2010), may provide some insights, I think it is at the household level 
that most of these movements or non-movements take place as most often the individual 
potential migrant needs support from the rest of the family.  The use of subjective remittance 
expectations of the family members left behind could help us to explain why some families 
would not want to support other family members to migrate. This is because if the family 
feels the need to improve its livelihood conditions, it would express this through the 
expected items the potential migrant must supply while in the destination country. So this 
study would also serve as an attempt to provide a conceptual link between initiation and 
perpetuation of migration, especially at the household level.  
 
1.5 Background and Scope of the Study  
Migration and remittance flows as family strategy of meeting economic challenges do not 
just occur. There must be something, either in the culture or traditions of the people that 
makes people believe that their expectations of remittance flows would be met by their 
migrant relatives. Understanding family dynamics in Ghana and perhaps many other African 
countries is important for us to know the basis of interpersonal relationship of which 
subjective remittance expectations form an important part.  It is appropriate to give some 
background account about family, especially the Akan family in Ghana since this would 
help us to put the whole study in its proper context in terms of the population we are dealing 
with. This section presents basic characteristics of family migration, the culture of monetary 
transfers and receipts in Ghana to help throw lights on family expectations of remittance 
flows and how this affect migration decisions. 
 
1.5.1 Traditional lineage and extended family system 
The concept of the family in Ghana and many African societies varies from a spectrum of 
nuclear and to large extended members (Nunkunya, 2003).  Traditionally many African 
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families consist of a big domestic cluster, sometimes consisting of one or more nuclear 
families, each of which may have a husband, wife and children, leading to big household 
sizes.  In Ghana there are two broad lineage groups: patrilineal and matrilineal societies. 
Patrilineal societies trace descent through the paternal ancestry and inheritance succession 
pass through the paternal line, while matrilineal people trace descent from maternal ancestry 
and inheritance go through the maternal line. The sample for this study is from the Akans 
who practice the matrilineal linage system. Traditionally, a maternal family is large, usually 
made up of a woman’s children, her maternal brothers and sisters, children of her maternal 
sisters, maternal grandmother, and maternal brothers and sisters of the grandmother 
(Mensah-Bonsu and Dowuna-Hammond, 1996).  Residential arrangement among the Akans 
is, however, patrilocal, and since this is in contrast with the traditional matrilineal 
inheritance system children are not expected to stay in their father’s house for ever. 
Traditional matrilineal system in a way alienates children from their father’s relations and 
makes them turn to maternal uncles for support whenever there is a need.  It is therefore not 
surprising to find uncles performing the functions of the father even though the latter may 
still be alive. And even though traditionally men or husbands are the major decision makers 
in the family, it is not uncommon to find reference being made to uncles and aunts in the 
extended family.   Thus child rearing is a collective and social duty in which not only the 
biological and nuclear family is involved, but also the extended family and kin including 
social parents, older siblings and other relatives, especially from maternal lineage.  Extended 
family systems and strong kin and lineage relations remain important in most parts of 
Ghanaian society being matrilineal or patrilineal as they provide a sense of belonging, 
solidarity, and protection as well as social control. In addition to protection and solidarity, 
the bond also involves expectations, obligations and responsibilities (Nukunya, 2003; 
Tiemoko 2004). Consequently socioeconomic changes in Ghanaian and many African 
societies cannot be discussed without reference to the extended family and its involvement 
in the decision-making process of individual family members (Brown, 1996; Fleischer, 
2007).  
. 
 
 
1.5.2 Changing structure and functions of the Ghanaian family 
In recent decades, the Ghanaian family is said to have undergone some changes in its 
structure as well as functions (Caldwell, 1968;  Nukunya, 2003). According to these scholars 
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the family is no longer closely knit together; there is a shift to more emphasis on individuals 
as opposed to family continuity; and the family is seeing more and more of relative 
exclusion of a range of kin influences from its everyday affairs, as the emphasis shifts in 
favour of conjugal relationship (Nukunya, 2003). With varying degrees of exposure to 
influential factors of change, - urbanisation, education, Christianity and migration -, the 
family as a social institution is liable to change. But by and large, it is economic factors that 
really bring changes in family composition. Just over half a century ago, a family was an 
economic production unit in Ghana and many other developing nations. This has changed in 
the last 60 years. Wage employment has made it possible for members of households to get 
dispersed across vast geographical space locally and internationally leading to reduction in 
economic production functions of the co-residential family.  According to Nukunya (2003) 
the weakening of the traditional sanctions - resulting from exposure to these influential 
factors – has brought laxity in kinship behaviour which the traditional sanctions used to 
sustain.  The head and elders of kinship systems no longer have control over the economic 
lives of the members; religious beliefs, which used to be integral part of traditional life, are 
no longer strong motivators of behaviour (ibid); and migration has worsened things as 
people are no longer in proximity of traditional grips. Elsewhere it has been argued that 
increased resources of the aged especially in the wake of social security/welfare schemes are 
the main cause of reduction in multigenerational co-residence and independence of the aged 
in the advanced countries (Costa ,1999;  McGarry & Schoeni 2000).  This may, however, be 
for very small educated elites in the Ghanaian society, since for the majority of the working 
population social security/welfare schemes are not enough.  
 
Table 1.1 below, shows the basic demographic composition of the households in Ghana in 
two periods, about 15 years apart. The estimations are based on data from a nationally 
representative survey conducted by Ghana Statistical Service (GSS). These estimates are 
from the weighted sample with the country having 3320000 and 5538133 households 
respectively for the two surveys. The nuclear family, which is composed of father, mother 
and children (or adopted children) is the dominant household type in the country comprising 
almost 50% of the household types. When either of the spouses is not resident in the 
household, the nuclear family is incomplete. The nuclear households continue to be headed 
mostly by young people as a reflection of contemporary trends. Generally though one would   
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Table 1.1: Household structure in Ghana  between  1991/92 and 2005/06 
Household  type  Percent  Mean HH size  
Mean Age  of HH 
head 
Percent headed by 
Female  
1991/92 2005/06 1991/92 2005/06 1991/92 2005/06 1991/92 2005/06 
Solitary 16.7 22.0 1.0 1.0 43.1 42.6 30.9 33.4 
Nuclear  48.9 47.3 4.5 4.3 41.5 43.2 28.5 22.2 
Extended 26.0 20.9 5.3 5.1 48.0 50.5 47.5 45.5 
Compound 4.2 2.9 9.2 9.2 52.1 50.4 1.0 0.7 
Compound 
extended 2.8 2.7 9.4 9.2 52.6 52.3 5.6 4.2 
Non-related 1.3 4.2 7.0 6.1 46.1 46.6 35.6 18.8 
National  100 100.0 4.5 4.0 44.3 45.3 32.2 27.9 
Source:  Estimated from the Ghana Living Standard Survey of 1991/92 (GLSS 3) and 2005/2006 (GLSS 5), 
 
agree with Awuni’s (1988) observation that the extended family system (20.9%), a decrease 
of about 5% within 15 years is a testimony that it is gradually giving way to the a more 
nuclear and solitary living arrangement. In fact the solitary living arrangement recorded the 
biggest increase (5%) in the period. And the table shows that more and more young people 
prefer this living arrangement, while the extended1 system has lost about 4% of its presence 
in the country within the same period.    Nevertheless, putting all of them together the 
extended systems still form about one-third of all the types of household living arrangements 
in the country and they are mostly headed by older people with average age of about 50 
years with a significant percentage (46%) of them being headed by females.  Matrilineal 
societies, where children tend to lean toward the mother’s lineage,  have been found to have 
higher number of female-headed households than the patrilineal societies when other factors 
are controlled (Addai-Sundiata, 1996).  A possible reason for this differential is that, as 
stated earlier, among the matrilineal societies the mother’s brothers and sisters are quite 
influential in supporting her and her children.  Thus the fear of inadequate economic 
resources that can keep many women in unions may not be a serious factor among women in 
the matrilineal societies. With all these changes, the functions of the family, especially in its 
extended sense, as a kinship network that provides security for those who do not have it 
could be in danger.  
                                                          
1 Extended household = a household that comprises   at least one of the parents of the spouses is plus or 
minus children and other relations  
Compound household = a household with two or more married couples plus or minus children and other 
relations  
Compound-extended household= household with two or more couples, plus at least one of the parents of 
the spouses and plus or minus children and other relations  
Nonrelated household = household in which at least one of the members does not have any kinship 
relation with the household head 
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On the other hand, some other studies have found that the declining co-residence of multiple 
generations due to migration  and contemporary economic arrangement has not hampered 
the family’s ability to perform its traditional social support functions (Frankenberg et al, 
2002; Kholi and Kunemund, 2003; Frankenberg & Kuhn, 2004). The declining 
multigenerational co-residence and the rise of social welfare schemes may perhaps have 
negative effects on intergenerational transfers in the advanced countries, but certainly not in 
the developing nations.  In fact even in the advanced countries there is still large flow of 
resources from one generation to another within households (Kholi and Kunemund, 2003). 
So the most significant changes in Ghanaian and many African families today are more 
about its living arrangement rather than its functions.  The same social changes that have 
brought some transformation in the family composition have also led to new ways through 
which families, no matter where they are, continue to care for one another.  And the best 
platform for families to show this support is through migration of some of their members.   
 
1.5.3 Migration in Ghana  
About 1.5 million Ghanaians are said to be living in many countries across the world 
(Twum-Baah, 2005). After the expulsion from Nigeria in late 1970’s and early 1980’s,  
Ghanaians turned their attention to Europe, notably UK, Germany, Netherland, Italy, France 
and recently Spain, and America which hitherto had become destinations for the very rich, 
educated elites and those who had been offered scholarships (Bump, 2006; Mazzucato & 
Kabki, 2007).  Ghana and Senegal now  stand out as some of the few countries that have 
broken away from colonial migration patterns and from where a substantial increase and 
diversification in migration to southern Europe (and the USA) have taken roots (De Haas, 
2007).  It is estimated that between late 1960’s and mid 1980’s Ghana lost between one-half 
and two-thirds of its most experienced, top-level manpower to emigration (Rado 1986).  It is 
this group that created the network which continue to fuel emigration from the country. 
Between 1995 and 2002, about 69% of doctors trained in the country and many health 
professionals left the country (ISSER, 2006). In recent years, however, a good number of the 
emigrants from the country are semi-skilled people.   They often find themselves in lower-
levels on the occupation ladder. By 1991, only 4.2% and 7.4% of Ghanaian immigrants in 
Canada, for example, were employed in managerial and professional levels respectively; and 
only 7.2% of them have university education with the rest having secondary or primary 
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education (Owusu, 1998). Over 41% of them were in processing and machining occupations 
(Statistics Canada, 1994 cited in Owusu, 2000).  Most of the migrants in these low-paying 
jobs do not tell their kins about the jobs they do because even though those jobs may pay 
well by Ghanaian standard, they may have low prestige in Ghana, (Diko and Tipple, 1992; 
Peil, 1995; Owusu, 2000). This means those who tell may be a selection of professionals, 
academics and administrators.  
 
 
1.5.3.1 Any Peculiar Factors responsible for long history of migration in Ghana?  
A brief discussion of some historical and socioeconomic factors would help to put 
international migration in Ghana in context. At the time of independence Ghana generally 
had far better supply of bureaucrats and professionals than most African countries. Ghana 
was among few third world countries that  promoted study abroad with the “Study Abroad 
Policy” giving opportunities for many families to take advantage of available scholarships  
in British and North American universities (Peil, 1995; Jeffrey, 2006). Even though 
economic meltdown in the late 1970’s and 1980’s, together  with rising cost of living and 
scarcity of scholarships, led to decline of migration for educational purposes, families 
worked hard to continue to educate their offspring abroad, capitalising on the networks that 
had been created earlier.   
 
Also, hardship at home and strong desire to have good standard of living offered incentives 
for some parents to find jobs abroad so as to have better education for their children (Peil, 
1995). Several newly independent countries in the region capitalized on the country's woes 
and hired Ghanaian professionals to assist them in their development. Emigration of 
teachers, doctors, administrators, and lawyers to Uganda, Botswana, Nigeria, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe characterized these initial emigrant flows (Bump, 2006). Ghana lost almost all its 
professionals during this period (Jeffrey, 2006). In fact it is claimed that there were more 
Ghanaian doctors and nurses practising in Western Europe and America in early 1990’s than 
in Ghana (Ibid).  Furthermore agriculture has not been an adequate source of employment 
for the people in many agricultural areas such as Eastern and Bono Ahafo Regions where 
this study is based. Most of the farms are too small to provide any adequate sources of 
income. Meanwhile the youths see their counterparts returning from migration with enough 
capital that enable them to do large-scale farming or small but successful businesses. In spite 
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of these economic problems international migration in Ghana and perhaps elsewhere has 
never been for the poor households (Peil, 1995; van Dalen et al, 2005).  
 
Another significant factor about migration in Ghana is family support migrants receive. 
According to Ghana Statistical Service, about 64% of migrants move for family 
considerations, while only 25% cites employment as the main reason for their movements 
(GLSS5 Report, 2008). However, it must be emphasised that even though family reasons 
may be cited as the initial push factor, newly arrived migrants are eventually assisted to find 
some job (Mazzucato et al, 2006). Even self-motivated individuals are often inspired and 
mostly financed by family members some of whom are also the main sources of information 
about the countries of destination (Kabki et al, 2004; De Haas, 2007).  And in the destination 
countries, settled migrants usually facilitate the passage of other family members and friends 
through provision of information and access to housing (Mazzucato, 2005; Mazzucato et al, 
2006).   
 
Perhaps the most peculiar factor about migration in Ghana is the social associations at 
various destination countries.  Ethnic associations and churches continue to offer significant 
help to new immigrants to America and Europe (Peil, 1995; Mazzucato, 2005; Mazzucato et 
al, 2006; Quartey 2006), thus enabling them to foster relationships that create avenues for 
more migration networks between Ghana and various destinations. In spite of these supports, 
wherever they travel to, most Ghanaians do not intend to stay permanently; they maintain 
contacts with relatives at home and save for their eventual return. Logan (cited in Peil 1995) 
finds that only about 4% of Ghanaian professionals in the USA acquire permanent residency 
or citizenship, even though they qualify to apply.  And even among those who have 
permanent residency or citizenship in Canada, an overwhelming majority (81%) intend to 
return to Ghana (Owusu, 1998). So why is this the case if there are supports from families 
and social associations to make migrants find their feet in destination countries? The 
functions of the social association in the destination countries could give a reason for this 
trend.  Apart from helping new immigrants to adjust to their new environment, Ghanaian 
ethnic and township associations as well as established branches of home churches try to 
bring migrants in touch with their social and cultural values through social activities such as 
child-naming ceremonies, funerals and christening.  In these activities members are 
encouraged to exhibit their sense of Ghanaian culture through dresses and traditional 
dancing.  Some even go to the extent of having traditional leaders who also have some link 
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with the proper ones at home of origin. With concern that their foreign-born children may 
have little or no appreciation of the Ghanaian cultural values, some informal traditional 
schools have been organised in Britain and North America, for example, to teach the youths 
some cultural values, the local language and traditional cuisine (Peil, 1995; Owusu, 2000). 
Through these social and cultural activities the immigrants are constantly reminded of their 
roots and the need to return to contribute something to the developments of their families 
left behind and communities.  The granting of dual citizenship by the Ghanaian government, 
a brainchild of these associations, further enhances social, economic and cultural ties with 
homes of origin, especially for those who want to take up citizenship status in the host 
country.  
 
But not all Ghanaian migrants have the strong desire to go back home to settle.  Mazzucato 
(2005) notices that a good number of Ghanaian migrants in Netherland who enter the 
country at the ages of 20’s and 30’s take up two hard jobs as cleaners or machine workers 
and work for over 10 years before they legalise their status. After that, a sizeable number of 
them are too old and weak to go home or their children have got so accustomed to the Dutch 
culture that they decide to stay on as opposed to going back as they had intended. They just 
maintain their contact with those left at home and support them financially.  
 
 
1.5.3.2 Inter- and intra-family transfers  
Irrespective of the level of integration at the place of destination, Ghanaian migrants do not 
overlook the importance of transfers, including remittances in the interactions with family 
members left behind at the place of origin.  The flows of remittances among Ghanaians are 
found to be similar to what has been found elsewhere in terms of its frequency, rationale and 
choice of beneficiaries. But what is different about transfer flows is that Ghanaians remit for 
a longer period of time (Bump, 2006).  It is therefore not surprising to see the rising 
importance of remittances in the Ghanaian economy over the years. Remittances are 
estimated by the Central Bank of Ghana to be around US$1.2 billion in 2006 contributing 
about 14.4% of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) from less than 1% in the 
1970’s. With lots of flows going through the informal channel, this figure could probably be 
half of the actual flows. 
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But the greatest impact of remittances and all transfers has been in the household. Ghanaian 
households whose head had migrated spend, on average, $78 per adult per annum more than 
households whose head had not migrated (Lichtfield and Waddington, 2004 cited in Shaw, 
2007).  Adams (2006) also finds that household receiving international remittances spend, 
on the average, 48.9% more than those with no remittances. And using the squared poverty 
gap measure he adds that international and internal remittances can reduce poverty in Ghana 
by 34.8%, and 4.1% respectively. 
 
The content of the remittances are mostly money, goods, or direct purchase of domestic 
goods also form important part. Sabates-Wheeler and others (cited in Knight and Gunatilaka, 
2009) cites a Ghanaian study showing that the majority of remittances were brought back by 
returnees in the form of goods. Even though the distinction between imported and goods 
brought home by migrants is not clear, Anaarfi et al (2003) also observed that 95% of the 
remittances are made up of goods, with vehicles, equipments and machinery being 
prominent. In fact others even claim that the housing industry in Ghana depends almost 
entirely on remittances (Kabki et al, 2004; Shaw, 2007). One of the things Ghanaians, 
especially the Akans, use for measuring wealth is landed property of which home ownership 
is key (Owusu, 2000).  Building a house at home confers status for both the migrant and his 
or her family; it is a sign of the migrant’s attachment to home family as well as success in 
going abroad.  House ownership allows obligations of hospitality to kin to be fulfilled (Diko 
and Tipple, 1992).    The wish to own a house is deeply ingrained in the Ghanaian psyche.  It 
is therefore not surprising that Mazzucato and Kabki (2007) find that housing, business and 
money for general living expenses form over 70% of remittances. The houses are usually 
built in vertical stages: foundation, walls, roofing, and finishing and furnishing spending 
approximately ₤2000-3000 each year on the project (Diko & Tipple; Tipple, 1992; Peil, 
1995).  Thus a migrant does not have to accumulate lots of money before starting the project. 
Migrants who fail to remit or do anything at home are referred to as “Burger useless2” 
(Kabki et al, 2004).   
 
Apart from building houses, establishing business while away or on return is another 
important thing to which remittances are put. Over 30% of the Ghanaian immigrants in 
                                                          
2 “Burger” is a generic term referring to those who have been abroad. It is said to have originated from 
Hamburger, the Germany city,  where most of the pioneer migrants from Ghana, especially those from the 
Ashante Region, settled.  
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Canada are found to have invested in the home economy in areas such as transportation, 
housing and small business (Owusu, 2000). Small businesses usually include restaurants, 
tailoring shops, communication centres, and agricultural businesses for cash crops such as 
cocoa in Ashanti region. And in recent years there have been a growing number of migrant-
financed commercial vehicles on the roads (Kabki, 2004).  These businesses are usually 
managed by family members at home.  According to Ghana TransNet research programme 
cited by Mazzucato (2005) about 33% of remittances are used for business, while  over 55 
percent of those surveyed in the study by Sussex Centre for Migration Research were self-
employed on return, and the vast majority of these individuals employ other Ghanaians in 
their business (Bump, 2006). 
 
Who are the traditional senders and receivers of income transfers? Table 1.2 presents 
characteristics of both internal and international income transfers by different types of 
household. The estimates are based on the latest round of the Ghana Living Standard Survey 
conducted by the GSS (GLSS 5).  Statistically, while there are significant differences in the 
mean amount sent by households the receipts show no significant differences. 
Table 1.2 Annual income transfers by type of household  
Type of household  
Mean Sent 
(Gh¢) 
Mean 
received 
(Gh¢) 
Percentage of 
total sent 
Percentage of 
total received 
Solitary 88 110 18.9 14.9 
Complete nuclear 72 74 15.5 10.0 
Extended 80 150 17.5 20.3 
Compound 46 205 9.9 27.7 
Compound extended 63 44 13.5 5.9 
Non-related 116 157 24.9 21.2 
National  78 105 100 100 
Computed from GLSS 5;   GH¢0.92 = US$1:00 in June 2006. 
 
On average, all household types receive more than they send, but the difference is much 
more pronounced for the more traditional types of households – extended, compound, 
compound, extended and non-related.  This could probably be due to the fact that these 
households are generally headed by older people, especially older women (Refer to Table 
1.1), and have bigger household size. They are also found to be generally poorer than the 
contemporary households (GLSS Report, 2008).  The largely non-significance differences in 
receipts across household types emphasizes the fact that transfers are sent to any type of 
household, be it traditional or not.  But in terms of wealth, it has been found that households 
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receiving most of the international remittances are the richest (Adams, 2006; Adams et al, 
2008); obviously it is the rich who usually participate in international migration.   
The type of household is not as important a factor as the relationship between senders and 
receivers of income transfers.  In a study conducted in Netherland, Mazzucato, finds that 
Ghanaian migrants sometimes sojourn with different types of relatives at two or more places 
in Ghana before they finally reach their destination in Netherland. He finds that over 70% of 
remittances for health and funeral purposes are sent to maternal relations with the rest going 
to non-kin (Mazzucato, 2009).  Relational closeness is an important determinant of 
remittance flows. Close relations (parents or spouse) often get the bulk of the remittances.  
In Table 1.3 annual transfer receipts and transfers made by household and non-household 
members are shown.  On average, and as expected close relations – parent, spouses and 
children – who are not members of the household, make more transfers than others. And as 
observed in other studies, even though average transfers made by females are lower than  
 
Table 1.3  Recipients of annual income transfers  
Relationship to 
household head  
Sent by non-
household members* 
Received by household 
members 
Received by non-
household members 
 
  Mean(Gh¢) Percent Male (%)  Female  (%) Male(%)  Female (%) 
Parent  113 28.3 4.3 10.5 17.8 30.5 
Spouse 324 11.8 9.1 1.4 0.7 5.6 
Child  111 28.1 32.7 39.0 35.6 20.8 
Brother/sister 69 11.4 22.0 20.5 18.7 13.7 
Other relative  64 16.0 19.2 20.2 21.6 24.4 
Non-relative  78 4.4 12.8 8.3 5.7 4.8 
National 126 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: GLSS 5 Report, Ghana Statistical Service, 2008; GH¢0.92 = US$1:00 in June 2006; * Own estimation 
from GLSS5 data 
   
those of males, the former provide about two-thirds of the annual total transfers (see 
Caldwell, 1961; Adams, 2008).  A high proportion of transfers received by households go to 
children, especially the female ones (39%) compared to male children (32.7%). Brothers and 
sisters are the second highest receivers.  Transfers to non-household members mostly go to 
male children (35.6%) and parents, especially female parents (30.5%). 
 
 
1.5.4  Conclusions and implications of Ghanaian family and migration systems 
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The family as a social unit in the Ghanaian society is becoming more and more of a nuclear 
type: father, mother and children. This suggests a shift in family obligation towards the 
nuclear family and less towards the extended family.  However, evidence from GLSS data 
and studies on Ghanaian migrants show that nuclearisation of the family living arrangement 
has not eroded the sense of obligation towards extended kin as it has been alluded by 
Caldwell (1966).  Interfamily monetary transfer is still a deeply ingrained support system in 
the Ghanaian culture. Irrespective of one’s location or wealth status there is a lot of transfers 
made across families and relations. Members do not have to be in the same household; they 
can be scattered but they are still bound together by the sense of obligation towards each 
other’s socio-economic welfare.  Thus even though, and expectedly, close relations make 
and receive most of the transfers everyone in the large kinship extended family is expected 
to participate in this support system no matter how small one’s contribution is (Nukunya, 
2003).  
 
Even if they are far away from home, migrant members are still part of big families and are 
expected to meet their family obligations of supporting the less fortunate ones. And this 
obligation is irrespective of whether or not the migrant was supported by the family to 
participate in migration.  Most family members at place of origin may not know much about 
the migrants’ socioeconomic conditions, for lots of migrants do not tell how they earn their 
income.  But the fact that the migrant is a relative is enough for them to put lots of pressure 
on him or her to fulfil their expectations (Arhinful, 2001). The first emigrant is assisted by 
the household with the expectation that he or she will help alleviate financial problems of 
the family and finance subsequent emigrant from the family (Kabki et al, 2004). These 
expectations may have little or no regards to place of destination given the fact that 
Ghanaians are found to be remitting from many countries. Also due to the fact that past 
migrants have been able to establish houses and businesses with their not-so-high education 
and apparently low-status jobs, either while still in migration or on return, a Ghanaian 
migrant may have no excuse to fail to meet expectations at home. Whoever fails cannot 
escape the ignominious label of “Burger Useless.”  
 
 
1.6 Definition of concepts  
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There are few key concepts that need to be clarified for us to understand the contexts in 
which they are used in this thesis. I present these definitions in Table 1.4 below.  
Table 1.4: Definition of concepts  
Concept Definition  
Compound 
household 
Household with two or more married couples plus or minus children and other 
relations  
Compound-
extended household 
Household with two or more couples, plus at least one of the parents of the 
spouses and plus or minus children and other relations  
Dedicated /private 
information  
Information Migrants share with those left behind  
Extended 
household   
 Household that comprises   at least one of the parents of the spouses is plus o 
minus children and other relations  
General/public 
information  
Information about the migrant that those left behind get from other sources 
in the community, eg. From friends. 
Household human 
capital  
Average years of education of all household members of age 15 and over.  
Household wealth   This is an index constructed from household assets 
Migrant 
performance  
Achievement of migrant adjusted by the number of years the migrant has 
been away from home of origin. The items included in this estimation are 
money for living expenses, housing and business investment.   
Nonrelated 
household 
Household in which at least one of the members does not have any kinship 
relation with the household head 
Observed 
remittance flow  
Absolute values of remittances migrants send home  
Remittance 
expectations  
An index of items families left behind expect to get from their migrant 
relations abroad within certain period of time  
The nuclear 
family 
A family  which is composed of father, mother and children (or adopted 
children) 
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1.7 Outline of the rest of the study  
The study is organised in eight chapters. As we have just seen Chapter One focuses on the 
motivational background as well as the significance of the study. This included some 
discussion on socio-cultural and migration dynamics peculiar to Ghana. This sets the scene 
for us to appreciate the nuances that will underline the findings in the results chapters. 
 
Chapter Two deals with theoretical and empirical literature on migration decision and 
possible impact of remittance expectations future household migration decisions. Syntheses 
of selected theories of migration and expectations, and how they interact are discussed in 
this chapter. In addition, the chapter includes a discussion of the literature and points out the 
limitations in understanding household migration and how these limitations inform the 
purpose of this study. The concluding part of this chapter focuses on description of 
processes and actors engaged in subjective remittance expectations and why it is important 
to study this behaviour in household migration decisions. In the discussion of actors and 
processes, I focus on the theoretical relationship between subjective remittance expectations 
and decision to perpetuate migration at household/family level. This is done with some 
discussions on how the three main factors – information flow, performance of migrant and 
kinship ties – through their effects on formation of remittance expectations can have 
differential effects on intention to support other members to migrate. I end the chapter with 
the three main hypotheses to be tested by the study. 
 
With the understanding of what the study is all about and socio-cultural settings we now 
move to the strategy used to gather information and analyze it. Two chapters are devoted to 
the methodology section of the study. In Chapter Three a detailed description is given from 
sampling strategy to the development of questionnaire and the implementation of the 
fieldwork, including the challenges that were encountered in these processes. Because the 
study involves primary data, a lot of concepts that are crucial in the study had to be 
operationalised. Chapter Four is devoted to operationalising concepts such as information 
flow, expectations migrant performance etc.  I end Chapter Four with detailed discussions 
on the type of  analytical techniques used and their limitations.  
 
In Chapter Five I present the descriptive statistics of the population and key variables being 
considered in the study. This will give a preliminary direction or pointers into rudimentary 
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understanding of the population and key variables. Chapter Six begins the two main results 
chapters with specific attention to one of the major determinants of subjective expectations: 
past events.  In this chapter I explain the determinants of observed flow of remittances 
measured as past performance of migrants at home of origin. The analysis pays special 
attention to the effect of type of kinship ties. The chapter builds on the theory of new 
economics of labour migration with the consideration that migration is a family strategy to 
improve on their livelihood conditions. Hence depending on the type of relationship, people 
left at home of origin should have varying effect on the observed flow of remittances or past 
performance of migrants. As remittance receipt may not be a random phenomenon among 
migrant household population, the issue of self selection is considered and corrected for 
possible selectivity.   
 
Information flow is the other important factor, investigation of which opens the windows for 
us to understand formation of remittance expectations of any kind.  Two types of 
information flows are distinguished: information from migrants (dedicated private 
information) and information about migrants from the general public in the community 
(general public information). A major assumption is that there is exchange of information 
between migrants and their relations left behind through observed flow of remittances. This 
assumption relies on the strength of kinship ties and shared responsibility towards members 
of the kinship network embedded in NELM and network theories of migration. Since 
information flow is crucial in the formation of expectation of any kind, I test this assumption 
in the second part of Chpater Six. Two main variables are of importance here: relationship 
and observed flow of remittances. That is, the chapter tries to see if, for example, 
information from migrants to relations left behind flows with observed flow of remittances. 
If this is the case then perhaps NELM is right to assume information flow between the 
migrant and those left behind. And hence perhaps there will not be any need for studying 
subjective remittance expectations as a major part of migration-support decisions. This 
chapter will help us to make that judgement.  
 
Having investigated the major factors of subjective remittance expectations –past 
performance and information flow in Chapters Six – we move to Chapter Seven to estimate 
effects various exogenous factors have on the formation of subjective remittance 
expectations.  The main variables of focus are kinship ties, performance of migrant 
(measured by observed flow of remittances adjusted to years of migration) and flow of 
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information. The chapter further discusses the differential effects of these variables under 
through interaction with information flow from the migrants. Again since there may be a 
possible selection as regards migrant families that have remittance expectations, the 
Heckman model is applied to correct for the effects of biases. Using generalised ordered 
logit, I estimate the effect subjective remittance expectations are likely to have on the 
intensity to perpetuate migration in the second part of Chapter Seven. I try to see how the 
effect of remittance expectations, kinship ties and past performance differ when interacted 
with private information from migrants.  
 
Chapter Eight concludes the whole study by presenting discussions of major findings. This 
will not just be a summary, but a summary with new insights and possible implications for 
programs and policies. The chapter also discusses areas for future research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 While some work supports the simple view of remittance expectations based on reference to 
past events such as performance of migrants in the community, a growing theoretical and 
empirical literature suggests that formation of expectations, and remittance expectations in 
particular, could be much more complex than this.  This chapter presents a review of some 
of these relevant works, and argues that subjective remittance expectations have only been 
equated to revealed or objective flow of remittances. In addition, the review of the literature, 
as we shall see shortly, demonstrates that due to their failure to investigate what goes into 
formation of subjective remittance expectations, existing theories and empirical works have 
not been able to fully explain why some households perpetuate migration while others do 
not. 
 
 
2.2 Expectations as part of family migration decision 
Expectations as part of international migration decision model was first introduced, at least 
theoretically, by Sjaastad (1962) who initiated the micro theory of neoclassical economics of 
migration based on individual’s cost-and-benefits estimations. Even though this was later 
modified by Todaro (1976; 1989), the central idea of migration being an individual’s cost-
benefit calculation of expected gains verses expected loss has always remained intact. Thus a 
potential migrant has pre-migration expectations of some gains that influence his/her 
decision to move. After cost and benefits analysis the individual moves to a destination 
where the expected utility or returns is greatest (Todaro, 1989). These pre-migration 
expectations are said to be a function of earnings in the destination country, discounted by 
certain probabilities such as deportation and employment (Massey et al, 1993).  Following 
this model, Yoesting and Bohlen (1968) found that in addition to these probabilities, some 
social and demographic characteristics act as exogenous factors influencing individual’s pre-
migration expectations. They found that gender, occupational, attainments and educational 
aspirations are among the major factors that are significant in high levels of individual pre-
migration expectations. Potential migrants with higher education, employment experience 
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and males were found to have positive relationship with high levels of pre-migration 
expectations. In more recent studies, it has been established that socioeconomic wellbeing 
(Bjarnason and Thorlindsson, 2006) and times of economic shock (Konseiga, 2005; 
Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007)  raise levels of expectations of potential migrants. Others have 
also found pre-migration expectations as the major driving force for realisation of high 
income among potential migrants (Gao and Smith, 2010). Attempts by Banerjee (1984) and 
Vishwanath (1991) with different models also confirmed the positive effects of these socio-
demographic determinants.  They however added that the expected benefits of potential 
migrants are not always high, but sometimes less than those that can be obtained in the 
destination areas.  Interestingly though, these expected benefits – whether higher or lower 
than what can actually be realised – still propel migration movements (Banerjee, 1984; 
Vishwanath, 1990; De Jong, 2000; McKenzie, 2007). Even though neoclassical 
microeconomic theory and its empirical works such as these ones clearly incorporate 
expectations into individual migration decisions, and give a way of quantifying expected 
returns to migration movements, they do not extend this expectation to remittances. And this 
is because, as noted by many others, this theory only views migration as an individual act in 
which case remittances have very limited role, if any, in migration decisions.  Or it views 
expectations as coming from only one side: the potential migrant. 
 
2.2.1 Migration and different types of expectations  
While expectations in their general form can be defined as the state of looking forward 
(from Latin, exspectatio, looking, waiting for), they come up in different forms in various 
disciplines, and fortunately or unfortunately remittance expectations would usually –not 
always – cut across all these disciplines. From social psychological perspectives, 
expectations are always in relative states, that is, an expectation for self relative to other, and 
may, for simplicity, be viewed as positive, negative, or undifferentiated.  They are relative 
conceptions of task ability, which each member of a group or family comes to hold for each 
other (Sobieszek, 1972). These relative states are conceptualised in two modes: expectations 
one holds for oneself (first order expectations) and those one believes others hold for him or 
her (second order expectations) (see Troyer et al, 2001; Webster & Whitmeyer, 2002; 
Webster et al, 2004).   In both cases, expectations are fundamental sources of actions for the 
individual in any social settings including the family, and are determinants as well as 
allocative principles of how people should undertake their social and economic actions both 
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now and in the future (Young, 2007). This distinction is important because it provides 
fundamental theoretical explanations of social interactions where expectations are 
paramount in shaping individual behaviour.   In migration, for example, this distinction is 
very useful in helping us to know that, in contrast to neoclassical economic view of 
migration, expectations in migration may go beyond the individual migrant.  This distinction 
is also important for us to know the kind of expectations families could have about their 
migrant relations residing abroad.  Apart from the migrant’s own expectations of what 
he/she hopes to achieve, which could be referred to as first-order expectations, there are also 
second-order expectations from those left at home of origin that the migrant would 
contribute something to meet the cost of household living and other livelihood expenses.   
Thus migrants would have to act in accordance to both first and second order expectations 
from relations.  But this could potentially prove to be an unstable dichotomous relationship 
between expectations of the migrant and those of relations left behind. In two experimental 
studies conducted by Troyer and Younts, it was established that the second-order 
expectations are quite significant, most of the times more powerful than the first-order 
expectations when the two orders of expectations are in conflicts of influencing actions, and 
particularly when there is no way to resolve the conflict (Troyer & Younts, 1997; Troyer et 
al, 2001). Thus according to this thinking, expectations (remittance expectations) of family 
members left behind would take a very important role in various migration decisions 
including remittance flow and decision to move even if these decisions may not sit well with 
the migrant member.  Unfortunately this cannot be tested in the study given that I do not 
have information that measures individual migrant’s own expectations.  And even though 
having information about migrant’s own  expectations could help this investigation, the 
thesis is based on the assumption that people left behind hardly take into consideration 
expectations of the migrant when forming their own expectations.  
 
The importance of expectations of other members of the family is given more emphasis in 
the new economics of labour migration (NELM) theory which incorporates expectations of 
those left behind in migration decision processes, unlike neoclassical economics of 
migration. The theory sees expected utility from migration as not only a function of 
individual potential migrant’s utility, but a whole household or family (Massey et al, 1993).   
In this theory migration becomes a tool that families use to manage the various risks that 
result from underdeveloped markets. By having a family member to work away from home, 
a household makes an investment that is expected to pay off in the form of migrant's 
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remittances. In the case of extended families the same principle holds: the guiding model for 
decision to migrate is expected utility maximisation of all families in the extended network. 
If the expected utility of migration of one family from the extended kinship cannot cancel 
out the disutility of other households, migration cannot take place in the kinship network 
(Kubursi, 2006).  These are theoretically logical and nice, but whether or not they work is 
still not clear.  On one hand the theory suggests that family members left behind would have 
remittance expectations in times of failures in the market or businesses such as agriculture. 
On the other, the theory suggests that the sense of relative deprivation of some income due 
to improvement in the incomes of other households in the community of origin could be the 
basis for which the household engages in migration by sending a member (Stark and Taylor, 
1989; Stark, 1991; Taylor 2006). In both cases households would expect the migrant 
member to help them to improve their standard of living relative to other households 
whenever they feel deprived either due to improvement in livelihood conditions of other 
households or some economic shocks. But what informs the level of these expected returns 
(remittances) subjectively has not been fully investigated. For example, are the levels of 
these subjective expectations gauged by the amount of economic shock or the extent to 
which the family feels deprived, or both? 
 
 
2.2.2 Theories of remittance and their implications for remittance expectations  
Insights from the theoretical explanations of why migrants remit do give some clue in 
determining expectations levels of those left behind amidst some limitations. Lucas and 
Stark (1985) are among the pioneers in developing theoretical model to explain remittance 
behaviour. They came up with three main explanations: one, migrants remit based on pure 
altruistic motive. That is the migrant just enjoys remitting to friends and relatives. In this 
case the utility of remitting for the sender is positively correlated with the receiver’s.  That is 
anytime those in need ask the migrant sends irrespective of who the recipient is – close or 
distant relation; poor or rich, etc. If this theory holds then the observed  or experience of 
remittance flows for those left behind would have little or no variation from the sender’s 
(migrant’s) point of view.  Variations in observed remittance flows could only be explained 
by the demanding behaviour of the recipients – those left behind. For example given the 
economic background of the receivers, pure altruistic motives would predict that the poor 
would receive more from the migrants than the rich, since they have much to do to improve 
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their relative deprivation.   The implication of this is that while some remittance expectations 
may be met by migrant members, others may not be fulfilled, because migrants are not 
bound to meet any expectations.  They would respond to expectations according to their 
wishes. Nevertheless, it would still be necessary for those left behind to form remittance 
expectations because they could still benefit from the altruistic behaviour of the migrant 
members. The problem is that, under this condition, it is difficult to tell whether or not the 
levels of observed flows are reflection of expected ones. 
 
If remittance flows are purely  explained by  migrant’s own self-interest,  then those left 
behind may not form any remittance expectations, because it would have no effect on flow 
of remittances.  According to the theory, migrants may have self-interest to send remittance 
to secure inheritance, or investment in housing or business, etc (Stark and Lucas, 1988).  In 
this case, the socioeconomic conditions of those left behind and their relationship with the 
migrant would not matter; variations in flows of remittances would solely be determined by 
the migrant’s desires, irrespective of formed expectations of those left behind. Consequently 
expected flow of remittances has no place in the observed flow. This therefore rules out any 
impact of subjective expectations of remittance flow as well as the very foundation of 
migration as a household livelihood strategy.  
 
In the third model, however, the migrant’s liberty to remit is limited because of the 
contractual agreement between him/her and the family members or relatives left at home. 
This could take the form of repayment for earlier investment in, for example, education, 
travel cost, etc (ibid). Variations in levels of observed remittance flow as well as remittance 
expectations would depend mostly on the bargaining power of the parties involved in the 
contractual agreement (i.e. between the migrant and those left behind). Thus unlike the pure 
altruistic motive which could favour the poor,  the bargaining or tempered altruistic model 
would rather predict otherwise as the richer families would try to wield their power over the 
migrant to expect more  and more from him/her as  they feel more and more deprived with 
reference to other households in the community of origin.  And unlike the first two theories, 
the tempered altruism, at least, offers some possible way by which people left behind could 
come up with various levels of subjective remittance expectations.  However, it takes us 
back to the original postulate of the NELM theory that the remittance expectations are most 
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likely to be informed by deprivation either due to economic shock or improvement in the 
livelihood conditions of other households in the community.  
 
When the need for improvements of livelihood conditions are due to relative performance of 
migrants in other families in the community of origin, then according to NELM theory and 
its theoretical explanation of remittance flow (as seen in tempered motive) this relative 
performance could also be the reference point by which other migrant households would 
gauge their expected returns from migration.  Remittance expectations then become more 
adaptive to what others have done or are doing in the community of origin. Hence, 
remittance expectations, like all adaptive expectations, become modelled as a distributed lag 
of past values of other performances (Palley, 1993).  For example expectations of value of 
future flow of remittance will be influenced or determined by past trends of remittance 
flows. Though this is biased towards the influence of few variables of the past (Muth, 1961; 
Curtin,  2003), it is epistemologically relevant, for we all learn through our past experiences, 
which invariably suggests that the world is relatively stable in many socioeconomic 
phenomena including remittance expectations. When only the past performance or historical 
data inform expectations, the confidence with which people hold their expectations are also 
the very past events of the variable in question (i.e remittance flow). In this case, significant 
events in the past about flow of remittances could be turning point exerting excessive 
influence on the formation of remittance expectation. This is because those turning points 
could be viewed as containing information about the general course of events of the variable 
(Schmalensee, 1976). Perhaps this could explain why relations left behind do not care to 
hear any other stories, because the past events of observed remittance flows do have 
excessive influence on remittance expectations.  From the foregoing discussion it is clear 
both empirical and theoretical literature only, at best, point to past flows in the community 
as major influencing factor that could possibly explain levels of remittance expectations. 
 
 
2.2.3 Information flow and formation of remittance expectations 
Formation of expectations of any kind cannot rely only on past events, because current 
information flow also shapes our expectations. In an attempt to improve upon adaptive 
approach to formation of expectations, Muth came up with the rational expectations theory 
with the emphasis on expectations based on rational outlook of economic agents, available 
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information and past experiences. The theory holds that the current expectations in the 
economy are similar, if not equivalent to what the future state of the economy will be. As 
Muth himself stated “I would like to suggest that expectations, since they are informed 
predictions of future events, are essentially the same as the predictions of the relevant 
economic theory” (Muth, 1961: 316). For example, people’s expectations of an increase in 
the value of equities in the stock market will lead to more purchase, and this in turn, will 
lead to increase in the prices of equities. In another example, production of food crops in the 
agricultural market will depend on how much farmers expect to produce. Thus rational 
expectations require that people take, into account, their knowledge of all relevant economic 
information, especially the macroeconomic ones, so that their actions are based on an 
expectation that is, in turn, realised as a result of their actions.  Following this logic the 
amount of remittance flow in any community or economy is based on the level of remittance 
expectations of individual families which are, in turn, as result of remittance flow behaviour in 
the community. Rational expectations would imply that the same factors that predict actual 
flow of remittances also predict individual remittance expectations (conditional on these 
factors being in the information set of the individual).  
 
Unfortunately, rational expectations remove the subjective aspect of expectations in 
decisions. That is individuals do not hold private information different from the objective 
ones in the formation of their levels of expectations. This approach therefore suggests that 
individual expectations are accurate; hence there is no need to incorporate them in any 
model. That is the subjective-probability distribution of economic actors is identical with the 
true objective probability distribution of the economic system (Herr, 2009).  When 
subjective expectations are assumed in this way we imply that observed choices are 
consistent with various combinations of expected preferences (Manski, 1993). On this basis, 
it can firstly be assumed that subjective probabilities of remittance flows of all household 
members left behind are identical with the observed probabilities of remittance flow. And 
this is exactly what has been the case with almost all the works on household migration.  
Remittance flows have been explained at best from publicly observable choices. When this 
happens we assume that what is sent is consistent with what the individual household 
members left behind expect.    But it has been established that this assumption does not hold 
(Manski, 2004). We therefore need to relax this assumption and incorporate subjective 
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expectations in behavioural models such as remittance transfers among family members 
(Manski, 2004; Walker, 2006; Braykov, 2010). 
 
A major criticism of rational expectations, however, is the assumption of access to 
information, be it private or public.  The theory presumes people can have access to ‘relevant’ 
information as well as have the capability to adjust their expectations in ever-changing structures 
of an economy (Demery and Duck, 2007). Even if the information is available it may be too 
costly for people to get it (Demertzis, 2008).  Migration theories such as NELM, network and 
cumulative causation, though they recognise the importance of information flow through 
interactions between migrant and those left behind, are also victims of this assumption. 
These migration theories hold that informal contract between the migrant and those left 
behind can be maintained, as it is assumed that this cooperation will enable the migrant to 
know the needs of those left behind, and also those left behind to know socioeconomic 
conditions of the migrant. As discussed earlier, it is believed that the strength of social 
norms and values in kinship networks is enough to ensure that people cooperate in 
information sharing (Massey et al, 1993). Social norms, as customary rules of behaviour 
coordinate our interactions with others, and hence once a particular way of doing things 
becomes established as a rule, it continues in force because people would prefer to conform 
to the rule given the expectation that others are going to conform (Young, 2007). The 
resultant collective social capital arising from interaction between the migrants and relatives 
left at home, and governed by trustworthiness, is therefore hypothesised to increase 
efficiency in the cooperation between the parties with resultant reduction in transaction cost.  
By lowering transaction cost, networks among the members in the entire big family also 
facilitate communication of information about others, and hence detection of non-
compliance (Fleischer, 2007; Brunie, 2009). 
 
Interfamily transfers of any nature needs monitoring; and information flow is crucial in this 
regard. Numerous empirical studies show that geographical proximity is important for 
households and migrants, for example, to monitor and enforce these implicit contracts 
(Stiglitz, 1991; Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007); and contribution from information economics 
attests that information flow cannot be assumed to be available to everyone (Ryan et al, 
2002). Nevertheless, believers of social capital from kinship network expect smooth 
interactions between the migrant and those left behind to enable smooth flow of information 
needed for formation of their remittance expectation levels. And this is achieved especially 
32 
 
if the family has a powerful head who can enforce the contract (Hagen-Zanker, 2008).  
According to Mazzucato (2009), in absence of geographical proximity “cultural proximity” 
ensures that all members in the kinship networks abide by the informal insurance contract. 
In absence of geographical proximity, Ghanaian migrants are found using trusted network 
members such as friends, because according to him (Mazzacuto), migrants can deal with a 
friend who misbehaves more than a relative who misbehaves. Those who are well 
established travel back and forth between Ghana and Netherland, for example, to monitor 
their transfers.  Another way Mazzucato (2009) finds is that through the gatherings of 
various social events like church service, funerals, marriage etc, migrants from same vicinity 
share information on what is happening back home, including progress of their projects 
(Ibid). All this, according to him, indicates that in absence of geographical proximity, social 
and cultural proximity help the migrants to monitor and enforce the informal insurance 
between them and their relatives and friends. But how about those left behind? How do they 
monitor the migrant member to make sure that he or she also complies with the informal 
contract? The best they can do is just to rely on phone calls and assume that whatever the 
migrant tells them about his/her socioeconomic conditions is correct.  
  
Even within the same family in the same location, it is reckoned that members can only have 
partial information (Chen, 2006). Also feedbacks from returning migrants, especially the 
most recent ones, have been found to be partial and have negative impact on potential 
migrants’ expectations of job opportunities and levels of income (McKenzie et al, 2007).  
Three major reasons have been identified in the literature to explain why informal contracts 
with the assumption of full information flow may not hold within the family. Firstly, 
because participants are not legally bound to fulfil their obligations in the contract (i.e. to 
share information), they are at the liberty to compare the short and long term utility of 
conformity and nonconformity (Morduch and Sharma, 2002). If, for example, current non-
cooperative behaviour has much bigger long-run utility or benefit for the migrant, he or she 
may choose not to cooperate, and vice versa if the utility is much better in the short-run. And 
as long been established in consumer economics (Nelson, 1970), monopolistic (migrant’s in 
this case) power over a good (remittance expectations) is greater if consumers (family 
members at home of origin) know only a few things about the nature of the good 
(remittances).  In other words individuals may choose to increase their bargaining power 
rather than participate in the shared interests (Doss, 2001). It is therefore not surprising that 
many migrants do not tell their relatives at home how they make their money or how they do 
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socially and economically (Diko and Tipple, 1992; Peil, 1995; Owusu, 2000; McKenzie et 
al, 2007). Keeping all or part of the information enhances their monopoly of the decision to 
send or not and how much to send. 
 
Secondly differences in resources and trajectories of wealth and social class between the 
migrant and those left behind can also result in non-cooperative behaviour in information 
sharing.  As social and economic situations of families change, so do their social class 
relationships. When families become wealthy, they tend to associate more with the wealthier 
people either in or outside the kinship network, leaving the relatively poor ones out (Doss, 
2001; Morduch and Sharma, 2002).  After some years in the destination country, migrants 
tend to become more integrated in the culture of the destination country (Mazzucato, 2005; 
2009). The effect of this integration may lead to non-cooperative behaviour with those at 
home as they become more and more distant not only geographically but also culturally. Of 
course, transnational theorists would dispel this assertion with empirical evidence that 
migrants do maintain strong transnational ties over sustained periods and that these ties can 
even become trans-generational (O’Neil, 2003); and as observed in Ghana, migrants tend to 
remit for much longer duration than average (Bump, 2006).  More research, however, is 
needed to augment the transnational claim, because most of the studies emanating from the 
transnational school are from cross sectional data, which hardly factor in effects of time in 
the analyses. Flow of remittances, for example, has been found in many studies to be 
inverted u-shaped when years of migration are considered (ibid).  And the explanation that is 
often given is that after some years, the migrant would have most of the close family 
members with him/her in the destination country. This is most likely to lower information 
sharing, because with close relations now residing with migrants, migrant would not feel any 
major need to share information with other relations who may be distant, especially if the 
latter did not play any major role in his/her original migration decision (Briant, 2005).  
 
The third possible reason for non-cooperation in information sharing is the cost of obtaining 
information. Network and kinship systems of migration theory postulates that there is almost 
negligible cost involved in information about migration as trust of friendship and family 
relationship ensures the information is free and available. Perhaps this might be the case 
with those very close to the migrant, especially the ones through whose help the migrant was 
able to make the journey.  In the extended kinship system, not all the members who expect 
something may have free access to information, especially about socioeconomic situation of 
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the migrant. This implies that obtaining information about socioeconomic conditions of the 
migrant could be difficult and costly for some people in the kinship network.   In a study on 
imperfect monitoring due to distance between migrants and household members left behind, 
Chen (2006) found that there are bound to be information asymmetries. And when this 
happens, people are likely to resort to guess-work. According to Demertzis and Hallet 
(2008), guess-work is not only the most natural behaviour when an economic agent faces 
uncertainty due to inadequate information flow about various economic parameters, but also 
the optimal choice of action to take. Members of the kinship network who may find it 
difficult to access information from the migrant will resort to alternative sources of 
‘relevant’ information that will help them to determine their levels of remittance 
expectations. These sources may be different not only in their origins but also their 
authenticity.  Or they may just resort to guess-work. Another consequence of these 
information asymmetries could be inability of the agents to form well-informed remittance 
expectations (Knight and Gunatilakaw, 2010).  Alternatively, as Van Dalen et al (2005) 
point out, in the absence of perfect information flow, past flows of remittances may be a 
major source of information that would “talk” to those who are left behind to either enhance 
or dampen the spirit of expectations of potential migrants. This then takes us back to earlier 
discussion that remittance expectations are being born out of adaptive behaviour much more 
than current flow of information.   Van Dalen et al (2005) assertion also reemphasise the 
claim that remittance and information flow between the migrant and those left behind are 
synonymous. 
 
 
2.2.4 Relational composition of remittance expectations 
From the above discussion it is apparent that empirical works have only equated remittance 
expectations to observed remittance flow without taking into consideration the effect of 
information flows. That is people form expectations with reference to past events. But this is 
looking at expectations, mainly from economic considerations.  Migration as a family 
strategy, and especially remittance expectations, may go beyond economic considerations.  
Empirical studies on migration and remittances have established the importance of kinship 
ties in remittance flows.  It is therefore worthwhile to discuss how kinship network, 
especially from sociological and social psychology literature, may help us to have a better 
grasp of remittance expectations. 
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The family has always been the source of transmission of social values and norms.  Families 
play important role in determining intergenerational support for one another. It is said to be 
stronger than filial norm found among siblings. De Vries et al (2009) find a strong 
transmission of values across generations as children whose parents have strong kinship 
norms also exhibit stronger kinship values. As it were, obedience is the channel through 
which this transmission operates. The basic explanation for this generational transmission of 
values and norms can perhaps be found in child development psychology. Authors from 
child development studies have argued that observational learning constitutes a powerful 
way in which behaviour and attitudes are transmitted from parents to children (Bandura, 
1982; Amato, 1996). It results from the often unconscious imitation of behaviours and roles 
during the early phases of childhood (Tillmann, 2004).  In a highly theoretical model, 
Bramoulle and Kranton (2007) show that efficient networks can always keep people together 
irrespective of the cost involved in the attempt to keep it.  In these conditions expectations of 
various behaviours are products of collective social capital, born out of mutual trust, 
voluntary cooperation, norms of reciprocity and network (Brunie, 2009). It creates a sense of 
belongingness. 
 
It is from this social psychological sense of belongingness that the NELM theory also draws 
its assumption of a cohesive traditional family, the members of which share common goals, 
and are likely to trust, and remain loyal to each other in sharing information (Sana, 2003).   
The value-expectancy framework championed by De Jong (2000), perhaps raises the 
strongest voice of this cohesiveness in family expectations from migration. According to this 
framework, migration intentions are based on an underlying desire to improve or maintain 
the individual’s or family’s quality of life. Migration decisions are seen as involving specific 
values and goals of the kinship network, and the expectation that migration will result in the 
attainment of these goals including information sharing between migrants and those left 
behind (Ibid). The strength of family ties between migrants and those left behind is an 
important part of the altruism model of remittance flows (Van Wey, 2004) since it dwells on 
emotional attachments to generate commitment to care for relatives and family members left 
behind. Obviously this goes beyond any economic rationality. Apart from being relational, 
this aspect of remittance expectations could also to be moral, given that it also depends on 
the moral obligation members have towards each other in the family.  
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But this strong sense of cohesiveness does not necessarily mean all members in the family or 
the kinship network have the same expectations of obligation towards one another.  
Expectations of kinship obligations have been found to differ according to the type of 
relationship: children, parents and the general family (De Vries et al, 2009). In fact it has 
even been argued that social norms do not represent objective social values but embodiment 
spill-over from individuals’ conscious pursuit of their own interests (Crudeli, 2006). Even in 
nuclear families, empirical literature from the bargaining school has found that family 
decisions rest mainly on the person who wields the bargaining power in the household 
(Cigno, 1991; Laitner, 1997).  
 
From the foregoing discussion it could be deduced that even though social norms and values 
keep members of kinship network together, expectations of obligations towards one another 
could differ. But how would they differ?  In large stable or static networks peripherals are 
most likely to be cut off from the core as components cannot be maintained for a long time 
in a large network, suggesting that time variance can have a negative effect on the strength 
of the bond connecting kinship network. This echoes one of the reasons for information 
asymmetries discussed above: information may not be available to extended kin as the closer 
ones join the migrant abroad (Doss, 2001; Morduch and Sharma, 2002).  So who among the 
kinship network would be considered as being in the peripheral?  In Egypt and Morocco, for 
example, the likelihood of a household head receiving remittance is highest if the migrant is 
a spouse or brother (van Dalen et al, 2005). Thus if the observed flow of remittances is an 
indication of who is important in large extended kinship network one would perhaps agree 
with  the argument by De Vries and Kranton that extended family members are more likely 
to be considered as peripherals. And if observed flows of remittances are a true reflection of 
expected flow then one would again concur that expectations from extended members of the 
family may not be as high as those from the closer ones.  
 
 But other empirical literature in migration has found that extended family members play 
very important roles not only in migration decision, but also receipts of remittances 
(Fleischer, 2007). In high emigration countries such as Mexico, expectations of support from 
extended family members have been found to be a major influence in the choice of 
destination state in USA. New migrants rely on support from their relatives and friends at 
the place of destination for accommodation and linkages with employment opportunities at 
least for some time till they find their own feet (Glick, 1999). While in India, remittances 
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play roles not only as the medium through which the kinship networks are kept but also as 
poverty reduction mechanism among all the families, including the extended ones, spread 
around in distant places of the network (De Haan, 1997).  In Ghana over 70% of the shock 
remittance, which is made up of contributions for funeral and health care,  goes to extended 
relatives (Mazzucato, 2009). All these findings show that extended members of the kinship 
network are very important and may perhaps not be at the periphery of migration processes 
including remittance expectations.  
 
 It could be that the observed differences in flow of remittances are not due to 
socioeconomic and demographic factors only but also due to differences in subjective 
remittance expectations.  So far the assumption has been that the observed differences in 
remittance receipts by various relations left behind are true reflections of the expected 
receipts. Thus as discussed above, migration literature has also followed the same untenable 
assumption made by the rational expectation theories in economics that revealed data are 
consistent with individual subjective choices. As Walker (2006) rightly points out, this has 
been the case over many years. 
 
 
 
2.3 Expectations and perpetuation of migration 
 
2.3.1 Insights from studies using observed data 
Because they are always assumed, expectations have rarely been used as an exogenous 
factor in explaining both initiation and perpetuation of migration, especially in studies that 
use observed data. Most studies on migration decisions from revealed data show that 
demographic and socioeconomic factors that initiate migration also have some influence on 
perpetuation (See Hatton and Williamson, 2004 for review). From these studies 
demographic characteristics such as gender, age and marital status, albeit some conflicting 
results, have been identified as important factors influencing family migration decisions.  In 
some male dominated societies, where social norms expect women to be in marital unions 
some family pressure has prevented single women migration, reserving migration mostly for 
men (Thadani & Todaro, 1984; Garip, 2006). But in the Philippines, division of labour has 
led to rural–urban migration of women especially to Manila as household’s strategy to get 
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short term remittances (Lauby & Stark, 198).   Daughters are increasingly playing important 
roles, providing a secondary source of support for aged parents; hence human capital 
investment in daughters are increasing even in traditionally patrilineal society of Matlab 
(Osaki, 1999; Kuhn, 2006).  In terms of age structure, households with few adults are found 
to be less likely to invest in migration as they do not have candidates for migration (Boyd, 
1989). However, Massey et al (1987) found that among the Mexican communities, men with 
young children are more likely than recently married men to invest in migration because of 
increased economic needs of the family.  Klein adds that families involved in migration are 
younger than those who do not, but migration starts, not at the beginning of the couple’s 
marriage life as Massey found, but a bit later when first child starts school (Klein, 2005). In 
parts of Africa, preliminary results from an ongoing study in Johannesburg shows that 
though greater percentage (45%) of migrants are single men, a growing size of them (30%) 
are married (Landau, 2006).  Socioeconomic factors from revealed data also show that 
families that engage in migration are relatively wealthy (Adam, 2006) with higher human 
capital than the average in the community of origin (Peil, 1996, Adam, 2006; Jeffery, 2006).  
 
However, the most influential factors from studies using observed data in perpetuating 
migration are network and social capital effects. Networks are enforced by the fact that 
relatives give information in languages that are better understood by the receivers than what 
the formal mass media or official statistics on the labour market in the destination countries 
(Fawcett, 1989; Mazzucato, 2005; Mazzucato et al, 2006; Quartey, 2006; Doevenspeck, 
2008).   Information about potential destinations is not only important for further migration, 
but new ideas from pioneer migrants and their exposure to new lifestyle also increase 
aspiration for those left behind to migrate (De Haas, 2010).  This is said to happen more 
frequently among groups with strong bonding and strong bridging capital because they are 
more likely to benefit from the spread of migration information (Ibid).  In a theoretical 
construct, Epstein (2008) adds that it is not a necessity that everyone in the group must have 
access to full information in order for migration to become self-perpetuating. According to 
him, people with little information would migrate to where pioneer migrants have gone. 
Migration clustering in some destinations fails because of absence of these “tiny initial 
leads” that facilitate migration (De Haas, 2010).   
 
But it is qualitative studies such as the one of Fleischer (2007) that really bring out the 
dynamics of how transnational families make decisions to perpetuate migration. Collecting 
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information from Cameroonian migrants in Germany and their families back home, and 
using in-depth interviews, informal conversations, focus groups and participant 
observations, she elucidated some underlying structure of rules and beliefs in which family 
migration decision-making process is embedded. She found that decision to support another 
member of the family to migrate involves everybody in the household. The major decision-
makers are the persons who are investing in the migration project. Parents and/or older 
siblings exert the main influence on the child to migrate, but cousins, uncles, aunts who are 
strongly connected to the family are also involved. Sources of financial support for potential 
migrant come from household income, borrowing from relatives or community members, 
contribution from relatives, mostly those residing in the potential destination country, and 
selling of some property. The views of the potential migrants are often times ignored; they 
are supposed to follow the demands or the wishes of the parents or other relatives who want 
them to go with expectation of acquiring good education, well-paid jobs financial support, 
contacts for further migration, remittance for school fees, investments in business (Ibid).  
 
Network and social capital factors are important for the perpetuation of migration as they 
give us some insights into importance of information through network channels in 
facilitating perpetuation of migration.  But what makes the networks very effective in 
perpetuating migration is the flow of remittances.  Negative effects of nonremittance on 
perpetuation of migration have been observed by Stark (1999) who finds that one of the 
motives of migrants sending remittances is for them to make sure that others do not follow 
them abroad.  In a way this should be expected if relative deprivation or an economic shock 
is a major factor in family migration decision. If those left behind are satisfied with the flow 
of remittances then there is no further need for the household to send more members.  In that 
case remittance would not have any positive effects on intention to perpetuate migration 
since the primary objective of improving the lives of those left behind is achieved. Also if 
previous migrants have not performed well at home of origin then sending another member 
maybe risky as past experience of nonremittance flow could lead to some uncertainties. But 
in a latter study, Stark and Wang (2002) find that the pioneer migrants, who are usually very 
skilled or entrepreneurs, do pay for less skilled migrants to join them as this does not 
threaten their comparative advantage in the host country job market.   
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2.3.2 Insights from studies using stated preference data  
Analysis of observed data alone cannot give us adequate explanation as to why some 
networks fail to perpetuate migration even with information flow. According to De Haas 
(2010) this in gap is partly due to the fact that most of the studies are based on observed that 
which tend to sample only on successful migration systems and leave out the failed ones. 
But perhaps more fundamental is the fact the subjective expectations of those left behind, 
who also form important part of the decision to either perpetuate migration or not, have been 
left out in these analyses. As Manski (2004) rightly concurs “econometric analysis of 
decision making with partial information cannot prosper on choice data alone.” A 
combination of choice data with other data such as elicited subjective expectation should 
mitigate the credibility problem and improve our ability to predict behaviour (Ibid).  
 
Attempts have been made to use stated preference data in the form of intentions/beliefs to 
study migration decisions by individuals and families (Adam, 1993; De Jong, 2000).  The 
theoretical justification often employed is that of the theory of reasoned action and planned 
behaviour widely used in social psychology. The theory posits that most volitional 
behaviour in society are determined and best predicted by intentions of that particular act 
and the intentions are themselves a function of people’s attitude towards the behaviour or act 
and their subjective norms surrounding the performance of the act (Ajzen and Fishbein, 
1980). Thus according to this theory, a family’s or individual migration behaviour can best 
be predicted by intention to help one of its members to emigrate. The basic assumption is 
that people will be free to carry out their intentions, which is a huge call given various 
organisational and other constraints in movements, especially across borders.  Following 
internal migrants, De Jong (2000), for instance, finds that migration is a two-step process: 
the first is the intention to migrate and the second the actual migration behaviour (De Jong, 
2000).  Some doubts have been raised as to whether or not this could be the case also for 
international migration given that there are many more uncertainties and constraints that are 
likely to prevent intentions to be realised (van Dalen et la, 2005). Avato (2008), for example, 
holds that more and better information flow is needed for migration intentions to better 
predict migration behaviour because intentions, under these conditions, are formed with 
rational expectations than the use of inadequate information flow. As discussed earlier there 
are bound to be information asymmetries between migrants and those left behind and hence 
incorporation of migration intentions or decisions are important because people would still 
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have to make decision to move or not based on the limited information (Epstein, 2008; De 
Haas, 2010).  
 
The use of migration intentions as ex ante stated preferences in studying decision to move 
has increasingly become popular in studies of determinants of international migration  
decisions  (Drinkwater, 2003; van Dalen et al, 2005;  Wentzel et al, 2006;  De Jong and 
Steinmetz, 2006;  van Dalen and Henkens, 2008; Avato, 2008; Thissen et al, 2010).  
Interestingly demographic and socioeconomic factors that are commonly identified as 
determinants of migration in revealed data are also found in these studies to be relevant in 
migration intentions. The young, males, household size and the more educated are found to 
be more likely to harbour migration intentions (van Dalen et al, 2005; Fourage and Ester, 
2008).  But the effect of education has been found to be ambiguous (van Dalen et al, 2005; 
Thissen et al , 2010). Thissen et al, for example, find that level of education becomes a 
significant factor of migration intentions only when it is interacted with networks, while van 
Delan et al (2005) only find it is significant only among Ghanaians and Egyptians in a four 
nation study that also includes Senegal and Morocco. In both of these studies the strength of 
migration networks is said to overshadow any effect of educational background.  The 
strength of migration networks, especially at the destination in influencing intentions has 
also been stressed by Wentzel et al (2006), De Jong and Steinmetz (2006), and Fourage and 
Ester (2008) who find that networks override other demographic and social factors such as 
education, gender, age and marital status.  As discussed in the preceding section, this 
perhaps is not surprising because when social networks of relations and friends are well 
developed the utility of households will be larger as positive externalities ensure reduction in 
the cost of movement as well as stay, especially in the first few months or years in the 
destination country. Past movement also lowers the cost of migration including 
psychological cost due to experience and access to better information (Liebig and Souza-
Poza, 2004).  However, Thissen et al (2010) empirically argue that the importance of 
migration networks, in terms of history of migration is relative to how rooted people are to 
their area of origin. They find that in villages where most people have strong bond with their 
traditions, few past migration events do not make any difference in their intentions to 
emigrate.  Nevertheless it is important to stress that migration intentions are strong 
determinants of decision to actually migrate and hence a good indicator of perpetuation of 
individual and household migration strategies (De Jong, 2000; Drinkwater, 2003; Liebig and 
Souza-Poza, 2004; Zohry, 2005).  
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De Jong (1983) is among the pioneers to have incorporated subjective expectations into 
studies on intentions to move. He used likert scale of “very important,” “fairly important” 
and “not important” to score various values attached to migration. Controlling for other 
factors such as migration network as given by number of family members or friends in the 
destination country, individual demographic, human capital characteristics and kinship, he 
found that subjective expectations of where goals of the individual migrant can be achieved 
are quite significant determinants of international migration.    More recently, Van Dalen et 
al (2005) used what-do-you-expect questions to show the effect of pre-migration optimism 
on migration intention. They found that expectations (or optimism/pessimism) drive 
individual (from Ghana, Egypt, Morocco and Senegal) intentions to migrate to various 
destination countries. In Egypt they find that generally individuals that expect to migrate are 
1.4 times more likely to do so if they are from remittance-receiving households than if they 
are from nonreceiving households.  The limitation in the use of likert scale or what-do-you-
expect question to measure subjective expectations has been observed by Manski (2004), 
McKenzie et al (2007) and Delavade and Kohler (2009) and Delavande et al (2010).  All 
these studies attest to the fact that this approach lacks specificity as regards true moments of 
measurement. That is one is not sure whether respondents are stating mean, minimum or not. 
Perhaps the most robust of these attempts is the one of McKenzie et al (2007). By 
employing elicited subjective probabilistic expectations, they found that negative feedbacks 
from migrants have negative effects on pre-migration expectations of potential migrants, but 
not on their intentions to migrate. What is common from the findings of these studies is that 
subjective expectations have important role or implications for migration movements.   
 
What has not been addressed adequately in the literature on expectations and migration 
intentions, however, is the subjective remittance expectations of those left behind.  Thus 
effects of expectations on migration decisions have been confined to the first-order – 
expectations migrants hold for themselves, following the neoclassical microeconomic model 
of migration studies. As being noted recently part of this problem has to do with 
unavailability of data on subjective expectations, especially in Africa (Delavande et al, 
2010). The first large scale expectation data in sub-Saharan Africa is notably the one 
collected in 2006 Malawi Diffusion and Ideational Change Project which involved over 
3000 individuals in rural Malawi. But even this was not on migration but on other life events 
such as health, mortality and economic outcomes (see Delavande and Kohler, 2009).  
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2.4 Conclusions from the literature review  
The theory of new economics labour of household migration has made us to understand that 
migration can be a whole household decision or strategy to meet economic shocks as well as 
improve its relative deprivation in the community. It therefore follows that when a family 
member migrates he/she is expected to contribute meaningfully in helping the family to 
meet the economic shocks as well as dealing with its relative deprivation (Rosenzweiger, 
1989; Stark et al, 2009).   Proper functioning of this implicit contract largely depends on 
remittance behaviour of the migrants as well as expectations from those left behind. The 
review above clearly shows that remittance expectations could take different forms: 
adaptive, rational/cognitive, moral or relational, first or second order expectations. The 
differences in these forms are not clear-cut, leading to conceptual as well methodological 
challenges.  
 
 Due to lack of data and conceptual problems, remittance expectations have only been 
assumed or equated to observed flow of remittances in most cases. This assumption thrived 
on another assumption of flow of information necessary for monitoring the implicit contract 
between the migrant and relations left behind. But due to factors such as cost of information 
and noncooperative behaviour resulting from maximisation migrant’s own utility and change 
in social class, adequate information flow cannot be assumed. Even the trust of kinship ties 
is not enough to ensure that information flow between the migrant and those left behind is 
adequate. And even if information is available it is most likely to differ according to the 
level of relationship between the migrant and those left behind, and hence expectations may 
also differ likewise.  All this shows that we still have a lot to explain how those left behind 
form their subjective remittance expectations. This thesis attempts to deepen understanding 
of formation of remittance expectations from subjective but a more cognitive point of view. 
That is remittance expectations are basically individual’s calculations based on individuals’ 
own consideration of relational bonds and past events.  In doing this I do not pretend to have 
adequately dealt with the complexity in expectations as discussed above, but at least thrown 
some lights on them.  
 
If perpetuation of migration is a response to relative deprivation or economic, which could 
be expressed in subjective remittance expectations, then we still have a lot to explain as 
regards decision to perpetuate migration, especially at the household or family level.   This 
is because studies in migration decisions both for initiation and perpetuation have mainly 
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focused on demographic, socioeconomic and network factors. The few studies that have 
incorporated subjective expectations in migration decisions have two limitations: One, they 
only consider the subjective expectations of the individual potential migrants even though 
both theoretical and empirical works over the years have shown that migration, especially 
international migration from developing countries can involve a whole household or family.  
The second limitation emerging from the few works that incorporate expectations is that 
almost all of them pay very little attention to the exogenous factors determining subjective 
expectation levels; thus assuming that expectations have the same effect on future migration 
behaviour irrespective of how they are formed. And the third shortcoming is the equation of 
remittance expectations to observed flow of remittances. 
 
 
2.5 Theoretical Framework: Actors and processes of remittance 
expectations 
  
In order to answer the questions emanating from the above discussion we first have to 
disentangle the main actors and accompanying processes that emerge from the above 
discussion. From the foregoing discussion it is clear that major actors in formation of 
remittance expectations are the individual migrants, the family including the extended 
members left behind and the community of origin. And the processes are information flow, 
observed flow of remittances or migrant performance at home of origin and kinship ties. The 
description of these actors and the processes that link them is shown with the aid of Figure 
2.1.  
 
 Families left behind form levels of subjective remittance expectations given the strength of 
kinship ties they have with the migrant member. That is given the type of relationship they 
have with the migrant they would expect the migrant to do certain things for them. But 
remittance expectations may not just be based on relational or kinship ties.   Other factors 
may affect the process of formation of remittance expectations. One of these factors is the 
information those left behind get from the migrant or hear about the migrants. The amount 
of relevant information about the socioeconomic conditions of the migrant and other 
information available to them may either increase or decrease their expectation levels.   This 
information would usually come from two major sources: dedicated private information 
which comprises information individual migrants choose to tell their relations back home; 
and the general public information flow being what relations hear about migrant members 
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from the community of origin.  Dedicated private information could comprise migrant’s 
working status, type of job, salary, marital status, household size, among others, while the 
public information is usually about what people see or hear about migrants’ achievements in 
the community of origin. The private information could range from little or no information 
to relatively full information or knowledge about the socioeconomic conditions of the 
migrant. 
 
Fig 2.1 Actors and processes of remittance expectations and implications for further 
migration  
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If people left behind do not have much information about the socioeconomic conditions of 
their migrant relations abroad, then private information may not be a significant factor in the 
formation of subjective remittance expectation as people may just disregard it and rather put 
more emphasis on what they hear from or see in the community of origin to form their 
expectations.  Public/general information flow is most likely to have positive effect on 
formation of remittance expectations, if those left behind only hear of achievements of 
migrants in the community of origin. On the other hand, if the talk in the community about 
migrants’ achievement is not favourable, the reverse effect on remittance expectation is also 
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possible, even though that does not seem to be the norm, as observed by Tsikata (2006) in 
the opening statement.  But this public information may have negligible effect on subjective 
remittance expectations for those whose private/dedicated information flow is high. This is 
because family members left behind may value information they get directly from their 
migrant relations more than what they hear from other sources. However, if there is a 
general disbelief in what migrants tell relations then those left behind would not really “care 
to hear the stories.”   
 
Formation of subjective remittance expectations could be heavily adaptive to past event, 
expressed in the form of performance of former pioneer migrants or other current migrants 
in the place of origin, if information flow from the migrant to those left behind is limited. As 
Tsikata (2006) puts it, relationships have turned sour because migrant members have not 
been able to “remit them as Johnny has been doing for his parents.”  People left behind 
would just use what they see other migrants doing in the community as the yardstick to 
measure expectations which their migrant relations have to meet. Or they would just assume 
that it is part of the social responsibilities that migrant relations have to perform as kins, so 
that parent would not “denounce” their sons and daughter for not remitting.   
 
As Figure 2.2 (a simplified version of part of Figure 2.1) demonstrates, the effects of these 
two processes – performance of migrants in the community and kinship ties – on formation 
of remittance expectations would also depend on the type of information flow to the migrant 
households left behind.  Under conditions of high private information flow, for example, 
remittance expectations could be tempered with realism as people left behind would have 
more realistic knowledge of the struggles and difficult conditions under which migrants 
make a living in the destination country.  
 
Figure. 2.2 The role of information flow in remittance expectations  
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On the other hand if the family left behind relies on public information from the community, 
the effects of kinship ties and migrant performance may be huge as discussed earlier. 
Information flow is therefore a key factor that acts as a check on effect of past migrant 
performance and kinship ties on remittance expectations. But again this would hugely 
depend on whether or not those left behind “care to hear the stories” from their migrant 
relations residing abroad.  
 
It is also important to stress that there is likely to be some interactions in these processes.  
For example, observed flow of remittance (or performance) could come with information 
flow since migrant may have to communicate as they send their remittances. In the same 
way if past performance of migrants has not been good for some of the relations left behind, 
the frustrations and disappointments – as expressed in Tsikata’s (2006) observation - may 
have a negative effect on remittance expectations.   But perhaps the most significant 
interaction would be between private information flow and kinship ties as the levels of the 
former are likely to differ according to the type of relationship people left behind have with 
the migrant.  At low levels of private information, expectation levels of the extended 
relatives may be slightly higher than those of the immediate relatives, mainly because, 
expectations of the latter would be more affected negatively by the disappointment of not 
getting adequate information from their migrant member.  
 
All the scenarios coming from various interactions and processes of formation of remittance 
expectations may have different implications for future decisions for those left behind to 
support migration of other members in the family.   Remittance flow does play a crucial role 
of maintaining kinship ties. Families are linked to the areas of destination through migrant 
members or relations. And what links the system is the exchange of resources in the forms 
of information, money, social assistance and emotional supports; the most significant of 
these is the remittance (Root & Jong, 1991).  Family impact on migration is very enduring.  
Even if rules and policies change, the obligation towards one’s family members will not 
change. Family members are more trusted source of information regarding destination 
countries than any migration agency or the media can give. This is reinforced by the fact that 
relatives give information in languages that are better understood by the receivers than what 
the formal mass media or any migration agency can give. Ultimately there is a transnational 
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migrant network which, in a way, translates into a social capital upon which people – both 
the migrant and those left behind – rely to gain access to resources and also to enable future 
migration of members (Massey et al, 1999).  This shows that in addition to financial and 
human capital, social capital is also an important factor in people’s motivation to migrate 
(De Haas, 2010).  It is therefore not surprising to find that remittance expectations, which 
are a by-product of this social capital of migration, are at the centre of both initiation and 
perpetuation of migration at both community and household levels (Massey et al, 1993).  
The effects of subjective remittance expectations on family decision to perpetuate migration 
would also depend on the conditions under which remittance expectations are formed.  For 
example, high expectations that are likely to come with inadequate private information flow, 
as discussed earlier, may also lead to a high desire of those left behind to support migration 
of other members.   This is because their expectations would mostly be based on what they 
see or hear in the community. Expectations in such conditions would continue to rise and 
this would make the households continue to support other members to migrate so as to reap 
more from migration. But under high dedicated private information flow, expectations might 
be checked and hence the desire to continue to support other members to migrate may also 
be checked unless they “do not care to hear” whatever the migrants tell them. In the above 
case families would continue to support members to migrate irrespective of the fear of the 
unknown following the belief that the potential migrant “may be the fortunate one to scale 
the barb fences successfully to the promise land where the pastures are green.” Thus in order 
for us to fully understand why families and individuals would continue to support relatives 
to migrate in spite of the possible dangers, we need to first know what is behind the 
expectations that propel their decisions to support migration in the family.  
 
2.6 Hypotheses  
The main hypotheses to be tested in this study are the following: 
1. Receipts of remittance do not necessarily lead to increased flow of information 
between the migrant and those left behind. The literature has it that remittance flow 
comes with information (Van Dalen et al, 2005) that could help those left behind to 
form some ‘rational’ expectations. But I don’t think this is necessarily the case.  
2. Remittance expectations, though based on cognitive calculations, are influenced 
much more by relational and past events than information flow, especially dedicated 
information from migrants.  
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3. The desire or intention to perpetuate migration at the household level could be 
influenced by remittance expectations.  But when these expectations are more 
informed by dedicated private information flow from migrant, the effect on desire to 
perpetuate migration is very much reduced or even insignificant.  
 
  
50 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
 METHODOLOGY:  DESCRIPTION OF FIELDWORK  
3.1 Introduction  
The discussion on the background of the study in Chapter One showed that inter- and intra-
family transfers, which mostly involve money, are quite embedded in the Ghanaian 
societies, despite the increasing trend of nuclearisation of the family.    And in Chapter Two 
we saw that international migration and the remittance expectations that go with it, in a way, 
is a by-product of this socioeconomic support system which is so ingrained in many African 
societies. To determine subjective remittance expectations of migrant families left behind 
and how this affects future family migration intentions, the need for appropriate 
methodology cannot be overemphasized. As alluded to in the literature review, there is not 
much data on expectations, including remittance expectations, so I had to use primary data.  
Simple though this might seem, generating remittance expectations data from such 
population presents some methodological challenges. Apart from the general sampling 
problems around migration studies, defining concepts such as family, remittance 
expectations, etc in such populations where these terms are loosely used present a challenge 
to any researcher. In this Chapter, I describe the concepts and processes used to gather data 
as well as the challenges associated with the processes.  
 
3.2 Choice of study area  
International migration is relatively common in many parts of Ghana (United Nations, 2004; 
De Haas, 2007; Corrado et al, 2008). Obviously, there are various national and regional 
factors such levels of economic development, political atmosphere, cultural change and 
others as described in previous chapter that directly or indirectly affect migration processes 
in the country. But to measure remittance expectations and their effects on perpetuation of 
migration we shall study a population in which the culture of international migration has 
become part and parcel of ordinary household life. These are areas that are quite prominent 
in sending its people abroad. These areas include Brong Ahafo, Ashanti, Eastern and Greater 
Accra regions of the country (De Haas, 2007).  After seeking expert advice from  Professor 
Awosabo-Asare, the head of Population Studies Programme at the university of Cape Coast, 
Ghana and  Dr. Susie Ubomba-Jaswa, formerly  the head of population and epidemiology 
division of Statistics South Africa, who also hails from Ghana, Brong Ahafo Region was 
51 
 
suggested.  The reason for this suggestion was that unlike Kumasi and Accra, most of the 
migrant households in this region are indigenes of the region. Also this region is among the 
highest recipients of remittances from migration, especially international migration (Anaarfi 
and Awusabo-Asare, 2000).  The two most urbanised areas – Sunyani and Berekum – where 
international migrant households are mostly found were chosen. The choice of these two 
districts was also based on the fact that compared with the national population pyramid from 
the 2000 census these two districts show a slight deviation from the norm.  They show a 
decrease in age-sex cohorts between 20-29 age groups.  And this has been attributed mainly 
to both internal and international out-migration (Ministry of Local Government, 2006). 
Another reason for the choice of this area was to allow for a good mixture of both legal and 
illegal migrants. Though international migration in this area is largely through network 
facilitated by earlier migrants, in recent years the area has been noted for increasing number 
of youths migrating illegally. For example, in 2009 the Ghana News Agency quoted Apea-
Kubi, the Deputy Minister of Interior that “about 60% of Ghanaians deported from Europe 
are indigenes from the Brong-Ahafo Region" (GNA, 2009).  But the most important reason 
for the choice of these two areas is that with their long history of international family 
migration, they present some meso-level socioeconomic contextual feedback mechanisms 
such as migrant networks, migration-induced social stratification, remittance-financed 
migration, etc (see Appendix 3A to locate the two districts on the map of Ghana, and 
Appendixes 3B and 3C for detailed maps of the districts). 
 
The economic activities of these two districts are small- and medium-scale businesses such 
as manufacturing of garments, leather products, metal fabrication and spare parts, carpentry 
and joinery and trading. But agriculture, especially in food crops and cash crops such as 
cocoa and palm plantations, is the main economic activity in the area. The region, as a 
whole, is said to be the food basket of the country.  And with the decline of agricultural 
activities which are the main sources of income, it is not surprising that the youths from this 
area are seeking greener pastures elsewhere. All this makes the population of these two areas 
appropriate for the study. 
 
3.3  Migrant family  
Before a sample is drawn from the population of the study area it is important for us to 
determine boundaries within which the main unit of analysis for the study – migrant family 
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– falls. In migration studies a family is considered as a migrant household if at least one of 
its members has migrated and/or still resides abroad for a certain period (Eurostat NIDI, 
1995; Adams, 2005).  The Eurostat and NIDI study qualified this definition by adding that, 
the principal commitment and obligation of a migrant must be to that household and the 
migrant must return to this household in the future.  A slightly different definition is used for 
this study.   A migrant family in this study is the one that has got a close relative who still 
resides abroad. Close relations include migrant(s) related to the household head as brother or 
sister, son or daughter, father or mother, nephew or niece and in-laws or even as a friend. 
The migrant does not need to be a member of that household in the strict sense of returning 
to that household in the future.  The advantage of relaxing the definition this way is to cover 
all those in the extended kinship system who may not share the same household with the 
migrant but still expect the migrant relation to do something for them. As observed in the 
background section of Chapters One and Two, it is a common practice in Ghana and many 
African countries for migrants to support relations both in the nuclear and extended kinship 
system including those residing abroad.   The kinship economic and social support system is 
not only limited to those at home, but also those abroad.  Hence using a narrow definition of 
the migrant household excludes a whole lot of people in the kinship network who also are 
expected to remit. In places like Ghana, one of the main objectives of migrants is to build 
their own houses. Even though some of these houses accommodate relations, on return, 
migrants stay mainly in their newly built houses and become household heads, a significant 
shift from the household that accommodated them before migration.  If the household has 
relation who was once an international migrant, but he or she is no longer one, that 
household does not qualify to be a migrant family in this study. In other words if the migrant 
has returned home permanently that household does not qualify to be counted as a migrant 
family. 
 
Following Unalan (2005), a migrant in this study is defined as one who has migrated to stay 
abroad for a continuous period of at least one year. This was done to distinguish the target 
population from short moves which may not carry expectations of remittances.  However, if 
the migrant has migrated recently, at least three months ago, and is intending to stay for at 
least a year, he or she is considered a migrant relation of the family and the household is 
counted as migrant family.  
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3.4 Sampling strategy  
The primary sampling units of the survey are individual migrant families as defined above. 
That is households that have migrant relations outside Ghana. The major eligibility criteria 
are: the household must know a migrant who resides abroad for at least a year; and that the 
migrant(s) must be related to the household as defined above. Generally sampling was 
conducted in a way that would be representative to the two districts chosen for the study.  In 
sampling international migrant households, there are three major challenges that must be 
considered: the tendency of international migrant households to concentrate in a particular 
area, especially in relatively wealthy or emerging suburbs; two, the general rarity of migrant 
households; and three, the lack of adequate information on geographical distribution to serve 
as sampling frame for international migrant households (Corrado et al, 2008; McKenzie & 
Mistiaen, 2009).  For example, a prior analysis of the Ghana Living Standard Survey 
(GLSS) 4 & 5 could not give useful information for a sampling frame. The only variable that 
can be used to identify international migrant households from this survey was the source of 
remittances from various regions of the country and from abroad. An attempt was made to 
use this as a proxy for international migrant households. The distribution that came out of 
this was disappointingly not adequate for sampling frame at the district level. For instance, 
in Berekum, GLSS5 has no household said to have received remittances from abroad in the 
year prior to the survey.    
 
Given the challenges inherent in the survey, a different strategy was adopted for the 
sampling procedure. A chain-referral approach was used to identify the international migrant 
households in the two districts.  An important condition for this approach is that people must 
know the households that have relatives abroad (Kalton, 1991).  In Ghana, and particularly 
the area for the study, knowing and identifying the migrant households is not a problem as 
people know them by their wealth exhibited in the type of houses they live in and displays 
during ceremonies such as funerals.  Also since the area chosen for the study have closely 
knit communities people know a lot about general movements of one another, including 
migration flows.  A major problem with this approach though is that people with large 
networks are more likely to be over-sampled. It was for this reason that the second stage of 
the sampling process was introduced.  
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At the second stage (see Table 3.1), a random selection of 1000 international migrant 
households with probability proportional to the size of number of households with 
international migrant relations was applied. The choice of 1000 as sample size was based on 
cost, time as well as representativeness of the geographical area chosen for the study. 
Representativeness of the sample is important because the acceptance of how people form 
expectations of remittance flows and how these expectations influence future migration 
probabilities depends on the extent to which this information can be generalised, at least, at 
the district level.  Due to high probability of selection of migrant families, the sample is 
highly representative of at least the whole region and possibly other high emigration areas in 
the country indicating a good external validity of the study.   
 
An average response rate of 94% shows relatively successful completions of the 
questionnaire given people are usually reluctant to talk about their migrant relations to 
strangers. There are two main reasons for this relatively high response rate.  One, in the pilot 
study it was found that respondents answer poorly when interviewers start with questions on 
migrant relations.  To avoid possible noncooperative behaviour, interviewers were trained to 
remove or reduce suspicion by emphasising the fact that the study is about them more than 
their migrant relations abroad. Also the simplification of elicitation of probabilistic 
 
Table 3.1: Sample design 
 
Listed 
Migrant 
Households  
Selected 
households Responded 
Response 
Rate  
% of 
total 
sample 
% of 
total 
response  
Berekum  Municipality  
     Berekum central  235 151 146 97 27 27 
Senase 220 142 139 98 25 25 
Amangoase 184 118 114 97 21 21 
Zongo 156 100 91 91 18 17 
Kato 88 57 56 98 10 10 
Total  883 568 546 96 100 100 
Sunyani Municipality  
     Abesim 169 109 103 94 25 26 
Sunyani Central 173 111 102 92 26 26 
New Dormaa 164 106 98 92 25 25 
Nkwabeng  96 62 59 95 14 15 
Zongo & Nkrankrom   68 44 35 80 10 9 
Total  670 432 397 92 100 100 
Grand Total  1553 1000 943 94 
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expectation questions also helped increase in the response rate (See Chapter Five for details 
about this simplification).  The other reason for high response rate was that with the 
assurance that the study is a student project and has nothing to with any political party or 
agency, gave respondents some confidence to cooperate with the interviewers. Some 
respondents deemed it as “giving a helping hand” for a student to finish his studies.  As will 
be explained later in this chapter, this assurance was important, because people were just 
coming from the most closely contested general election in the country.   
 
Of the 943 migrant families that were successfully interviewed, almost two-thirds (59%) 
have only one close migrant relation abroad. The other 41% have either two or more 
migrants that are close to the families interviewed. Very few households mentioned more 
than six migrant relations. They were included in the category six of number of migrants per 
household (see Table 3.2). In all there were 1590 migrants about whom relevant information 
was acquired through interviews with the families left in Ghana.   
 
Table 3.2: Number of migrant relations per household  
No. of migrants/household 
No. 
Households  
No. of 
migrants  
Percent of 
Household  
1 560 560 59 
2 228 456 24 
3 95 285 10 
4 27 108 3 
5 17 85 2 
6 16 96 2 
Total 943 1590 100 
 
 
3.4.1 Problems with sampling procedure  
There are a few concerns with this type of sampling procedure. One of the concerns is that it 
is not nationally representative and the sample regions or domains were chosen for their 
relatively high incidence of international migration. Therefore, the dataset is likely to show a 
higher incidence of international migrant households than would be the case for the country 
as a whole. In any case the study was not meant to be a national one. But given the general 
picture discussed in the immediate chapter, the results may not be far from what obtains 
nationally.  
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The most challenging issue in sampling is increasing precision of estimates while lowering 
cost.  In order to keep the cost of transportation, listing and interviews to a manageable limit 
only domains or regions of high concentration of international migrant households were 
sampled. With this clustering the degree of homogeneity is likely to be high – households in 
the domains are likely to have, for example, similar income and occupation characteristics, 
or they may have similar attitudes towards expectation of remittance flows.  As we will see 
in the next chapters, the standard errors of the coefficients in various regression estimates 
give no cause for alarm about the variability of the data.  
 
3.5 Questionnaire design  
In order to facilitate collection of accurate information a simple questionnaire was 
developed, revised and validated with a pilot study.  Questions follow the recommended 
sequences of sample unit, demographic characteristics of the individuals and finally the 
detailed questions on main objectives of the study (United Nations, 2005).  For example, 
since the flow of realised remittances might influence or condition people’s responses to 
questions on expectations, questions on remittances were asked after those of expectations.  
Generally the questionnaire design took into account the following issues: data requirements 
for analysis, type of questions (close, open/pre-coded), detailed instructions to the 
enumerators, logic of layout, ease of handling, manageable length, wording and ordering of 
questions and, the need for built-in cross checks.  
 
The questionnaire was pilot-tested with several variations before the final version was 
developed. The original questionnaire sought to use probabilistic elicitations such as 
percentage chance of getting a migrant to build a house, establish a business etc. The 
percentage points were given in 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%  and 100%. During the pilot phase, it 
emerged that people found this a bit cumbersome. As one respondent put it a bit frustratingly 
“I know Kwesi will have to build the house in about 5 years because that’s the way it is done 
here. All the migrants from this community do the same.” This resulted in poor response and 
hence a revision of that part of questionnaire (see Section 5.6 in Chapter 4 for more details 
on how the revision was done).  On average, the final questionnaire took about 33 minutes to 
be administered. See Appendix X for the full questionnaire. 
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3.6 Implementation of field work 
Of great importance for the success of any survey is the need for ample time to plan the 
survey. The first part of the planning stage was to go and visit the place. This was 
familiarisation visit during which I was able to get necessary clearance from the relevant 
authorities to conduct the study. Clearance letters were acquired from the district chief 
executives and the police commanders of the respective districts. This was necessary to 
prove to the respondents that I had the backing of relevant district authorities and that the 
survey had nothing to do with politics, since the country was just coming from highly 
contested general elections.  
 
 
3.6.1 Recruitment and Training  
Families consider issues relating to their migrant relations abroad as confidential and hence 
are not ready to tell ‘strangers’ about them.  Others may view any attempt by strangers to 
know a bit about their migrant relations with suspicion. These possible challenges were 
taken into consideration when recruiting fieldworkers. Secondary school teachers and 
university graduate who were on national service assignment in the area were chosen to 
conduct the field work. The main criterion for this selection was not only because they are 
capable of understanding the concept of the study but also these people are among the well 
respected in their respective communities.  
 
Training the team of fieldworkers was a continuous process that began with its formation 
until the end of the survey. Initial training was mainly about the following issues:   
• Discussion of remittance expectations 
• Discussion of study aims, objectives and expected outputs 
• Visits to the selected study sites - acquisition of consent from concerned parties,  
     including those from the district chief executives  
• Commencement of initial training 
• Discussion of study schedule and preparations for fieldwork 
On-going training continued throughout the collection for information.  Also in order to 
avoid or minimise nonsampling errors the objectives of the survey were clearly spelt out for 
the interviewers as follow:  
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1. To collect information on the socioeconomic characteristics, observed remittance 
flows, expected flow of remittance, socioeconomic and demographic characteristics 
of the international migrant households or families, and their relationship with the 
migrant members. They were also made to collect information on intention to 
support other members of the family to migrate. 
2.  In addition, they were made to understand that the information they collect should 
be able to  
a. help determine how types of relationships between the migrant and those at 
home  influence realised flow of information and remittances.  
b. help the measurement of levels of remittance expectations relatives hold for 
their migrant members. 
c. help in the assessment of how these levels of remittance expectations can 
influence future migration participation by households 
 
3.6.2 The universe 
As part of the planning it was important to let field workers know the geographical and 
target population to be covered. It was made clear to them that the study is limited to the two 
districts of Sunyani and Berekum of the Brong Ahafo Region. Each of them was given a 
copy of the list of areas to be covered. The target population was the international migrant 
households with clear explanations of the definition given above.  The head of the household 
was the main respondent. In absence of the household head the spouse or any person deemed 
by the household to be in position to answer the questions was chosen.  In cases where the 
respondent was not the head of the household, interviewers were instructed to indicate the 
relationship of the respondent with the household head.   
 
Table 3.3 below gives some basic characteristics of respondents.  Most of the interviewees 
were the head of the household (65%). In situations where the household head was not 
disposed to respond, children or the spouse were the main people designated to grant the 
interviews. The head of the household was however required to be present to assist in 
questions that could not be answered by the designated members in another visit. The 
education level of the respondents was generally good for them to grasp the concept of the 
questions. In any case the final questionnaire was not too technical to be grasped. And the 
interviewers were well trained to explain things well for respondents’ understanding.  
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Table 3.3: Some basic characteristics of respondents   
Relationship of respondents to the household head 
        Number Percent  
Household head  614 65.1 
Spouse  61 6.5 
Son/daughter 212 22.5 
Nephew /niece 15 1.6 
Parents  9 1.0 
Brother /Sister  26 2.8 
Grandchild 6 0.6 
Total  943 100.0 
   Education level of respondents  
No formal education  80 8.5 
Finished primary school 60 6.4 
Finished Middle or JSS  319 33.8 
Finished senior secondary  270 28.6 
Tertiary  214 22.7 
Total  943 100.0 
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CHAPTER FOUR  
 
 METHODOLOGY: KEY CONCEPTS AND ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Before presenting the results from the analysis there are some key concepts which need to be 
operationalised in this study.  Concepts such as household wealth, household human capital, 
performance of migrants, information flow and subjective remittance expectations are 
complex and multidimensional.  There are many sources of information that can constitute 
each of these concepts at the household level. Hence there is a need to construct indices that 
can place individual households on continuous scales of wealth, human capital endowment, 
information flow, observed remittance and expected remittance flows.  In the first part of 
this chapter I explain the procedures used for constructing these indices. In the second part, I 
discuss the statistical analytical techniques used for various investigations. 
 
4.2 Construction of Indices  
This section of the chapter presents series of indices constructed to operationalise some key 
concepts used testing the hypotheses mentioned in Chapter Two.  Cronbach’s Alpha is used 
to measure internal consistency of all the indices, except that of human capital. Cronbach’s 
Alpha tells us how closely related are the sets of components used for various indices. A 
high value indicates that the items are suitable for measuring the underlying construct of 
what it is intended.  Since this measure does not imply unidimensionality, it is often 
advisable to include exploratory factor analysis to check dimensionality of the items used.  
Appendix 4A gives the results from both Cronbach’s Alpha and exploratory factor analyses 
for various indices. The index score of household level human capital is left out, because as 
we will see shortly, this index does not involve many items.  
 
4.2.1 Household wealth index 
If expectations are reflections of household relative deprivation and if households need 
financial resources to support members to migrate, then we need to know the wealth status 
of individual households. There are two sources of information from which household 
wealth can be determined in this study. The first is could be determined from the direct 
question on total annual income of all the members in the household, and the second from 
household durable assets.  The stated income was not used for the wealth determination for 
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two reasons. One, being a sensitive issue, income reports are subject to non sampling errors.  
The reasons for this sensitivity could be that respondents fear taxation, sharing income with 
relatives and low social status etc.  Even though in this survey only 40 households (4.2%) of 
the total sample refused to answer questions on total household income, the missing income 
information could have impact on the analysis. Two, income is a flow variable that is 
defined in terms of a specific time period. Collecting accurate data on a flow variable is 
more difficult than collecting accurate data on a stock variable, such as assets, which can be 
measured or observed at one point in time. The accuracy of an estimate for an income flow 
variable can depend on many factors, including whether or not accurate written records are 
kept.  Lack of written records and hence reliance on recall of income information about each 
member of the household could highly be prone to recall errors. And the third problem is 
that lack of record also contributes to making the fungibility of financial resources within the 
household difficult to attribute flows to their appropriate sources, and to accurately calculate 
net income. For example due to lack of appropriate record it is difficult to attribute 
household income to investment with remittances from abroad or proceeds from their own 
business at home. Many experts recommend frequent and multiple visits to the household to 
overcome some of the problems associated with income flows and inaccurate recall through 
direct observation. Thus generally the traditional approach of collecting data on income or 
expenditure requires extensive data on each household, which was too expensive for this 
study to carry.  
 
Given the problems associated with using stated income or expenditure, in recent years, 
wealth measures derived from durable household goods and from access to services have 
been tried out as substitutes for income or expenditure-based ones.  Following Kalton 
(1991), Vukovic et al (2008) and Balen et al (2010) household wealth in this study was 
determined from an index of household durable assets.  Households were asked to indicate 
whether or not they have the following items: fridge, television, motor vehicle, bicycle, 
landline phone, radio, cell phone, electric fan, stereo, satellite dish, electric/gas cooker, 
computer, tractors/ploughs, motor bike, DVD player and microwave.  Since some 
households do have more than one of these items, respondents were asked to state the 
number of these items that household members are free to use.   
 
Even though in his study in southeast Nigeria, Onwujekwe (2006), questioned whether 
proxy measures such as the use of assets as done here are indeed more reliable than direct 
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measurements such as the use of income or expenditure, there are well documented 
advantages of using assets as a proxy measure of household wealth (Inssera, 1996; Vukovic, 
2008, Balen et al, 2010).  It is easier to collect data for assets. This is because assets are 
conceptually easy to deal with, and questions about them tend to be unambiguous and easy 
to understand (Inssera, 1996). Interviewers can visually verify physical assets, and thus 
contribute to the accuracy of responses. Eliciting information on assets may be less sensitive 
than direct questions on income. This may also contribute to increased accuracy of the 
information. Since assets are a stock variable that pertains to a single point in time, 
providing information on the current status of assets need not involve as much recall for 
respondents, and therefore as much associated recall error, as providing information on 
income flows does (Inssera, 1996; Vukovic, 2008; Balen et al, 2010).  In addition, assets are 
not as subjective to the kind of frequent and seasonal fluctuations that characterize income.  
And finally, the level of assets may provide more meaningful information about likely future 
and long-term changes in household living conditions, since productive assets can continue 
to be used and affect economic well-being into the future (Kumar 1989, cited in Inssera, 
1996).  In spite of these advantages the use of asset as proxy for wealth is not totally free 
from the problems associated with fungibility of household capital. For example, it is 
difficult to find the contribution migrants remittances make to the purchase of these assets. 
An attempt was made to avoid or reduce the effect of this problem with elimination of assets 
acquired through remittance from abroad from the index.  Though it helps to reduce the 
problem this attempt may not entirely eliminate problem of fungibility since the use of 
remittances on other things such as feeding, school fees, health and utility bills may also 
cushion households to purchase these durable assets. It is also possible that a household may 
attribute the purchase of these assets to income from a business which may have been 
financed with remittances from abroad.  But one could also argue that even in such cases the 
household might have added some value to the receipts from abroad and hence they can 
have some rightful claim to the purchase as coming from their own resources.  
 
Though some households stated possession of more than one of the assets, the variables are 
treated as ordinal information. Hence in conformity with the recommendations from 
Kolenikov and Angeles (2009), polychoric principal component analysis (PCA) is used to 
score the level of wealth for each household in the sample. This becomes necessary because 
as Kolenikov and Angeles (Ibid) advise, in cases where the variance of proportion explained 
is important in the study, polychoric PCA is more appropriate technique to use.  With PCA, 
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variables are weighted with the proportion of the variance in the original set of variables 
explained by the first principal component.  This technique has the advantage of determining the 
set of weights which explain the largest variation in the original variables (Ibid).  Households 
use a lot of durable assets so it is important to emphasize on the proportion explained by few 
variables. Here the proportion of variance explained in the first component is about 39% 
(see Appendix 4B-2). The proportions explained by the first and second components are 
dominated by household electrical appliances such as radio, fridge, television, electric fan 
and DVD player while that of the third component is mainly dominated by phone, satellite 
dish, computer and gas/electric cooker (Appendix 4B-1). This is not surprising given the 
urban setup where electrical appliances are commonly used.  The second and third 
components explain 18% and 7% respectively. Together the first three components on which 
the scores are mainly based explain about 64% of the variations. The resulting asset scores, 
based on the first factors, are then divided into population quintiles – five groups with 
slightly different number of observations as shown in Table 4.1.  The first quintile is the 
poorest and the fifth, the richest. The kernel density plot with overlaid normal density as 
given in Figure 4.1 shows that wealth among these migrant households is normally 
distributed 
Table 4.1: Wealth quintile of households 
  No. Percent 
1st quintile  192 21 
2nd quintile  203 21 
3rd quintile  171 18 
4th quintile  189 20 
5th quintile  188 20 
Total  943 100 
 
                       
As shown in Appendix 4A, the Cronbach’s alpha measure of (0.75) is good indicating that 
the scale or index is good enough to be used.  The eigenvalue of the first factor is larger 
(more than twice) than the second factor, and it accounts for almost 50% (0.47) of the total 
variance. Thus there is some reasonable level of unidimensionality in the items used.  
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Figure 4.1: Kernel density plot of household wealth 
               
 
  
 
4.2.2  Household  human capital index 
Human capital is a key factor in international migration can affect remittance expectations 
levels as it can enable household to access information about the migrants. The best way to 
factor human capital at household level in various analytical techniques is to construct an 
index. A very simple approach is used to estimate household level human capital index since 
the computation involved only one variable: years of education. Education in years of all 
household members of age 15 and above was summed. The resultant sum is then divided by 
the number of household members of age 15 and above.  This is done to adjust for the effect 
of household size.  The result is then grouped into five quintiles.  Table 4.2 below shows the 
composition of human capital for the household in the survey.   
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Table 4.2 Human capital quintiles of households  
 Quintile  Freq. Percent 
1st quintile  325 34 
2nd quintile  57 06 
3rd quintile  199 21 
4th quintile 177 19 
5th quintile 185 20 
Total 943 100 
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Interestingly about 34% of the households have the lowest per-capita human capital.  Most 
of these households with the lowest human capital are large and about one-third of them are 
in the 1st and 2nd wealth quintiles.  These are the households most of whose members have 
only completed primary or secondary school. It is surprising though that about one-third of 
the households would are in this low level of human capital given that international migrant 
households are generally found to have more than average level of education in the 
community. The reason for this is that this is a high-emigration society so factors such as 
human capital that selects households into international migration is no longer an important 
factor due to network effect as explained in Chapters Two and Three.  Also as mentioned in 
the previous chapter, it is this migration network that has made this area popular for illegal 
migration among the youths, both highly educated and otherwise.   
 
With the human capital index involving only one variable, there was no need to employ 
Cronbach’s alpha measure. But the kernel density plot (Figure 4.2) of household human 
capital does not show any serious deviation from the normal distribution.  
 
Figure 4.2: Kernel density plot of household education level 
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4.2.3  Measuring migrant  performance at home of origin 
One of the major determinants of expectations of any event is the past occurrence or trend of 
the event itself.  The past event in our case here is the performance of migrant at home of 
origin. This performance plays a major role in the formation of future remittance 
expectations of those family members left behind. As Tsikata (2006) noted families are not 
happy with their migrant members because “they have not been able to remit them as 
Johnny has been doing for his family” (emphasis mine). It is therefore important to explain 
how I conceptualise measure migrant performance at home of origin. 
 
As noted in Chapter Two, observed flow of remittances has been measured in various 
studies using monetary and nonmonetary items migrants send home.  The usual practice has 
always been to use the monetary values of the nonmonetary items and add them to the 
money sent to the total amount. This absolute measure of remittances could be used when 
one is studying, for example, effect of remittances on household income, livelihood. But 
when studying remittance as a major factor in expectations, the use of absolute values may 
not be the best. This is because people left behind usually refer to what migrants have 
achieved within a certain period of migration (Tsikata, 2006). Remittance flow is therefore 
operationalised as migrant performance adjusted to the time migrant has been away and 
weighted. I refer to this time-adjusted remittance flow as performance of migrant at home of 
origin. That is if parents are complaining about their migrant sons’ and daughters’ inability 
to do for them what “Johnny has been doing for his parents,” then we have to factor the 
number of years migrants from the two families have been away before we can make 
judgement about their performances for their respective families at home of origin. Thus 
migrant performance is not just cumulative results of remittances sent over the years, but 
operationalised as what the migrants have achieved relative to the number of years they have 
been away.  Further details of the procedure are given below. 
 
Drawing from previous works; families were asked to indicate whether or not they were 
getting some support from relations residing abroad.  The items were limited to the three 
most popular ones for which most households support members to migrate: annual amount 
of money for living expenses including school fees and healthcare etc, investment in 
business venture and establishment of a house (see Diko & Tipple, 1992; Adams, 2005; 
2006; Brown & Leeves, 2007; Mazzucato, 2009).   That is migrant households were asked to 
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state whether or not their migrant relations have provided these items. Respondents also 
provided the time period within which each of these items were accomplished. 
 
The problem with recalling information like this is that data may be subject to inaccuracies 
and distortions due to a number of different types of nonsampling measurement and 
response errors. The length of time between the actual event and the act of recall may affect 
the quality of information collected. But some scholars argue that errors due to recall need 
not present an insurmountable problem, because it is assumed that the inaccuracies caused 
by recall will be random and so will not interfere with the statistical analysis (Inserra, 1996).   
In addition, memory for regularly occurring events such as flow of money tends to be 
relatively good, unless the amount of flows vary considerable from time to time like daily 
sales in the retail shop. But money flows mostly at a frequency of once a month and this 
helps overcome any problem associated with recall. Most often the flows are of the same 
amount of money.  Recall of migrant performance in the other two items should not be 
difficult, because establishing a business or building a house is an important livelihood event 
that cannot be easily forgotten.  
  
Almost 90% of the 943 migrant households have received at least one of the three items 
(Figure 4.3). This leaves a sample of 837 remittance- and 97 non-remittance receiving 
households respectively.  As regards individual items, the flow of money for living expenses 
such as feeding, health, education etc expectedly score the highest among three items, with 
about 89% of the families having received some money. This is consistent with the findings 
of other studies in Ghana (Black et al 2003; Anaarfi et al, 2003). About 56% of the migrants 
are known to have built a house at home of origin, underscoring the importance of getting a 
house as one of the major objective or expectations of migration in most Ghanaian 
communities (Owusu, 1998; Diko & Tipple, 1992; Adams, 2005; 2006; Mazzucato, 2009 ). 
The low percentage of business establishment is also expected (see Black et al, 2003; 
Orozco, 2008) as this is not as important an objective of migration as the other two items.  
Moreover, while houses are mostly built while the migrant is still abroad, business 
investments are mostly done when the migrant returns (Black et al, 2003; Mazzucato, 2005). 
Business investments done while the migrant is still away, mostly come as support for 
siblings left behind at the home of origin (Manuh, 2001). These include personal services, 
retail, light industry, restaurants, construction and agriculture as we saw in the introductory 
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Fig.4.3 Percent of families that have received or not received items from migrant relations  
 
 
chapter (Owusu, 2000; Black et al, 2003).  From the sample the average amount migrants 
send is about GH¢894 (US$650) for living expenses which is roughly about one-seventh and 
one-fifth of  what migrants generally send annually for building a house and opening a 
business respectively (see  Diko and Tipple, 1992; Orozco, 2007).    Weighting of each item 
therefore takes the form expressed in Table 4.3.  On average migrants take within two years 
to start sending money for living expenses while it takes much longer period, five and six 
years to respectively realise their other two objectives of building a house and opening a 
business venture. Again I use Cronbach’s alpha as an exploratory factor analyses to 
determine internal consistency and unidimensionality respectively. The results, as given in 
Appendix 4A, show that the items have good level of internal consistency (Alpha=0.71) and 
are unidimensional (first factor explains 65% of proportion of the variance). 
 
Table 4.3: Weighting migrant performance 
Expected Item Average waiting 
period (Years) 
Indicator Weight  
(Q) 
Money for living 
expenses  
2 Amount sent  (Amount sent) ÷ 894 
House  4.9 Yes (1) or No (0) 7(1, 0) 
Business  6.2 Yes  (1) or No (0) 5(1, 0) 
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To measure flow of remittance over the years a specification given in equation (1) is used. 
Let Rmtt represent the total evaluation of migrant’s remittance flows (in terms of what he/she 
has done since migrating) for each family in origin country during time period t. And let Qi,t  
represent its ith component (i.e individual items received).  The general relationship between 
Rmtt  and  Qi,t  is simply represented as   
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where r is the interest rate at the time of the survey and n= {i: 1, 2, 3}. Though equation (1) 
takes into account interest rate and the time period within which each of the items was 
achieved at home of origin, the estimates are very much biased by number of years of 
migration as Figure 4.4 clearly demonstrates.  The fitted line shows rising values of migrant 
performance with increasing years of migration. The problem with Figure 4.4 is that one 
cannot compare performance of migrants across households as households have migrants 
with varying periods of being away.       
          
Figure 4.4 Relationship between unadjusted migrant performance (remittance  
                    flow) and years  of migration  
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To enable comparison of performance across households, total remittance flows are adjusted 
by the number of years the migrant has been abroad.  Migrant performance at home of origin 
is therefore measured with the following specification: 
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where perf  is performance of migrant at home of origin and m, number years since the 
migrant has been abroad.  With this period adjustment, the effect of years of migration is 
neutralised as shown by Figure 4.5.  The fitted line does not vary with years of migration. 
             
              Figure 4.5 Relationship between adjusted migrant performance and years of 
migration using scatter plot with a fitted line 
              
 
The adjusted migrant performance index ranges from 0 to 17.4 with a mean of 0.972 and 
standard deviation of 1.088. Thus the distribution shows some level of skewness to the left, 
and therefore there will be a need for some transformation in before the regression 
techniques are applied.  Appendix 4C gives the detailed descriptive statistics.  Table 4.4 
gives a simple demonstration of the relationship between migrant performance and the 
components that constitute this performance.  The table gives average values of migrant 
performance across different quintiles of household wealth - poorest to the richest. Across 
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all the categories of wealth the differences in average number of migrants are not that much. 
However the table clearly shows that even though wealthier households (4th and 5th 
quintiles) receive much more remittance flows than the poor counterparts, there is no 
commensurate difference in performance. For instance, even though households in the 
second quintile receive about 16% more items than those in the first quintile, the percentage 
difference in performance between the two groups (first and second quintiles) is more than 
double (33%) in favour of the former. And this is mainly because households in the second 
quintile have got migrants who take less time period to accomplish than their colleagues in 
the first-quintile families. In Chapter Six we will investigate, in details, the factors that 
influence levels of migrant performance at home of origin. 
 
Table 4.4: Relationship between migrant  performance  and its components 
 Wealth Quintiles  
Average no.  of 
migrants 
Average 
no. of 
items 
Average years 
of migration Performance  
1st quintile  1.46 1.67 10.14 0.69 
2nd quintile  1.59 1.94 9.90 0.92 
3rd quintile  1.55 1.92 9.10 0.87 
4th quintile  1.81 2.10 9.83 1.00 
5th quintile  1.97 2.48 12.02 1.30 
All  1.69 2.04 10.26 0.97 
 
 
4.2.4  Computing information index 
Apart from past event current information flow is another important variable in formation of 
expectations; Current and adequate information is likely to give some reality check on the 
expectations that people have.  Hence we need to understand how it is operationalised in the 
study. 
 
 Given that different factors are likely to affect information flow and hence the level of 
knowledge of those left behind about their migrant relations, a simple question of asking 
households to rate their knowledge of socioeconomic conditions of the migrant relations 
would not be technically appropriate. This is the case firstly because respondents do not 
necessarily use the same frame of reference when answering such ordinal questions.  For 
example, the elderly may use a different frame of reference than the young when assessing 
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or rating their level of knowledge about the migrants. Secondly, some factors can cause 
respondents to employ different thresholds when describing their knowledge levels. For 
instance the more educated may have different threshold from the less educated household 
heads.  In addition, some households may be more modest than others in describing their 
levels of knowledge. For these reasons and to arrive at a more standardised measure of 
knowledge (or information) about migrants, an index is computed using access to various 
pieces of information items about the migrant’s socioeconomic conditions in the host 
country as indicated in Table 4.5.  That is they were asked to indicate whether or not they 
currently have knowledge about the following socioeconomic conditions of the migrants: 
current or additional educational attainment since the migrant left Ghana, size of migrant’s 
family abroad, current employment status of the migrant, type of job and salary. These  
 
 
information items were chosen because current knowledge of each of them as well as 
combinations of any of them is likely to impact on people’s expectations of remittance flows 
and consequent intention to support future migration. For example, having current 
knowledge that the migrant’s salary is high can bias expectation levels to be high, but if the 
household also knows the big size of the migrant’s family, the high expectations may be 
moderated. Because of the sensitivity of some of these pieces of information, respondents 
were encouraged to state “yes” or “no” without giving further details.  Perhaps knowledge of 
some of these information items (salary, for instance) may influence remittance expectation 
levels more than others (attainment of more qualification), and hence should carry more 
weight. But given that getting figures on wages was not only too sensitive an exercise, but 
also unreliable as most households have little or no knowledge about how much the migrant 
earns, I take these items as having the same weights. Figure 4.6 below shows various levels 
of information or knowledge about these conditions.  Of the 1590 individual migrants, about 
Table 4.5 Information items for  construction of knowledge/information index  
No. Information Item Response  
1 Migrant has attained more qualification  Yes =1 / No=0 
2 Marital status of migrant  Yes =1 / No=0 
3 Size of migrant’s family abroad Yes =1 / No=0 
4 Employment status Yes =1 / No=0 
5 Type of job  Yes =1 / No=0 
6 Salary  Yes =1 / No=0 
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94% of them disclose their marital status to the family relations left in Ghana.  Other social 
status information like size of family and skill upgrade also score very high. But when it 
comes to the economic issues there is a significant decrease in number of migrants letting 
their relations back home know how they are doing, confirming the findings of Diko and 
Tipple (1992),  Peil (1995), Owusu (2000) and McKenzie (2007). For example, only 37% of 
migrants tell their relations the type of job they are engaged in the destination country, while 
only 19% do so about their salaries.  Migrants do not disclose their conditions especially the 
type of job as most of them work in areas that are deemed downgrading at home of origin.  
Those who score high on the index are the families that have access to crucial information 
such as type of work and salary. 
 
 
                
 
The responses for all the items for each migrant related to the household were summed and 
divided by the total number of migrants related to the household. So, for example, if a 
household answers ‘yes’ to all the information items for each of say five  migrant relations, 
the household would have the maximum score of 6 (30/5) representing a very good 
knowledge of the migrant’s socioeconomic conditions. But if the households has full 
information on four of its migrants and only three items for the fifth migrant, the household 
scores 5.4 (27/5).  Conversely, if the household does not have current knowledge of any of 
these items about the migrant, it scores zero. Thus the score ranges from zero to six. The 
mean score for the 943 household is 3.85 with a standard deviation of 1.14 and a highest 
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score of six.   As shown in Appendix 4A, there is a very good level of internal consistency 
with Cronbach’s alpha measure of 0.82 indicating that the index is good to be used.  The 
eigenvalue of the first factor is quite larger (more than thrice) than the second factor, and it 
accounts for almost 86% of the total variance. This show a very high unidimensionality 
within the items used. Appendix 4D gives detailed descriptive statistics of the information 
flow index. 
 
There is no index computation for access to general information flow. Families were asked 
whether or not they access information about their migrant relations from other sources such 
as non-migrant friends and relations living in the community of origin. Figures 4.7a and 4.7b 
show that most of the households (63%) have low or poor knowledge about the 
socioeconomic conditions of their migrant relations. These are households that score four or 
less on the index scale.  They usually have information on the marital status, family size, 
whether or not the migrant has attained some qualification since he or she left for abroad and 
some employment status of the migrant. On the other hand families that have high or good 
information about the migrants, score more than four on the scale. In addition to the general 
social conditions most of these families also have crucial economic information on the type 
of work and salary of their migrant relations. In addition to the private information flow 
 
Figure 4.7a: Access to private information   4.7b:  Access to Public information  
                                                               
  
 
from migrants, a good number of the families (72%) source their information about migrants 
from friends and relations living in the same community or in Ghana.  This is not surprising 
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as such information is not as expensive as the one from the migrants themselves. As we saw 
in the background information in Chapter One, families at home of origin gather this type of 
information mostly through social meetings such as funeral celebrations, church services or 
family visits in the country. They do not have to make expensive international phone calls.  
 
As Table 4.6 shows, access to the two sources of information is not mutually exclusive. That 
is there are families that access both sources of information. The chi-square test shows no 
statistically significant interaction between families that access private and public sources of 
information flow.  One might expect households which have very little information from 
migrant would significantly opt for general information, but that is not the case. As Table 
4.6 shows, we have most of the households with low (70%) and high (74%) access to private 
information flow are also found to be having public information about their migrant 
relations. 
Table 4.6: Access to private and public information about migrants 
 
Dedicated private  information 
General public Information Low   High  
Yes   419 (70%) 256 (74%) 
No 178 (30%) 90 (26%) 
Total (no=943) 597 (100) 346 (100) 
Pearson chi2(1) =   1.5583   Pr = 0.212 
 
 
4.2.5  Measuring remittance expectations  
Even though subjective expectations seem to be common phenomena in our lives, measuring 
them statistically can be complicated. Since it is relatively a new area of study, we still do 
not have globally tested and acceptable approach for measuring subjective expectations, let 
alone subjective remittance expectations.  Likert scales have been used and continue to be 
used in many attitudinal researches by social scientists including migration studies to 
measure or assess subjective expectations of likelihood of an events occurring (Gill and 
Reynold, 1999; Gao and Smith, 2010).   As Dominitz and Manski (1997; Manski, 2004) 
have noted, there are some limitations to this method. It is difficult to do comparative 
analyses with such value-laden responses since each individual or household has different 
interpretations of terms such as “very likely” or “very unlikely”, “strongly likely”, “highly 
likely”, “highly unlikely”  etc. Also statistically, such qualitative expectation measures limit 
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the amount of information one can get from the analyses (McKenzie et al, 2007; Delavande 
et al, 2010).  
 
What-do-you-expect questions have also been used in many studies to measure expectations. 
Though simple and easy to answer, they are problematic because it is difficult to assess the 
quantity respondents specify (Delavande et al, 2010).  One is not sure whether the responses 
being given are mean, mode, minimum or maximum quantities.   Bearing these drawbacks, 
McKenzie et al (2007) followed Manski’s subjective probabilistic expectation method by 
asking potential migrants from Tonga to state their levels of percentage chance of getting 
employment in the destination country – New Zealand. These elicitations area said to have 
the advantage of being measured on numeric scale in which responses can be interpreted as 
probabilities. There has been an increasing use of this approach in recent years among 
cognitive psychologists and economists (Delavande and Kohler, 2009; Zafar, 2009; 
Attanasio and Kaufmann, 2009; Delavade et al, 2010; Braykov, 2010). This approach is said 
to be able to minimize the problem of overconfidence as respondents are not inclined to 
focus so much on central tendencies and ignore uncertainties of outcomes (Dominitz and 
Manski (1997).  And though it may seem complicated for illiterate populations, elicited 
probabilistic expectations have been argued strongly, with examples from Malawi, 
Colombia and India, by Delavande et al (2010) that the basic principle of probability is not 
difficult for illiterates to grasp. They advise that the researcher has to devise a means to 
depict the probability concept.  
 
However, there is still no conclusion on which of these methods should be the dominant one 
as the literature is not rich with various comparative studies of these methods in various 
settings. What is important though is for the researcher to take into consideration, the 
context within which the study is being conducted.  Delavande et al (2010) rightly suggest 
that an assessment of the general education level of the respondents and interviewers with a 
pilot study has to be done before an appropriate technique can be employed. 
 
In this study, attempts were made to elicit subjective probability of remittance flows in the 
pilot phase. I followed the approach used by McKenzie et al (2007) in the tradition of 
Manski (2004). That is respondents were asked to indicate various percentage chances of 
getting the things they expect from their migrant relatives staying abroad. The items were 
limited to the three most popular ones: annual amount of money for living expenses 
77 
 
including school fees and healthcare, business venture and establishment of a house (see 
Diko & Tipple, 1992; Adams, 2005; 2006; Brown & Leeves, 2007; Mazzucato, 2009).  This 
approach did not go well with many respondents leading to poor response rate for that 
section of the questionnaire (45%).  Respondents found it a bit cumbersome. At first I 
thought the problem was interviewers’ inability to execute the exercise as explained to them. 
So a special session was organised to retrain interviewers on how to carry out this particular 
session of the exercise. The response rate was still poor for that session.  The general 
comment from most of them was that they know migrant relations must provide these 
things, because “that is the way it is done here.”  There was some sense of impatience 
among the respondents about repeating the same question several times with different 
percentage chances. In spite of their apparent expression of certainty, though, respondents 
indicated that the time they expect to get these things may differ in accordance with the 
item.  
 
Hence in the second attempt the probabilistic elicitation of expectations expressed in the 
form of percentage points or chance was dropped. Respondents were, in the second attempt, 
asked to express their certainty or uncertainty about the probability of getting the items in 
time periods. The head of the family or the person whom the family designates is asked the 
number of these items that they expect the migrant to send and the time within which it 
should be accomplished.  Specifically they were asked to state whether or not they expect 
the migrant relative to send money for living expenses, build a house, and/or establish 
business, and the time for each of these items.  People at home of origin do have different 
time period within which they expect their migrant relatives to meet their expectations. As 
Vishwanath (1991) rightly points out, migrant relations left behind have expectations that 
are not independent of time. Through observation of achievements of neighbours or migrant 
relations, people do have a rough idea of what migrants have been doing within specific 
period.  Their expectations of migrant performance are always described or given with 
reference to what other migrants have done within some period.  
 
A possible problem associated with estimating expectations from this point of view is that 
expectations may be heavily influenced by past events, as it seems it is the past performance 
of migrants that becomes the reference point.  Whether or not people are influenced by past 
experience in the formation of their expectation levels will be discussed in Chapter Seven.   
For now it makes sense to view remittance expectations in this way, especially in the case of 
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second-order expectations since people are not directly involved in or do not know much 
about the acquisition of the expected items; they can only make reference to past trends.  It 
also makes sense that people at home would express their expectations in terms of time as 
this would propel them to take action, for example support for future migration.  People 
expect to get certain things within a certain period, which is usually shorter they would 
otherwise realise without migration, and this makes them participate in migration process. 
For if there is no time difference between staying at home and migrating in acquisition of 
these items, people may find very little incentives or motivation to engage in migration, all 
things being equal. Following this line of thought elicitation of expectations of these three 
items are weighted by the time period within which people at home of origin will want to 
realise the expected items, taking into account the relative value of the items and the 
discount rates. In order to avoid the problem of ambiguity in time period stated by 
respondents, interviewers were asked to emphasize on mean period of time that people are 
willing to wait to realise, at least, some of the expected items. For example if the family 
expects the migrant relative to build a house, the question is when, on average, the family 
expects the migrant to finish the building after migrating.  In this way, interpersonal 
comparison, which is difficult to obtain with Likert scale, can be achieved with this 
approach. That is by measuring expectations as weighted product of items expected and the 
time period within which they are expected to be done, we achieve a comparable measure 
that is equally understood by individuals as all of them have the same understanding of time 
in years.  Also with the emphasis on mean amount of money and time, the ambiguity 
surrounding quantity in what-do-you-expect questions is reduced. And since households left 
behind have to rely on the migrant’s commitment to a loosely monitored contractual 
agreement between them and the migrants, the time within which they hope to get the things 
becomes the best way they express their expectations.  Those who are not very certain may 
give migrants many more years to realise their expectations. I must, however, admit that, in 
spite of the emphasis on mean, there would still be some level of ambiguity as to whether or 
not respondents really refer to the mean when asked to state the average time within which 
they expect the items to be accomplished. Perhaps a study that combines this methods and 
that of probabilistic elicitations in the line of Manski, may give more insights about these 
issues of uncertainty and comparability of these measures. For the population I had to deal 
with, measuring expectations as a product of time and value of items expected works better 
in terms of response rate.  The internal consistency with Cronbach’s alpha measure of 0.62 
is not that great, but with the first eigenvalue explaining about 65% of the variance, the 
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unidimensionality of the items is quite good. Hence it is fine to estimate the expectation 
index with these items.  
 
From the sample the average amount people expect migrants to send is about GH¢2200 
(US$1600) for living expenses which is roughly about  one-third and half of what migrants 
generally send annually for building a house and opening business respectively (see  Diko 
and Tipple, 1992; Orozco, 2007).   Weighting of each expected item therefore takes the form 
expressed in Table 4.7 below. 
 
Table 4.7: Weighting expected items 
Expected Item  Average waiting 
period (Years) 
Indicator  Weight  
Money for living 
expenses  
1.5  Amount expected Amount expected ÷ 
2200    (X) 
House  3.7 Yes (1) or No (0) 3(1, 0) 
Business  4.0 Yes  (1) of No (0) 2(1, 0) 
. 
 
Taking the preceding discussion into consideration, remittance expectations of relation left 
behind are estimated with the specifications almost the same as the ones used for estimating 
migrant performance. Let Exp represent the value of total expected items of each 
household/family at home of origin and let xi,t  represent its ith component (i.e each 
individual 
item: money, house and/or business) at time t.  The general relationship between Exp  and  
xi,t  can be stated  as  
   	
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The  total value of expectations in future of each family can therefore be expressed presently 
as   
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where r is the interest rate and t is the waiting period (i.e. number of years people would 
allow for the realisation of their expectations and n= {i: 1, 2, 3}.  This gives an index of 
expectation level for households that expect at least one of the items. The index ranges from 
0 to 34.39, with a mean of 4.53 and standard deviation of 4.64.  This clearly shows that 
values are heavily skewed to the left. Hence there will be a need for appropriate 
transformation before the regression analyses are done. See Appendix 4E for detailed 
descriptive statistics. 
  
4.2.5.1  Internal and external validity of remittance expectation index 
In addition using factor analysis and Cronbach’s alpha to test for unidimensionality and 
internal consistency of the index there are few technical issues on selection bias, internal and 
external validity that I would like to address.  One of the biases often raised about subjective 
expectations is the problem of cognitive dissonance. That is people might exaggerate their 
beliefs (expectations) in order to rationalise their choices. For example if a household has 
not received remittance from any of its migrant relations, that household might report that it 
is not interested in expectation of remittance flows. Thus households would have 
unfavourable changes in expectations when they have not received some remittances and 
largely favourable changes in expectations when they have received some remittances. This 
may lead to some sort of endogenous relationship between past receipts and future 
expectations, kind of overly adaptive subjective expectations. A problem of this nature is 
overcome by the design of the questionnaire. All questions about remittance expectations 
come before those of past receipts were asked. In this way the effect of cognitive dissonance 
is either eliminated or minimised. As demonstrated in Table 4.8, 86 (10%) of the households 
that have received some flow of remittances in the past do not expect anything from 
migrants; and these households actually form the bulk (about 75%) of households that do not 
expect anything. Also about 65% (53) of households that did not receive anything do expect 
something from migrants in the future. If there is a serious problem of cognitive dissonance 
we would find most of the households that expect nothing to have received nothing.  This is 
in line with the work of Zafar (2010) who also did not find any serious changes in beliefs 
across various observed outcomes of students’ preferences.  
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Table 4.8: Status of Household expectation status and past receipts of 
remittances  
 
Expect something Expect nothing 
Received nothing in the past  53 29 
Received  something in the past  771 86 
Total  824 115 
 
 
Another problem that has been levelled against elicitation of subjective expectations is that 
respondents do not exercise serious mental effort in stating their beliefs (expectations). That 
is people just say anything that comes to mind. One of the ways of testing this is to align 
subjective data with that of observed choices. Even though it must be stressed that subjective 
data are not accurate in the sense of being the same as the observed choices, in order to be 
valid or useful, we would expect that households would draw some inferences about their 
expected times from what their observations of their own past experiences of remittance 
receipts or from what they see migrant do for other households.  If the expected flow lines 
well with observed flow, then it means individuals exert some considerable mental effort in 
reporting their beliefs, and hence their expectations can be said to be well defined.  There are 
two ways of testing this: comparing elicited expectations with future realisations and 
comparing elicited expectations with historical realisations. Following Bruin de Bruin et al 
(2000), Hurd and McGarry (2002) and Zafar (2010), I apply the second method.  As shown 
in Table 4.9a & b the average time period within which families expect to start realising 
their expected items line up well with realised time. In the same way average observed 
remittance flow seems to line with the expected ones. Thus families left behind seem to have 
a fairly good idea about the differences in times within which these three items are realised 
at home of origin.   This, in no way, refutes the argument that families do not reveal their 
true beliefs. It only shows that families left behind do have internally consistent and sensible 
responses to expectation questions. Thus they exercise some mental effort to respond to 
these questions. Their expectations can therefore be deemed well defined. 
 
Table 4.9a: Comparing average expected and realised items  
 
Expected time 
(years) 
Past realised time 
(Years) 
Money for living expenses 1.5 2 
Investment in housing 3.7 4 
Investment in business 4 6 
Total   3.1 4.0 
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Table 4.9b: Comparing average expected and realised items  
 Household wealth 
quintile  
Observed remittance 
receipts (index) 
Expected remittance 
receipts (index) 
Poorest  0.688 1.740 
Poor 0.913 1.742 
Middle  0.875 1.832 
Rich  1.005 1.741 
Richest 1.308 2.065 
Total  0.972 1.826 
 
It has also been argued that subjective expectations usually involve respondents giving 
socially acceptable answers especially in the face-to-face interviews so as not to look bad in 
front of interviewers.  If this were the case in the sample, we would find a seriously skewed 
information as families would either give short time to boast of how well their migrants may 
be doing or give long time period to avoid being viewed as too demanding. From Figure 4.8 
below the kernel density estimates show that the distribution of time is fairly normal, giving 
no serious suspicion of socially-correct responses.  
 
Fig. 4.8 : Kernel density estimates for expected items: business and housing investment                      
 
  
 
 
 
4.3 Analytical techniques  
Having operationalised key concepts in the study, I  now turn to the main statistical models 
that are used to investigate or test the hypotheses to achieve the four main objectives as 
enumerated in Chapter One.                                                                  
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4.3.1 Model specifications for migrant performance   
Before I test the first hypothesis of whether or not remittance flow leads to high levels of 
information flow, we need to investigate the main determinants of remittance flow, 
especially as measured in this study as migrant performance adjusted to years of migration. I 
use two models to estimate determinants of remittance flow and migrant performance. The 
first is a probit model to estimate the probability of household receiving each of the three 
items used to compute migrant performance index. The second model employs Heckman 
(1979) selection technique to estimate determinants of migrant performance at home of 
origin.  In both cases the main interest is to know the effects of kinship ties controlling for 
other socioeconomic factors. Thus in the first part I estimate a probit, modelling the 
probability that a family’s receipt of remittance (Rec)  as a function of kinship ties and other 
socioeconomic factors characterising the household. This gives us the following model:  
 
  Pr (Rec = 1 | Kini) =  Ф(β0 + β1iKini + β2ihi)              (5) 
 
where Kini is the kinship ties,  hi  represents various socioeconomic characteristics of the 
family,  Ф(.) is the standard normal density function and β are the parameters to be 
estimated.  In addition to estimating the general probability of receiving something, the 
model is run again for each of the three items.  
 
The second model fits OLS regression to estimate effects of kinship ties on migrant 
performance (as computed in Equation 2), controlling for various socioeconomic 
characteristics of the household. Because of the multiplicative effects emerging from the 
relationship between items received and the corresponding weight attached (time period), 
there is a resultant skewed distribution of total migrant performance as observed in Equation 
4.  Hence, following Limpert et al (2001), total migrant performance is transformed using 
square root transformation to gain symmetrical distribution in order to achieve properties of 
normal distribution.  This improves the distribution as the distance of various points of 
observations are much closer to the median. See Appendix 4F for the differences in the basic 
statistics of the performance variable before and after the square root transformation. The 
OLS model is specified in equation (6) below.  
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where m is the number of years the migrant has been away, Kin represents kinship ties and h 
is the various demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the household at home of 
origin. The middle part of the equation basically represents the performance index as 
estimated in equation (1). 
 
Running ordinary least square (OLS) regression might bias the estimates because of the 
suspicion that families that have received at least one of the three items might be a select 
group from the whole population of migrant families.  Migrant performance is only 
estimated for families that have observed at least one of the three items, and not those who 
have none. That is there might be a factor that systematically or uniquely identifies families 
that have had some level of observed performance from migrants. Some scholars have found 
selective mechanisms in various migration studies both in Ghana and elsewhere (Adams, 
2005; Adams, 2006; Taylor and Mora, 2006).  But in all these studies the systematic 
difference has been significantly established only between migrant and non-migrant 
households. Studies which involve only migrant households do not report of any empirical 
findings on selections bias. I do however suspect that households that have had migrants 
performing are systematically different from those who have not. It is difficult, however, to 
get a variable that uniquely identifies families that have migrants performing in the 
community as factors that affect remittance flow are most likely to be the ones that also 
affect migrant performance.  The factor that could possibly generate this systematic 
difference is the general attitude towards migration. In other words, those who have higher 
or lower attitude towards migration may influence receipt of some form of remittance as, for 
example, higher positive attitudes could make households support migrant relations. This 
support, be it moral or otherwise, could influence the migrant to send some form of 
remittance.  
 
The reduced form of the Heckman model is given as follows: 
 
      Perfi= βXi + εi                                                                                    (7) 
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where Perfi  is the migrant performance at home,  Xi observed variables relating to the i’th 
household’s kinship ties and other socioeconomic characteristics, and εi is an error term.  
Perf is observed only for households who receive at least one of the items constituting 
remittances.  The second equation relating to performance is  
Ri*=β4Zi + ui                                                                           (8)                                     
 
Ri =1   if  Ri*  > 0  and Ri = 0 if  Ri* ≤ 0  R 
 
In essence the selection equation is a probit in the form      Pr(Ri = 1) =  Ф(βi Zi  )                            
where R* is a latent variable indicating the utility from receipts of remittance,  We observe 
only Ri  as an indicator for status of remittance receipts (received=1, did not receive=0),  Zi 
denotes the determinants of remittance status, β is a vector of associated parameter 
estimates, and ui is an error term having a standard normal distribution. The assumption is 
that both error terms of equations (7) and (8) are normally distributed with mean zero, and 
that the error terms are independent of both sets of explanatory variables of the two 
equations.  After estimating β using the probit maximum likelihood method, the second 
stage (Equation 8) involves estimating OLS regression of levels of migrant performance 
conditional on R = 1. This second stage regression appends the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) 
calculated from the linear predictions of the probit model as an additional explanatory 
variable.  A significant coefficient of IMR, shown by rho, indicates the presence of sample 
selection bias. The basic assumption of all these models is that, just like observed remittance 
flows, performance of migrant at home of origin is due to contractual agreement between the 
migrant and those left behind.  This model will help us to explain the determinants of 
migrant performance at home, and this explanation will help us to understand the second 
part of Chapter Six where I determine the effect of remittance flow on information flow.  
 
 
4.3.2 Model specifications for information flow   
I use two models to investigate the effect of migrant performance or remittance flow on 
information flow. The first model employs the instrumental variable (I.V) technique to 
estimate impact of remittance flow on private and public information flow respectively.  In 
the second model I determine the factors that can help families to move from lower to higher 
levels of private information flow.  
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4.3.2.1 Instrumental variable (IV) techniques 
As discussed earlier it is assumed that remittance flow simultaneously go with information 
flow since migrant would have to communicate with relations during these transfers.  Thus 
there is a suspicion of endogenous relationship between migrant performance or remittance 
flow and information flow, because the very factors that determine remittance flow are also 
likely to be the ones that determine information flow. The literature has often depended on 
instrumental variable (IV) technique to overcome such endogeneity and selection bias 
problems. Hence I use instrumental variable (IV) technique to determine the impact of 
remittance flow or migrant performance on both private/dedicated and public/general 
information.  IV models are conceptualized as two separate equations: one specifies the 
relationship between the key independent variable (remittance flow) and the outcome 
(information flow), the second specifies the relationship between the instrumental variable 
(Attitude) and the outcome. The model is given below 
 
   Info = Rmt'B1+ X1'B2 + e1                                            (9.1) 
  Rmt'= X1'B3 + Att’B4 + e2                                            (9.2) 
 
where Info is the  private or public  information; Rmt' is the key independent variable 
measuring observed remittance flow; Att is the instrumental variable of attitude ; X1 is a 
vector of other control variables; B1, B2, B3, and B4 are parameters to be estimated; and e1 
and e2 are error terms. As stated earlier, general attitude or perception towards migration 
may influence remittance flow, but its effect on information flow is theoretically weak 
unless it does so through the flow of remittances. For the private information flow two-
staged least square (2SLS)  is used.  It has been argued that using the two-stage least square 
(2SLS) in case of a binary dependent outcome and endogenous  variable might lead to 
inconsistent estimates, hence it is suggested that in such cases one should use generalised 
least square (GLS) estimates given under the IV-probit command in STATA (Newey, 1987). 
Hence the IV-probit model is used for estimating impact of remittance flow on public 
information flow. It is also advisable that one should always combine the p-value of the first 
equation as well as the F-statistic to gauge the appropriateness of the instrument used. An F-
statistic which is below 10 is considered to be a cause for concern (Staiger and Stock, 199, 
p. 557, cited in Baum et al, 2002). The F-statistic of 18.74 clearly shows the instrument used 
for the model is not weak.  The test for the other IV model assumptions given in Appendix 
4G shows that the equation is clearly identified and the instrument is appropriate.  In 
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addition to the IV techniques, estimates from simple OLS and probit models are also 
produced for comparatives purposes.  
 
 
4.3.2.2 The generalised ordered logit model for estimating levels of information  
The kernel density plot (see Appendix 4H) with normal curve shows that the distribution of 
the private information index has four distinct peaks. Thus the index has yielded a semi-
continuous variable with ordinal characteristics.  I allow the data to be grouped naturally 
along the four distinct peaks yielding four main categories and then apply ordered logit 
model to estimate the likelihood of a family getting more and more private information from 
a migrant relation. The main advantage of using this model for a problem of this nature is 
that with its characteristic feature or assumption of an unobserved continuous variable that 
gets collapsed into some number of categories of observed response, the model is able to 
combine both linear and categorical techniques.  Also since the interest at this stage is 
mainly to know the effects of observed flow of remittances and kinship types on the 
probability or the likelihood of household getting higher or lower levels of information flow, 
this model serves this interest much better than what OLS would do.   Level of private 
information flow from migrants is grouped into four categories using the values of the 
information index as category cutpoints for the four quintiles. From the first (lowest) to the 
fourth (highest) quantiles are respectively labelled “Very low”, “Low”, “High” and “Very 
high” levels of information flows.  
 
Table 4.10 gives the descriptive statistics of the groups. Information flow or level of 
knowledge of families left behind is given in hierarchical ordinal structure, from those who 
know very little to those who have good knowledge about the socioeconomic conditions of 
 
Table 4.10: Descriptive statistics of information flow quintiles 
  Obs. Percent  Mean Std. dev Min Max 
Very low 319 34 2.55 0.63 0.00 3.00 
Low 278 29 3.87 0.23 3.17 4.00 
High  298 32 4.92 0.19 4.17 5.00 
Very high  48 5 5.80 0.28 5.20 6.00 
Total 943 100 3.85 1.14 0.00 6.00 
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the migrant. In order to control for other factors and ascertain the findings emerging from 
the descriptive analysis, given the structure of the data, ordered logit model or what is 
sometimes called the proportional odds model is used.  The basic assumption is that there is 
observed ordinal variable information flow, Y, which is a function of an unobserved latent 
continuous variable Y* that determines the values of the observed Y. The values of Y depend 
on whether or not a certain threshold (cutpoint) has been crossed. With M = 4 (categories), 
the values of Y are  
 
Yi = 1 if Y*i  ≤ j1 
Yi = 2 if j1 ≤ Y*i ≤ j2                                                     (10) 
Yi = 3 if j2 ≤ Y*i ≤ j3 
Yi = 4 if Y*i ≥ j3 
 
where Yi is the observed category of level of information flow, Y* is the unobserved 
continuous variable of information flow,  ji  thresholds and M is the number of categories of 
the ordinal dependent variable.  The relationship between the latent unobserved Y*  and  
other factors is given as follows: 
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The ordered logit (ologit) model estimates part of Equation (11) as  
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where Z is a measure of  Y*,   X  is a vector of factors influencing level of information flow, / the associated coefficients  to be estimated and * the error term, where the error has the 
standard logistic distribution. The probability of a household having a higher or lower level 
of information from the migrant can also be expressed as a totally constrained generalized 
ordered logit (gologit) model in the following form: 
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where g  is the logit link function and every other notation remains as defined before. With 
the change in cumulative probability from one level of information flow to another deemed 
to be a gradual process the choice of the logit function is more appropriate (Norusis, 2004, 
P.84).   Equation (13) is equivalent to the ordered logit (ologit) model given in Equation 
(12), which assumes that the betas are the same for all values of j.  This is what is sometimes 
referred to as proportional odds assumption or parallel regression assumption (Long and 
Freese, 2006). That is the ologit model does not allow for the fact that the thresholds or cut 
points may vary depending on the characteristics of the families involved in the quest for 
information about the migrants. In other words, coefficients for each group of independent 
variable are the same.  This is unrealistic because differences in factors such as household 
average level of education and experience in migration may result in different thresholds for 
different families.  The totally unconstrained version of  gologit (Equation 14), which allows 
all betas and alphas to vary,  may also not be tenable due to the fact that some of the values 
of j could be the same  (constant)  for all categories.  
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In order to know the appropriate version of the model for the data I conduct the Wald test for 
parallel assumption (see Appendix 4I). This test result is useful as it suggests the variables 
that are likely to have different coefficient at various categories. The result shows that four 
variables strongly violate the parallel assumptions: past performance of migrant, household 
level of education, kinship ties such as brother or sister and the family’s general attitude 
towards migration.    This indicates that the model should be estimated by a generalized 
ordered logit (gologit2) model as both the totally constrained and unconstrained models of 
gologit2 are not the best in fitting the model as explained earlier.  Hence I use the partially 
constrained model with gamma option, because, generally, the proportional odds assumption 
does not hold for this model (Williams, 2006).  The gamma option enables the model to 
keep all the coefficients that are not significantly different across the information categories 
constrained to be equal, and allows only the significantly unequal coefficients (here, 
coefficients for education, number of children under 15 years,  years of migration and 
attitude towards migration) to vary.  That is, using the partially constrained model helps in 
maintaining the assumption for all the covariates except for those variables that are strongly 
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found to be responsible for the violation of the assumption. The gamma option allows the 
alternative parameterisation which presents coefficients for the first model (Y>1) and then 
presents any deviations from that model as gamma coefficients. This also makes the model 
more parsimonious (Ibid).   Equation (15) presents the final model. Some of the betas (those 
for X1 and X2 ) are the same, but others (those for X3) are allowed to vary.  
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As stated earlier, X represents a vector of factors that determine the level of knowledge 
(information) about the socioeconomic conditions of migrants related to the family. It is 
difficult to come up with a theoretical justification to explain why these four variables 
violate the parallel assumptions, except to speculate that, for example, different levels of 
education may place households at different levels of access to private information, because 
highly educated households may have quite different way of accessing and processing 
information from the migrants. In the same way households that have a very positive attitude 
towards migration in general may also have quite different way of accessing and treating 
information.  In absence of any tested theoretical justification, William (2006) suggests that 
an automatically fitted model with a “more stringent significance level” such as .01 should 
be applied.  Hence I used 0.01 level of significance for the model. Predicted probabilities for 
each of the information flow categories are calculated from the generalised ordered logit (see 
Appendix 4J).  It is found that the actual and predicted probabilities are quite similar, 
indicating a good measure of fit for the generalised ordered logit model. 
 
 The covariates (Xi) include different types of relationship with the migrant, wealth, average 
education level of household, years of migration etc. The strength of relationship with the 
migrant is expected to have positive relationship with the level of information flow as those 
who are much closer (eg. spouse, brother/sister or son/daughter) are expected to have 
stronger social and kinship bond at all quintiles, while distant relations such as friends are 
expected to have negative relationship especially at the higher levels (quintiles).  The cost of 
getting information from the migrant can be expensive, especially as many migrants do not 
cooperate in information sharing (McKenzie, 2007).  Hence accessibility to this information 
could be difficult. The ability of those left behind to access information about the migrants is 
measured by household characteristics such as wealth, average level of education, number of 
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household members who are over the age of 15 years and age of household head. 
Theoretically it should follow that the older the household head, the less the information 
flow because older migrant household heads would have migrants who are also older and 
hence are more likely to be integrated in the host nation as they may have been abroad for a 
longer time than migrants from younger households. Wealthy households should be able to 
contact the migrants through long distance calls to get information. The fact that they are 
wealthy may also make the migrant relations feel at ease to disclose their socioeconomic 
conditions as the former may not make too much demand from them. In the same way 
higher education level should also help households to gather information about the migrants 
at least through readings or the media.  Larger families would have at least one of the 
members communicating with the migrant.  With time migrants are found to be integrated 
into the culture of the host nation. This is because migrants that have been abroad for a long 
time are said to be more integrated in the culture and society of the destination country.  Or 
they may have brought their close relations to live with them. Therefore they would not have 
any strong sense of obligation to share lots of information about themselves with the rest of 
the relations who may be distant kins. The number of years since the migrant has been away 
is used as a measure of migrant level of integration assuming that the longer the stay the 
more integrated the migrant is in the destination country.  The test for multicollinearity 
given in Appendix 4K does not show any collinearity among the independent variables.  
 
 
4.3.3 Estimating determinants of remittance expectations  
The main test in Chapter Seven is that the effect of remittance expectations on intention to 
perpetuate migration at the household level will depend on the nature of how the 
expectations are formed. The argument is that when remittance expectations are mostly 
influenced by past event (i.e. past flow of remittances) expectations would have great effect, 
but when expectations are mostly influenced by private or dedicated information from the 
migrant, their effect on intention to perpetuate migration is heavily reduced. This means that 
we first have to know the main determinants of remittance expectations. The levels of 
subjective remittance expectations was estimated using the three key items of money sent, 
business and housing investment by migrants.  We saw a detailed account of how this was 
computed with Equation 4 in Section 4.2.5 of this chapter.  In Equation 16, subjective 
remittance expectation is modelled as a function of observed performance of migrants.  
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where Perft-1 represents observed past performance of migrants, again as estimated in 
Equation 17.  Adding the information index (Info), kinship ties (Rel) and household 
characteristics (h)  to equation (16) gives us the final model in the following form: 
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where Info represents current private information available to the family at home of origin at 
the time of expectation decisions.  In addition to the general estimates from equation (17), I 
also estimate equation (17) with interactions of private information with key variables such 
as kinship ties, public information and migrant performance.  Thus equation (17) is modified 
a bit in the following manner.  
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where ! is the levels of expectation index as estimated in Section 4.2.5, h and Rel  are 
household characteristics and kinship ties with the migrant respectively, b0, b1, b2, b3 and  b4 
are parameters to be estimated, Infoi takes on the values of low and high levels of private 
information flows
 W(XS is the independent normally distributed error term with the 
variance of the mean equal to zero. The household covariates includes wealth, level of 
education, years of experience in migration, household size, age of household head and 
whether or not the household contributed significantly towards the movement of the 
migrant. Type of kinship ties is captured by categorical responses stating whether or not the 
migrant is a spouse, head, son, daughter, brother, etc as discussed in previous two chapters.  
Thus in response to the deficiency exhibited in adaptive models of expectations, this 
augmented model incorporates information on other variables that are assumed to influence 
the formation of expectations.  The use of this additional information can help to offset the 
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tendency toward systematic prediction errors associated with ‘excessive’ influence of past 
events like performance of migrants (Curtin, 2003). Remittance expectations variable is 
skewed to the right due to the multiplicative effects from the index computation. Hence I use 
square root transformation to normalize it. See Appendix 4L for the distribution before and 
after the transformation.   
 
 
4.3.3.1 Dealing with effect of selectivity 
 From the evidence presented in discussion of bias, internal and external validity in  Section 
4.2.5 we saw that people do not exaggerate their responses to expectation questions and that  
the responses are internally consistent. Hence one would not suspect sample selection bias in 
the data. Also the sample covers only migrant families so there might not be any concern for 
selectivity from the general population into migrant households. In addition the 117 (12.4%) 
of the total households sampled that do not expect anything clearly stated their choices. If 
these people had refused to answer the questions on expectations, then they could perhaps be 
treated as missing and hence a need to apply the selection bias model. 
 
Nevertheless, some level of selection bias may still arise. Levels of remittance expectations 
as measured by Equation (16) will only refer to families that expect at least one item from 
migrants. If families that expect things are a select group from the whole population of 
migrant families, that situation could render biased estimates from a simple OLS model 
presented in equations (17) and (18).  The biased estimates are likely to arise from the fact 
that certain factors – omitted from the model – may select families into the group of those 
that expect at least one of the items, but may not necessarily have any effect on the 
continuous choice of expectation levels as computed with equation (16). If these factors are 
not controlled, a simple OLS model may overestimate or underestimate the effects of factors 
that influence the choice of expectation levels.  I therefore tested for omission of variables 
via the ovtest  procedure given by Stata. The result form the test (see Appendix 4M) rejects 
the null hypothesis that the OLS procedure has no omitted variables. Hence, following the 
approach adopted by Atanacio and Kaufmann (2009), it would be important to 
simultaneously model the determinants of probability of expecting something or not and the 
continuous variable of remittance expectation levels.  Heckman’s sample selection model 
would be the appropriate technique to use in this case. A key advantage of this model is its 
ability to control for sample selection biases that could otherwise arise from the existence of 
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unobservable variables that determine both the discrete and continuous choices pertaining to 
remittance expectations respectively. Thus there are two regimes defined by one, whether or 
not the individual migrant household expect something from migrant relations, and two the 
level of these expectations once selected. In this way the model allows for the information 
from non-expecting families to be used to improve the estimates of the parameters in the 
regression model. The reduced form of the Heckman model is given as follows: 
 
               Expi= βXi + εi                                                                     (19a) 
                                                                                                   
 
where Expi  is the expectation level,  Xi observed variables relating to migrant  performance, 
information flow and i’th household’s kinship ties and other socioeconomic characteristics, 
and εi is an error term.  Exp is observed only for households who expect at least one of the 
three items.  The second equation relating to expectations is  
Si*=b5Zi + ui                                                                  (19b)                                     
  
Si =1   if  Si*  > 0  and Si = 0 if  Si* ≤ 0                                      
  
Just as we saw in Chapter Six Equation (19b) is basically a probit in the form     
     
Pr(Si = 1) =  Ф(βi Zi  )                            
 
where S* is a latent variable indicating the utility from expectation,  Si  is an indicator for 
expectation status (expect=1, do not expect=0),  Zi denotes the determinants of this status, b5 
is a vector of associated parameter estimates, and ui is an error term having a standard 
normal distribution.  After estimating b4 using the probit maximum likelihood method, the 
second stage (equation 19b) involves estimating OLS regression of levels of remittance 
expectation conditional on S = 1. This second stage regression appends the inverse Mills 
ratio (IMR) calculated from the linear predictions of the probit model as an additional 
explanatory variable.  A significant coefficient of IMR indicates the presence of sample 
selection bias. 
 
One of the major conditions of Heckman selection model is to get at least one variable that 
uniquely identifies the discrete choice of remittance expectation status from continuous 
choice of remittance expectation levels. This presents a challenge in a study of this nature in 
which factors that affect people’s expectation status are also most likely to affect the 
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expectation level. Attitude towards migration is chosen as unique identifier on the argument 
that having a good or bad attitude towards migration will determine the household’s choice 
of whether or not to expect something from migration, but attitude towards migration may 
not affect continuous levels of expectations.  This is because migration attitude may have 
very little to do with helping those left behind to know the socioeconomic conditions of the 
migrants – a knowledge that is important for gauging what to expect. Also unlike factors 
such as kinship ties, wealth and contribution to movement, attitude towards migration does 
draw very little responsive action from the migrant. Hence people left behind would not find 
attitudes helpful to determine their remittance expectation levels.   This assumption was 
tested by including attitude in both the selection and outcome equations, and I found that 
attitude was highly significant in the discrete choice of expectations but insignificant in the 
continuous choice of remittance expectation levels (see Appendix 4N).  In other words a 
good attitude, for example, would make the household expect something from migration, but 
when determining the level or quantity of the expected items households would not rely on 
their own attitude; they would most likely rely on factors such as kinship ties, past 
performance migration experience, etc, that are likely to generate some action or response 
between themselves and the migrants.  
 
 
4.3.4 Determining effect of remittance expectations on intentions to perpetuate 
migration  
 
Having estimated determinants of remittance expectations, we I turn to how these 
expectations influence migration intentions. I observe migration intention choices for the 
same individuals whose subjective expected returns of remittance were elicited. This allows 
me to model perpetuation of migration as a function of expected return to migration as well 
as other moments of the subjective probability distribution. In what follows, I model the 
decision of migrant families to support (or not) support other members to travel abroad. I use 
the subjective expectations data to study the extent to which these expectations affect 
intentions to perpetuate migration. Three models with maximum likelihood estimates are 
used to these effects.  The first is a simple probit model to investigate the influence of 
remittance expectations on family’s intention to continue migration process with support at 
least one of its members.  The second is the use of ordered probit model to estimate the 
factors that influence the strength of this intention. And finally multinomial logit model is 
used to estimate the factors that differentiate the group of families that have positive 
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remittance expectations and desire to continue migration process from the other three 
groups:  positive remittance expectations but no intention not to continue migration process; 
negative remittance expectations but desire to continue the migration process; and negative 
remittance expectations  
 
 
4.3.4.1 Probit with Heckman selection model   
Following Attansio and Kaufmann (2009), a probit function is used to model a family’s 
decision or intention to support at least one member to migrate. The dependent variable for 
this exploratory model is derived from the question: Do you intend to send or support at 
least one member of your family to travel abroad in the next five years?  The probability that 
yi  (intention to support) equals 1 (yes) is a function of a vector of explanatory variables 
represented by Xi.  β is the vector of parameters which describe the probability that yi = 1 
given a change in Xi. If families that intend to support at least one member to migrate are a 
selection of those who expect to gain from migration then a simple probit might not be 
appropriate as it would not be able to account for selection bias. That is families that intend 
to perpetuate migration would only be a selection of those who have positive remittance 
expectations, in which case the probit model would not be able to control for the effect of 
this selectivity.  In this case a technique such as Heckman selection model via STATA’s 
heckprob procedure would be more appropriate.  
 
The Heckman selection model has two regimes of equations.  Equation (20a) , which is  
defined only if Y2 =1, describes the outcome of  interest, that is the probability of supporting 
a member of the family to migrate: 
    
                      Probit(Y1=1| X1,)= X1 β + U1       Y1 is observed only if Y2=1       (20a) 
 
while equation (20b) describes the probability of experiencing the selecting event: whether 
or not the family expect something 
 
          Probit(Y2=1| X2)= X2ŋ+U2                                                                                              (20b) 
 
The relationship between (20a) and (20b) could therefore be simply presented by the 
following rule 
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                       Y1  Z '$Y1- 6 [['$Y1- \ []                                                                          (21) 
 For j =1, 2 and    u1~ N(0,1)    u2 ~ N(0,1)    corr(u1,u2) = ρ 
 
where y1 is the family migration-support status, x1 vector of predictors, y2 indicates whether 
or not the family expect something from migration, x2 predictors of y2, β and ŋ are associated 
coefficients of (20a) and (20b) respectively, and u1 and u2 are the respective error terms 
assuming bivariate normal distribution. When corr(u1,u2) = ρ = 0, the errors of the two 
models are independent and there is no need for the Heckman probit model; the two probit 
models could just be estimated separately.  Migrant performance will be used to identify the 
selection equation.  As we saw in the previous chapter, migrant performance significantly 
determines remittance expectation status but it would affect intention to support migration of 
family members only through the expectation that the potential migrant will be able to remit. 
In presence of remittance expectations, past performance of migrants is not expected to 
make significant impacts on intention to perpetuate migration in the family.  In other words 
past performance, per se, would not “induce” intentions to perpetuate migration as 
cumulative causation theory holds, but would have to interact with remittance expectations 
before this inducement can take place. Other covariates include migrant performance, 
private information flow between migrants and relations at home, kinship ties and other 
demographic and socioeconomic factors. I hypothesize that remittance expectation would 
have stronger effect on intention to support at least a member to migrate than any other 
socioeconomic factor only under the condition of low private information flow.  It is also 
expected that general/public information flow will play important positive role in 
household’s intention to continue the migration process.  .  
 
Other controlled factors include household socioeconomic and demographic factors that can 
either constrain or boost household migration intentions.  These are general attitude towards 
migration, household wealth, age of household head, number of family members at home of 
origin aged between 15 and 35 years, the number of children (i.e, under the age of 15 years),  
and household average level of education as estimated in Chapter Three.   These are factors 
that have been found in various studies to be positively associated with migration intentions 
(van Dalen et al, 2005; Wentzel et al, 2006; Avato 2008; Fourage and Ester, 2008).   Years 
of migration experience is included as a measure of migration experience in the family.  It is 
expected that families with long history of migration would have rich connections of 
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network that can enhance their migration intentions. Also following the theory of migration 
network, kinship ties are included as part of the control variables to see their effects on 
probability of perpetuating migration process within the household. The test for 
multicollinearity given in Appendix 4O does not show any problem. 
 
 
4.3.4.2 Ordered probit model 
Simple yes-or-no responses may not be strong measures of migration intentions and hence 
predictors of actual migration behaviour.  It has therefore become a common practice in 
recent studies to combine the estimates from a probit model with a more robust measure of 
the strength or intensity of migration intentions people profess. Various techniques have 
been employed to this effect. Avato (2008), for example, developed an index based on a set 
of questions about date of movement, knowledge of destination, availability of funds, etc. 
He then categorised this index to depict increasing likelihood that people will actually move, 
and analysed it with ordered probit technique. Van Dalen et al (2005) on the other hand 
measured the strength of migration intentions with timeline for movement such as “within a 
year”, “over a year”, “unsure.” Adding specifics such as time to intentions has been found to 
be more powerful in increasing the likelihood that the behaviours such as intentions to 
maintaining a healthy diet will actually be performed (Verplanken & Faes, 1999).  This is 
because respondents do exercise some mental effort in stating their intended preferences and 
hence those who are not sure are more likely to state longer period. Since the main objective 
here is to measure the strength of intentions to support international migration from the 
household, I use the number of household/family members that are likely to be supported to 
emigrate within a specific time frame: the next five years. The assumption is that the more 
members the family is willing to support the stronger the family intends to perpetuate the 
migration process.  The options were limited to five as shown in Table 4.11 below, coming 
from the 621 sample of households who intend to continue the migration process. As the 
table shows about two-thirds of the households who intend to perpetuate migration would 
only support just one member within the next five years, while about 37% of them would 
support two or three members.  Options four and five were combined with three since there 
were too few observations, resulting in only three ordinal categories.  As used by Avato and 
van Dalen, ordered probit could be an appropriate technique. However the parallel 
regression assumptions of coefficients, that underlines ordered probit or logit models, is 
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Table : 4.11 Intended number of potential migrants   within five years .  
Number of potential migrants Number of families Percent 
1 379 61.0 
2 161 25.9 
3 69 11.1 
4 8 1.3 
5 4 0.6 
Total  621 100 
 
often violated. For example a Brant test done on ordered logit shows some of the variables 
violate this assumption even though the global test statistic of Prob > chi2 =0.147 is not 
significant at 95% level. The test shows the variables that are most likely to violate the 
parallel regression assumption are two of the variables measuring kinship ties with migrant: 
migrant is a spouse and migrant is either a brother or sister (see Appendix 4P).  Hence a 
generalised ordered probit (goprobit) model is used with the specification given in equation 
(1). 
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where S_intent is the dependent variable measuring the strength of migration intentions, p is 
the probit link function, x the covariates and βi measures the associated coefficients, 
assuming the error has the standard logistic distribution.  Equation (22) is partially 
constrained to allow for the assumption of parallel coefficients for all the covariates except 
for the ones that are strongly found to be responsible for the violation of the assumption. In 
this case some of the Betas or coefficients of the independent variables (those for X1 and X2 ) 
are the same, but others (those for X3) are allowed to vary. These are the two of the variables 
measuring kinship ties with migrant: migrant is a spouse and migrant is either a brother or 
sister as observed from the Brant test.  A further test for the appropriateness of the model is 
given in Appendix 4Q following the suggestion by Williams (2006). The summary statistics 
of the predicted probabilities are similar to the original sample showing that there is no 
negative in-sample predicted probabilities.   The independent variables are the same as those 
given for the probit model, except for the additional explanatory information on whether or 
not the main financial contributor will be the migrant relation abroad when the intended 
migration actually takes place. This is because the step from intentions to behaviour may 
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require additional support from migrant relations as observed in other studies (Glick, 1999; 
Mazzucato, 2009).  
 
 
4.3.4.3 Multinomial logistic model  
It is expected that families that have positive remittance expectations about migration would 
at least have intention to send some of their members abroad. But this is not case. Not all 
families who have remittance expectations have the intention to perpetuate migration. Table 
4.12 below shows families in four groups of expectation-migration-intention decision 
making processes. They are 
1,  a group of families that has both positive remittance expectations and intention to 
support at least one family member to migrate,  
2. a group of families with positive remittance expectations but no intention to 
support any member of the family to migrate,  
3. a group of families with intention to support a member to migrate, but no 
remittance expectations and 
4. group of families with no remittance expectations and no intention to support 
migration of any member from the family.  
 
Table 4.12 Four groups of  expectation- migration-intention choices  
 
Intend to support migration of a family 
member  (N= 943) 
Remittance expectations Yes   (%) No   (%)  
Yes  I    ( 89.9) II   (83.2) 
No  III   ( 10.1) IV   (16.8) 
Total Number  (%) 621 (65.9) 322 (34.1) 
Pearson chi2(1) =   8.5644,   Pr = 0.003 
 
Even though over half of the respondents who have positive remittance expectations will 
also want to continue migration process in their families, about a third of them (34.1%) have 
no intention to support anybody to migrate.  Among the families that have no intention to 
continue migration process, 83.2% of them do have positive remittance expectations, 
nevertheless.  It is this group (II), that is of particular interest in this session of the chapter, 
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so more attention will be devoted to it.  This decision-making process is modelled with 
multinomial logistic regression, taking group I as the reference or comparison category.   
 
Letting yi denote the decision mechanism of the four responses indexed 1, 2, 3, and 4, and 
picking 1 as the base category, the log-odds for other categories can be estimated relative to 
the reference or baseline category.  The log-odds is estimated as linear function of the 
predictors given as  `Y	  7, which denotes the probability that i-th response falls in the    
j-th category. The model is specified  in Equation (23). 
 
 4Y	  7   abcD@AB>E?. abcD@AB>Ed>ef                         (23) 
 
For the reference category,  
 4Y	     ?. abcD@AB>Ed>ef  
 
where yi represents individual categories of expectation-migration-intention choices,   /1is a 
vector of regression coefficients (for j=2,3,4) and  J is the index for the baseline category, 
which is group 1 (positive remittance expectations and intention to support migration of a 
family member) in this  case.  Xi represents the covariates which are the same as the ones 
entered in equation (15). Multinomial logistic regression does not make any assumptions of 
normality, linearity, and homogeneity of variance for the independent variables. The major 
assumption of the multinomial logit model is that it is not appropriate if the alternative 
choices are close substitutes.  That is if the four choices of expectation-migration-intentions 
are very close substitutes the model will not be appropriate. It is therefore advisable that 
before the multinomial logit model is used a test is run to indicate whether this problem 
exists.  Following Garip (2006) a Hausman test is performed; and the result does not show 
any violation of this assumption (see Appendix 4R). There is no threat to the independence 
of irrelevant alternatives. This is not surprising given the fact that all the dependent variables 
exhausts all the possible choices.  As we saw in Appendix 4K, the test for multicollinearity 
among the independent variables shows none of the variance inflation factor (VIF) is less 
than one, indicating absence of multicollinearity.  
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4.4 Variable Definitions 
Tables 4.13 presents the main variables used in the estimations. 
 
Table 4.13: Variable definitions  
 Variable Name Definition  Type  
Remittance expectations  Level of remittance expectation as computed above Continuous 
Private information flow  Dedicated information from the migrant to those left 
behind  
Continuous 
Community dynamics  
Migrant  performance  Migrant achievement at home in terms of investment in 
housing, business and how much he/se sends 
Continuous  
Public information flow Migration information from the general public  Categorical 
Kinship ties  
Migrant is head Migrant is the head of the household but not resident  Categorical  
Migrant is spouse Migrant is a spouse of the household head  Categorical 
Migrant is son/daughter Migrant is a son/daughter to the household head  Categorical 
Migrant is an in-law Migrant is an in-law to the household head  Categorical 
Migrant is brother/sister Migrant is a brother or sister to the household head Categorical 
Migrant is other relation Migrant is other relations to the household head  Categorical 
Migrant is a friend  Migrant is a friend to the household  Categorical 
Household characteristics  
Household wealth  Household wealth as measured by the wealth index Continuous 
HH level of education  Average level of education in the household  Continuous 
Migration experience  Number of years the household has had migrant in the 
family  
Continuous 
Age of household head Age of household head  Continuous 
Age of hh hold head squared Age of household head  squared  Continuous 
 Household size  The number of people in the household who share 
resources together  
Continuous 
HH Contribution to movement  Whether or not household contributed financially to the 
movement  
Categorical 
Main decision maker Whether or not the migrant was the main decision 
maker in the first move, or the household asked the 
migrant to move 
Categorical 
Attitude to migration General attitudes toward migration in the household  Continuous 
 
 
 
4.5 Limitations of the Study  
A major limitation of the study is its inability to generate data to differentiate various types 
of expectations and hence difficulty in sorting out various forms of expectations all of which 
seem to be expressed in the remittance expectations. To do this requires massive collection 
of data which time and inadequate funds did not allow for such exercise. Perhaps in future 
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studies a more refined data can be collected to help us make distinctions between various 
types of expectations and how each type can influence migration decisions.  As stated 
earlier, data on expectations are very rare in developing countries, especially in Africa.  This 
study only lays down the foundation upon which larger scale and perhaps more refined 
information about different types of expectations can be formulated and collected. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF 
HOUSEHOLDS  
5.1 Introduction  
Having operationalised the concepts – migrant performance, information flow and 
expectations – in Chapter Four, I now turn to discuss the determinants of each of these in the 
next two chapters. Before then, we need to know household differ in their demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics as regards the four key variables being considered in this 
study: Migrant performance (remittance flows), information flow, remittance expectations 
and intention to perpetuate migration.  Two-tailed tests of difference in mean are performed 
in all the descriptive statistics to find where significant differences lie. 
 
 
5.2 Characteristics of Remittance recipient and nonrecipient households  
Table 5.1 shows the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of households that have 
receive some remittance and those that have not received anything at all. The statistics are 
presented for remittance recipient and non-recipient households with reported two-tailed test 
of difference in means and accompanying standard errors. Generally there are no major 
statistically significant differences in demographic and socioeconomic characteristics 
between remittance-receiving and non-remittance receiving households.  Among various 
types of kinship ties, friendship presents a significant difference as non-receiving households 
generally have more migrants who are just friends, but fewer migrants who are brothers or 
sisters of the receiving ones. The differences in other types of relationships are almost 
negligible.  Even though not significant, it is interesting to see that non-remittance-receiving 
households have bigger families in terms of number of children under the age of 15 years 
and adults over the age of 15 years.  One would expect that with a higher number of children 
in the household more remittances would flow for payment of school fees, child care and 
other living expenses. Probably the definition of remittance as total receipts of money for 
living expenses, establishment of house and business venture could be a reason for this 
unexpected outcome.  Houses and business ventures, which carry significant weights in 
remittance so defined, have very little to do with presence of children in the household. Also 
with remittance-receiving families having greater number of older household heads, it is 
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expected that they would also have bigger families, but the opposite is the case.  These 
results could perhaps be explained by the fact that these older families have got migrants 
 
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics of remittance-recipient  and nonrecipient households  
 
Recipients Non Recipients  
T-Test of mean 
difference  
 
Mean Std. Error  Mean  
Std. 
Error  
 
Mean 
Std. 
Error  
Migrant is head  0.05 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 
Migrant is a spouse  
        
0.12 0.01 0.06 0.03 
0.06 0.04 
Migrant is a son/daughter 0.46 0.03 0.26 0.08 0.21** 0.09 
Migrant is an in-law 0.13 0.01 0.10 0.04 0.03 0.05 
Migrant is a brother/sister 0.56 0.03 0.56 0.08 0.00 0.10 
Migrant is other relation 0.28 0.02 0.23 0.06 0.05 0.08 
Migrant is a friend 0.04 0.01 0.16 0.0 -0.12*** 0.03 
Household size (adult) 3.74 0.07 3.84 0.22 -0.10 0.24 
Age of household head 47.34 0.59 44.51 1.39 2.81 1.94 
Average level of education  3.52 0.03 3.68 0.09 -0.16* 0.09 
Household wealth 0.08 0.04 -0.01 0.14 0.09 0.16 
Information flow 3.91 0.04 3.26 0.14 
 
 0.66*** 
  
0.13 
No. of children  0.78 0.04 0.87 0.12 -0.09 0.13 
Migrant contributes to  
traveling cost  0.63 0.02 0.62 0.05 
 
0.01 
 
0.06 
Main decision maker - migrant 0.15 0.01 0.12 0.04 0.03 0.04 
Attitude to migration  0.97 0.01 0.79 0.05 0.97*** 0.01 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
who are well established in the host nation and therefore might have brought their immediate 
families members to stay with them. A quick look at Appendix 5A lends support to this 
assumption. The older the household head, the more years migrants have been away and the 
bigger the household size of the migrant in the host country. These are generally consistent 
with what has been found elsewhere (Orozco, 2008). A surprising finding here is the fact 
that families who have not received any form of remittances do have slightly and 
significantly higher level of education. Literature has it that migration, especially 
international migration is selective of educated families. It is therefore expected that more 
educated households would have more number of migrants and hence more flow of 
remittances.  Probably the loose definition of migrant household as families that have 
migrant relations (not necessarily household members) abroad could explain this. As 
discussed in Chapter Three we should also bear in mind that the sample for this study is only 
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limited to international migrant families, and so factors such as education that have been 
found to strongly differentiate migrant households from nonmigrant households in the 
general population may not carry the same weights here.  
 
There is no significant difference between the two groups when it comes to pre-migration 
influences such as final decision makers and main contributors to meeting travelling cost.  
Remittance-receiving households interestingly have slightly and insignificantly higher 
number of migrants who footed most of the travelling cost and took the final decision to 
move. It seems presence or absence of any form of remittance flow to relations left behind 
does not vary significantly according to who bears most of the travelling cost or takes the 
final decision to move. The significant difference between the two groups as regards attitude 
to migration is not surprising as people who have a more positive attitude to migration are 
most likely to develop better relationship with the migrant and influence some flow of 
remittances. 
 
5.3.1 Characteristics of households regarding information flow 
 As we saw in Section 5.2, most of the family members left behind only get private 
information on the social issues such as marital status and family size, and very few get 
information on the economic issues. So in the first part of the descriptive analyses I will like 
to show the differences or similarities in socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of 
the families that score high and low on the index of private information flow, and the second 
shows characteristics of those who source public information and those who do not.   
 
As Table 5.2 shows, generally there are not many statistically significant differences 
between families that have high information or knowledge of the migrant relation and those 
who do not. There is a significant difference between high and low private information as 
regards past performance of migrants, as families with high private information have better 
performance than those with low information. This somewhat gives indication of a possible 
positive influence of remittance flow on increasing flow of private information.  But as 
Figure 5.1 shows this increasing relationship between performance and private information 
flow does not seem to be that significant with the line showing a low gradient. 
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Figure 5.1 Relationship between migrant performance and information flow 
 
 
In terms of relationships or kinship ties, families in which the migrant is much closer (for 
example, head of family, spouse child) are generally more on the high information side than 
the low private  
 
Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics of households that have low and high private 
information flows  
 
High Low T-Test 
  Mean 
Std. 
error  Mean  
Std. 
error  
Mean 
diff 
Std. 
error  
Migrant past performance 1.18 0.07 0.85 0.04 0.33*** 0.07 
Migrant is head  0.06 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.03* 0.01 
Migrant is a spouse 0.13 0.02 0.10 0.01 0.02 0.02 
Migrant is a son/daughter 0.49 0.05 0.42 0.03 0.08 0.05 
Migrant is an in-law 0.12 0.02 0.13 0.02 -0.01 0.03 
Migrant is a brother/sister 0.53 0.04 0.58 0.04 -0.05 0.06 
Migrant is other relation 0.26 0.03 0.29 0.03 -0.03 0.04 
Migrant is a friend 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.01 -0.02 0.02 
Education level  3.60 0.04 3.49 0.03 0.12** 0.05 
Household wealth 0.37 0.07 -0.11 0.05 0.48*** 0.08 
Household size of age 15+ 3.81 0.11 3.72 0.09 0.08 0.14 
No. of children  0.76 0.06 0.80 0.05 -0.04 0.07 
Years of migration  10.54 0.37 10.10 0.30 0.45 0.49 
Age of household head 47.20 0.79 47.12 0.73 0.08 1.14 
Main financial contributor to travel 
- migrant 0.62 0.03 0.64 0.02 -0.03 0.03 
Main migration decision maker -
migrant 0.15 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Attitude  0.95 0.01 0.95 0.01 0.00 0.01 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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information flow.  But it is only in the case of families where the migrant is the head that the 
difference is slightly significant at 10 percent level. Families in which the migrant is a bit of 
a distant relation such as in-laws, other relations and friends are generally on the low side of 
private information flow, though again, these differences are not statistically significant. 
Thus, apart from situations where the migrant is the head of the family, all the other 
variables measuring kinship ties are not statistically significant. Pre-migration factors such 
as whether or not the migrant himself or herself mainly carried the travel cost and/or made 
the final decision to move have some ambivalent differences.  As expected families in which 
the migrant footed the travelling cost are more in the low information flow side most 
probably because the migrant may not feel strong any obligation to share information, 
especially the economic information about him or herself.  However families in which the 
migrant took the final decision to migrate are slightly more on high information side. This is 
a bit surprising because one would expect that more of such families should also be on the 
low side of information as the decision to migrate was more of the migrant’s own than that 
of the family.  In any case these differences, though puzzling, are not statistically significant 
so not much can be read into them. Significant differences between families that have high 
information and those with low information come out against the background of average 
levels of education and wealth. Families in the high category of dedicated private 
information flow have higher average level of education and wealth than their counterparts 
in the low category. This is in contrast with what the previous section showed as more 
families with high level of education do not seem to be receiving remittances. But this is 
expected because the highly educated families are also likely to be found in the higher 
quintiles of wealth and hence the ability to afford high cost of international phone calls. Also 
migrants might find it more comfortable to communicate with highly educated families as 
the latter may find it easier to understand the migrant through their exposure to mass media.  
 
None of the demographic factors such as the size of the household members who are 15 
years old and above, number of children and age of household head have statistically 
significant difference in mean between high and low information flows.  Even though not 
statistically significant, it is somewhat surprising that families whose migrants have been 
away for many years and older household heads are generally found to be on the high side of 
getting information about the migrant.  To further investigate the relationship between years 
of migration and age of household head, and information flow from the migrants, I use a 
lowess with a line representing least-squares smoothing is presented in Figure 5.2.  The 
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figure shows that information flow rises rapidly with increase in number of years the 
migrant has been away until around 15 years before it becomes relatively stable for the next 
ten years and then begins to decline. This therefore confirms the notion that private 
information flow eventually decreases with increase in years of migration even though the 
decrease does not seem to be that significant in this sample.  The figure also shows a similar 
relationship between information flow and age of household head, except that here the 
declining trend at older ages is more pronounced.  Information flow declines quite 
significantly after the age of 60 years for the household head.  As stated earlier this is very 
much expected as they might have older migrants who are well integrated at their host 
countries.  It must however be admitted that, for a greater period of the time in both cases, 
private information rises. 
 
Figure 5.2: Relationship between information flow, years of migration and age of household head 
 With  lowess smoother 
 
 
   
5.3.2 Descriptive statistics households regarding public information flow 
Just as found in the descriptive characteristics of families that have either low or high levels 
of private information about the migrant, most of the differences between families that got 
some information from the community through non-migrant relations and friends (public 
information) and those who did not seek information from this source are not statistically 
significant (see Table 5.3).  Interestingly, though, most of the characteristics that show 
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higher values of private information have lower values of public information. For instance, 
with the exception of migrants who are spouse to the household head, most of the families in 
which the migrant is much closer do not seek information from other sources.  Families in 
which the migrant is a friend or an in-law of the household head mostly seek information 
from other sources, on average. As expected, families that do not seek public information 
are found to be better educated than those who do otherwise.  Better educated families 
should be better placed to source information about the socioeconomic conditions of the 
migrants from the migrants themselves.  Also families that do not source public information 
are generally wealthier and have bigger family size.  As found in the previous section, 
bigger families generally are able to get higher level of information from the migrants than  
 
Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics of households that do or do not source public information  
 
Yes No T-Test 
  Mean 
std. 
error  Mean  
Std. 
error  
Mean  
diff 
Std. 
error  
Migrant past performance 1.01 0.04 0.86 0.08 0.15* 0.08 
Migrant is head of household  0.04 0.01 0.06 0.01 -0.02 0.02 
Migrant is a spouse 0.12 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Migrant is a son/daughter 0.43 0.03 0.49 0.06 -0.05 0.06 
Migrant is in-law 0.13 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Migrant is a brother/sister 0.55 0.03 0.60 0.05 -0.06 0.06 
Migrant is other relation 0.26 0.02 0.32 0.04 -0.06 0.05 
Migrant is a friend 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Education level  3.49 0.03 3.63 0.05 -0.14** 0.06 
Household wealth 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.08 -0.03 0.09 
Household size of age 15+ 3.62 0.08 4.09 0.14 -0.46*** 0.15 
No. of children  0.75 0.04 0.89 0.07 -0.14* 0.08 
Years of migration  10.39 0.28 9.94 0.43 0.44 0.52 
Age of household head 47.48 0.67 46.33 0.91 1.15 1.21 
Main financial contributor to 
travel - migrant 0.64 0.02 0.61 0.03 0.04 0.03 
Main migration decision maker -
migrant 0.15 0.01 0.16 0.02 -0.01 0.03 
Attitude  0.97 0.01 0.93 0.02 0.04*** 0.02 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
      
smaller ones, and hence may not be interested in seeking information from nonmigrants. The 
advantage of bigger households could be that at least one or two, if not all, of the members 
may be in the position to get information from the migrant.  
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5.4 Characteristics of families with remittance expectations   
Table 5.4 presents a descriptive statistics of households that expect some remittances and 
those that do not expect anything at all.  Of all the types of kinship ties, it is only in cases 
where the migrant is either a household head or spouse that we find a significant difference 
between the expectant and non-expectant families.  But there is no significant difference  
 
Table 5.4: Descriptive statistics of expectant and non-expectant families  
 
Expectant 
Families  
Non-Expectant 
Families  T-test of difference 
  Mean  
Std. 
Error  Mean  
Std 
Error 
Difference  
in mean Std. Error 
Migrant is head 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04** 0.02 
Migrant is spouse 0.12 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.06** 0.03 
Migrant is son/daughter 0.43 0.03 0.54 0.08 -0.11 0.08 
Migrant is an in-law 0.13 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.04 
Migrant is brother/sister 0.55 0.03 0.65 0.08 -0.10 0.08 
Migrant is other relation 0.29 0.02 0.22 0.06 0.06 0.07 
Migrant is a friend  0.05 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.03 
Performance of migrant 6.11 0.15 4.09 0.37 2.02*** 0.43 
Current information flow 4.08 0.04 4.15 0.11 -0.07 0.11 
Public  information  0.93 0.02 0.66 0.06 0.27*** 0.07 
Household wealth  0.05 0.04 0.19 0.11 -0.14 0.13 
HH level of education  3.52 0.03 3.61 0.08 -0.09 0.08 
Years of migration  10.43 0.25 9.27 0.63 1.16 0.72 
Age of household head 42.39 0.77 46.68 1.87 -4.29** 2.18 
 Household size  4.54 0.07 4.54 0.16 0.00 0.21 
HH bears travel cost 0.36 0.02 0.42 0.05 -0.06 0.05 
Main decision maker 0.23 0.02 0.21 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Attitude to migration  0.97 0.01 0.81 0.04     .16*** 0.02 
No. of Expectants =826;  Non-expectants =117;   *p<0.1; **p<0.05 ;    ***p<0.01 
 
between the two sets of families when it comes to current flow of private information about 
the socioeconomic conditions of the migrant members, even though the latter has slightly a 
higher level of information flow.  There are significant differences in the flow of public 
information as the expectants families have slightly higher public information flow.  Non-
expectant families significantly have older household heads than expectant families. This 
could probably be due to the fact that older families have also been in migration process for 
a long time enough to have realised most of the things they expect to get from migration.   
On average performance of migrants of expectant families is significantly higher than their 
counterparts from non-expectant families.  Families that expect some flows of remittances 
have significantly better attitudes towards migration than their non- expectant counterparts. 
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Interestingly there is no significant difference between those who did and those who did not 
contribute financially to the movement of the migrant. Does this imply that one does not 
have to make any financial contribution in the movement for one to expect to get something 
from migrant?   
 
In addition to the t-test of differences, a closer look at the relationship between expectations 
and migrant performance at as well as information flows with lowess smoother plots is given 
in Figures 5.3 and 5.4. Generally remittance expectations rise with increase in migrant 
 
Fig. 5.3:  Migrant performance and remittance expectation          
 
 
performance.  That is, for the bulk of the sample, there is a positive relationship between 
remittance expectations and migrant performance indicating that families that have seen 
migrants doing something at home of origin do have high expectations of remittance flows. 
From Figure 5.4 remittance expectations generally rise with increase in private information 
flow up to about level five where families at home of origin would have information on 
marital status or family size and education.  Beyond this level of information flow, 
expectations start decreasing. In other words people who have access to high information 
flow, like type of job and salary, seem to have lower levels of remittance expectations than 
those who have average information levels. However it would be too early to read too much 
into this relationship without controlling for other factors.  
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Fig. 5.4: Private information flow and remittance expectation  
 
 
 
 
5.5 Remittance expectations and household migration support intentions 
Remittance expectation is a major factor in migration in intentions to perpetuate migration 
and the strength of these intentions. However, we also find that in spite of having remittance 
expectations some households do not have any intention of supporting any of their members 
for migration. This leaves us with four different choices between remittance expectations 
and intention to perpetuate migration.   Table 5.5 presents descriptive characteristics of the 
four decision groups: (1) those who have remittance expectations and intend to support 
migration of a member; (2) those who have remittance expectations but do not intend to 
support migration of a household member; (3) those who intend to support migration but 
have no remittance expectation, and (4) those who neither have remittance expectations nor 
intention to support migration of a household member. Generally households that have 
remittance expectations and intend to support migration (Group 1) have higher average score 
in most of the covariates being considered. They have migrant relations who have performed 
better than those of the rest of the groups; they have higher access to both private and public 
information flows about migration; they have more members within the age of 15 and 35 
years, and they have had many more years of experience in having relations who are 
international migrants. But more importantly they also have higher average score in most of 
the kinship ties than the other three groups.  It is therefore not surprising that, on average, 
these families also have much better attitude towards migration than the rest of the groups. 
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Families that have remittance expectations but do not intend to perpetuate migration seem to 
be the poorest as well as the youngest, on average. This perhaps implies that they may not 
have the funds as well as the potential people for them to perpetuate migration. However, 
the fact that the wealthiest group (i.e Group 4) do not intend to support any one for 
migration perhaps shows that availability of funds is not enough reason to support migration. 
There is not much difference in human capital available to the first three groups, but Group 
4; that is those who neither expect anything nor intend to support migration, has apparently 
higher average level of education than the rest. This is not surprising as there is usually a 
positive relationship between household wealth and levels of education. 
 
These descriptive analyses show that kinship ties seem to have some positive influence on 
remittance flow or migrant performance.  But these ties do not seem to be enough in 
influencing high flow of dedicated private information flow. At this stage it seems wealth, 
education and past performance of migrant at home of origin stand out to have some positive 
Table 5.5: Descriptive statistics of households’  expectation-migration-support intentions  choices 
(1) Expect  and 
support 
(2) Expect 
but  not 
support 
(3) No t 
expect  but 
support 
(4) Not 
expect & no 
support 
Mean  Std dev Mean  Std. dev  Mean  
Std. 
dev n  
Std. 
dev  
Performance of migrants  1.12 1.18 0.80 0.93 0.67 0.77 0.66 0.83 
Household wealth  0.12 1.21 -0.08 1.40 0.14 0.99 0.26 1.44 
Private information flow 3.92 1.08 3.75 1.19 3.89 1.31 3.59 1.19 
Age of HH household head 46.88 16.87 46.83 16.75 49.79 17.33 48.48 15.75 
Years of migration experience  10.61 7.17 9.96 7.37 9.55 7.06 8.94 6.51 
Public information flow 0.76 0.43 0.70 0.46 0.65 0.48 0.39 0.49 
Household level of education  3.54 0.72 3.50 0.78 3.45 0.89 3.79 0.87 
No. of HH members of age 
15-35 2.47 1.52 2.28 1.74 2.29 1.35 2.26 1.55 
No. of children (< 15 years) 0.75 1.07 0.88 1.11 0.79 1.17 0.72 1.12 
Attitude to migration 0.98 0.15 0.97 0.17 0.92 0.27 0.69 0.47 
Migrant bears travel cost 0.50 0.50 - - 0.22 0.42 - - 
Migrant is head of family 0.06 0.24 0.03 0.18 0.01 0.13 - - 
Migrant is a spouse 0.12 0.33 0.11 0.32 0.03 0.18 0.09 0.29 
Migrant is a son/daughter 0.46 0.86 0.37 0.65 0.65 0.95 0.41 0.63 
Migrant is an in-law 0.14 0.45 0.13 0.40 0.10 0.35 0.09 0.29 
Migrant is a brother  0.59 0.89 0.47 0.75 0.46 0.78 0.87 0.91 
Migrant is other relation  0.33 0.74 0.20 0.48 0.19 0.43 0.26 0.81 
Migrant is a friend  0.04 0.22 0.07 0.34 0.08 0.52 - - 
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effect on private information flow. As regards expectations and migration intentions past 
performance and pubic information seem to be important in remittance expectations as well 
as intentions to perpetuate migration within the family.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
REMITTANCE AND INFORMATION FLOWS BETWEEN MIGRANTS AND 
RELATIONS LEFT BEHIND   
Back home, expectations are so high among family members, friends and relations that it 
does not matter whether these individuals are able to make it to the so-called ‘promise land’ 
or not. It does not matter whether they are employed or not. After all who cares to hear 
their stories? They are in America and Europe where milk and honey flows, so they have no 
excuses – Tsikata, 2006 
 
6.1 Introduction  
In the strict sense of the new economics of labour migration (NELM), framework, 
investigating relationship between remittance flow and information flow might not be 
necessary, because the flow of remittance is enough indication that the contract between the  
and those left behind is being honoured (Scapens and Arnold, 1986; Stark and Taylor, 
1991).  If the flow of remittance or performance of migrants is enough, there will not be 
expectations, and perhaps no consequent desire to support more migration, because the very 
need for engaging in migration in the first place has been met.  The fact that there are some 
expectations means either the initial need or a new need has not been met.    Throughout the 
survey of literature we saw that kinship ties are very key in influencing remittance flows. 
And since migrants would have some sort of communication in their interactions with home 
as they observe the contract, one would assume that those left behind would have access to 
private information flow. 
 
We saw in Chapter Two, that there is a lot of debate around the flow of information between 
migrants and those left behind.  While some would agree with NELM’s assumption based 
on kinship responsibility for one another as a basis for cooperation including flow of 
information (Young, 2007; Hagen-Zanker; Mazzucato, 2009), contributions from 
information economics (Ryan et al, 2002) and rational expectations studies point to the  
contrary. According to this school information flow cannot be assumed to be available to 
everyone, even with the flow of remittance. With a vast geographical distance between the 
migrants and the relations left at home in international migration, the assumption of 
availability of information between migrants and those left behind becomes highly 
untenable. Other studies have also established that, in absence of legal bindings, the trust in 
social norms to relational values to guide information flow and monitoring is bound to give 
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rise to moral hazard with resultant information asymmetries between migrants and those left 
behind (Chen, 2006).    
 
In this chapter I contribute to this debate by examining whether or not the influence kinship 
ties and wealth have on observed remittance flow or migrant performance is the same 
influence they have on observed flow of information. The main question here is, does flow 
of remittance or migrant performance at home of origin simultaneously lead to increasing 
flow of information from the migrant to those left behind?  In addition to the direct 
information flow from the migrants, people left at home of origin also source information 
from friends and other relations in the community. This is what I call public information 
flow.  An analysis is done to determine factors that make families rely on this source of 
information. It must, however, be pointed out that the focus of the chapter is more on the  
dedicated private information flow from the migrants as estimated with the information 
index in Chapter Four than information sourced from the community.  But before then it is 
important to know major determinants of remittance flow or migrant performance as this 
will help us to explain better the determinants of private information flow. 
 
 
6.2.1 Exploring determinants of individual migrant performance in key items 
Even though most of the differences between families that have received remittances and 
those who have not are not significant in the descriptive analysis as observed in previous 
chapter, all the variables described above are entered in the multivariate model using 
maximum likelihood to assess their relative importance in determining the household’s 
likelihood of receiving the individual items. Table 6.1 presents result from a probit model 
estimating the effects of kinship ties on the probability of the household receiving money for 
living expenses, house and business investment controlling for various socioeconomic and 
demographic factors. In addition to the individual items, there are also estimates for  
probability of a household receiving something or nothing all.  Consistent with the results 
from the descriptive statistics, all the kinship types, with exception of friendship, have 
positive effects on the likelihood of the household receiving something from their migrants. 
The predictive effects are higher, as expected for closer relations such as spouse and 
household head. The results however reveal some significant differences in the effects these 
determinants have on the likelihood of the household receiving individual items.  
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Relationships are the dominant factors in determining receipt of money for living expenses 
with families in which the migrant is the head of the household or a spouse of the household 
head having much more impact than any other factor for obvious reasons. As found 
elsewhere (Manuh, 2001; Orozco, 2008), the influence of parents is among the strongest 
predictors of migrant remittance attitudes in the community of origin. Orozco finds that 
parents receive about 46% of the remittances sent by Ghanaian migrants in Netherland. This 
has been attributed to the strong matrilineal system among the Akans of Ghana (refer to  
 
Table 6.1: Results from probit model estimating effects of kinship ties on the likelihood of 
receiving money, house and business investment. 
 
At least one item Money House 
 
Business  
 
 
Coef. 
Std. 
err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. 
Std. 
err. Coef. 
Std. 
err. 
Kinship ties          
Migrant is head 0.791** 0.390 0.678** 0.277 0.325 0.219 0.389* 0.227 
Migrant is a spouse 0.605** 0.249 0.660*** 0.215 0.454*** 0.149 0.417*** 0.155 
Migrant is a son/daughter 0.336*** 0.119 0.211** 0.095 0.096 0.066 -0.002 0.073 
Migrant is an in-law 0.430** 0.198 0.152 0.141 0.097 0.104 0.083 0.114 
Migrant is a brother/sister 0.221** 0.099 0.162** 0.080 0.018 0.059 0.058 0.065 
Migrant is other relation 0.212* 0.112 0.214** 0.096 0.086 0.068 -0.010 0.077 
Migrant is a friend -0.190 0.167 0.010 0.162 -0.533*** 0.196 0.292* 0.158 
Household Characteristics          
No. of adults -0.054 0.038 -0.093*** 0.032 0.039 0.026 0.036 0.029 
Household Wealth 0.058 0.055 0.062 0.047 0.077** 0.037 0.161*** 0.043 
Household education level -0.120 0.092 -0.135* 0.079 -0.070 0.061 0.053 0.069 
Age of household head -0.017 0.013 -0.017 0.011 -0.006 0.009 -0.005 0.010 
Age of household head  sq. 0.000** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No. of children -0.092 0.058 -0.158*** 0.048 -0.012 0.040 0.023 0.046 
Migrant main contributor 0.167 0.160 0.000 0.138 0.224** 0.110 -0.023 0.122 
Migrant main decision 
maker 
0.016 0.218 0.110 0.192 -0.054 0.144 0.081 0.155 
Family migration  attitude 1.208*** 0.221 1.155*** 0.213 0.923*** 0.226 0.772** 0.299 
Constant 0.779 0.597 0.897* 0.515 -0.667 0.437 -1.905*** 0.528 
Number of obs. 942  942  942  942  
LR chi2 66.01  81.07  55.68  47.01  
Prob >Chi2 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Pseudo R2 0.119  0.103  0.043  0.048  
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
Chapter One).  A failure of the migrant to provide a decent shelter for the parents, especially 
if the parents are renting is considered an embarrassing situation for the migrant who is 
largely expected to lead the way in providing decent life for the parents. The situation 
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becomes worse if maternal relations find out that more support is going to the in-laws. This 
is considered utter “stupidity” as the in-law does not belong to the maternal lineage (Ibid).  
The comparatively lower effect of sibling (brother or sister) is perhaps not surprising. 
Migrants do not express as much concern for brothers or sisters as they do with parents. 
Some, especially male migrants, have been found to be complaining that their sisters at 
home of origin just continue to reproduce without much regards to care of the children 
(Ibid).  The matrilineal system which traditionally sees to it that nephews and nieces inherit 
from uncles and aunts sometimes makes parents shy away from their responsibilities and 
often look to brothers and sisters for support (Nukunya, 2003).  It is because of this that 
migrants would sometimes support their siblings in business investment or help them to 
travel abroad so that they would also contribute to the support of others in the entire 
extended family (Mazzucato, 2009). 
 
It is clear from this study that the sense of obligation towards close relatives such as spouse, 
parent and children means that they are more likely to get some money from the migrants.   
The effect of friendship is negative, though not significant, in receipts of money.   Surely 
kinship obligations differ according to the type of relationship (Orozco, 2008; De Vries et al, 
2009).  But an interesting phenomenon here is the significantly negative impact of 
household size. One would expect that all things being equal the presence of children would 
induce a flow of money for living expenses such as school fees. This negative effect which 
is also hinted at in the descriptive analysis is first thought to be influenced by the definition 
of total remittance flows which include houses and business investment that may have very 
little to do with children.  But the negative effect even on the flow of money for living 
expenses means it is something more than just the definition of remittance in the study. In a 
similar investigation, Garip (2006) also found a negative relationship between presence of 
school-going children in the family left behind and remittance flows. Amidst difficulty in 
explaining this unexpected outcome, she attributed this to the fact that the sample for the 
study was limited to migrants of ages between 18 and 35 years, who would probably not 
have children of school-going age. With the average age of migrants being 37 in this sample, 
this may not hold in explaining this unexpected outcome.  Even though the data do not allow 
us to empirically confirm, a possible explanation could be that these are not children of the 
migrants as the definition of migrant household does not strictly mean the migrant is a 
member of the household but just a relation.  So relationship would be more important than 
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just the number of biological children or adult the family has in inducing migrants to send 
money.   
 
Effects of these determinants on house investment are not too different from that of money 
for living expenses.  Friendship with the migrant significantly exhibits negative impact, 
while other relationships generally have positive impacts on house investment. The major 
difference here is that it is only the spouse that is statistically significant in having a positive 
influence on household’s likelihood of having its migrant building a house.  Household 
wealth, which is not significant in influencing flow of money for living expenses, has a 
significantly positive influence on household’s likelihood of getting a house built by the 
migrant at home. This could most probably be due to that fact that being wealthy, the 
household frees the resources from the migrant that could have been used for living 
expenses and significantly helps the migrant to reallocate it into other uses including 
housing.   
 
Demographic factors, again, are not important determinants of migrant performance in 
housing investment.  Building a house is one of the major objectives of travelling abroad. 
When a migrant bears most of the travelling cost, it is more likely that he or she will have 
more controlling influence on how to use the money he or she makes. He or she can 
therefore allocate remittances into realising his/her aim of building a house. On the other 
hand, if a major part of the financial contribution to travel costs is from the household, then 
there is a higher likelihood of the migrant being bound to the consumption demand from the 
rest of the family left behind and hence an inability to fulfil other aims such as housing and 
business investment.  
 
When it comes to business investment, effects of relationships are somewhat ambiguous. 
Spouses have significant effect on business investment.  Interestingly, friendship which has 
been recording negative impact on cash remittance and housing investment has a 
significantly positive effect on business investment. One explanation that could be offered 
for this is that most often migrants have been found to be using friends to either monitor 
their investments at home of origin or to do some market investigations when they intend to 
invest (Orozco, 2008; Mazzucato, 2009).  Household wealth has positive marginal effect on 
business investment. That is also not surprising because, as explained earlier, wealthier 
families would probably not use the money allocated to business investment for other 
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purposes. Among poorer households, there have been lots of cases in which migrants have 
come home to find that all the money sent for certain purposes have been diverted into 
something else (Owusu, 2000).   
 
 
6.2.2 Determinants of Migrant Performance at home of origin  
Table 6.2 presents the results from the OLS regression and Heckman models. As the 
likelihood ratio test significantly indicates the error terms of the equations are not 
independent, meaning it is appropriate to apply the Heckman model to estimating effects of 
kinship ties and socioeconomic characteristics of the household on migrant’s performance at 
home of origin.  The diagnostic tests of correlation matrix, multicollinearity, Ramsey test 
and kernel density estimates of residuals given in Appendices 6A, 6B and 6C, respectively 
 
Table 6.2: Determinants of migrant performance at home of origin (OLS) 
 
OLS Model  Heckman Model 
Coef. S. E. 
Coef. S.E Marg. 
coef 
Marg.S.E 
Outcome Equation: Migrant performance at home 
Kinship Ties        
Migrant is head  0.218*** 0.084 0.087 0.087 0.153* 0.083 
Migrant is a spouse 0.363*** 0.056 0.272*** 0.059 0.310*** 0.054 
Migrant is a son/daughter 0.169*** 0.025 0.131*** 0.027 0.205*** 0.024 
Migrant is an in-law 0.116*** 0.040 0.103** 0.042 0.172** 0.038 
Migrant is a brother/sister 0.124*** 0.023 0.102*** 0.024 0.157*** 0.021 
Migrant is other relation 0.110*** 0.026 0.075*** 0.027 0.116*** 0.025 
Migrant is a friend -0.071 0.059 0.061 0.071 0.060 0.064 
Household characteristics        
No. of adults 0.001 0.010 0.012 0.011 0.003 0.009 
Household Wealth 0.061*** 0.014 0.054*** 0.015 0.057*** 0.013 
Household education level -0.014 0.024 0.007 0.025 -0.010 0.022 
Age of household head -0.002 0.003 0.001 0.004 -0.002 0.003 
Age of household head  sq. 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No. of children -0.009 0.016 0.013 0.017 0.001 0.015 
Migrant main contributor  0.082* 0.043 0.040 0.045 0.045 0.040 
Migrant main decision maker  0.029 0.056 0.016 0.059 0.034 0.052 
Family migration  attitude  0.405*** 0.079     
_cons -0.240 0.166 0.656*** 0.159   
LR test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0):   chi2(1) =    47.87   Prob > chi2 = 0.0000  [*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01] 
 
 
show that the model is appropriate. Comparing the coefficients from the OLS and marginal 
effects estimates from the Heckman model, it seems most of the significant differences are 
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from the kinship ties variables.   Because a lot has already been discussed around household 
likelihood of receiving at least one item in the previous section, the selection equation from 
the Heckman model has been omitted from the discussion here. This is because the selection 
equation measures the same probability of a household receiving at least one item from the 
migrant. The outputs from the selection equation are given in Appendix 6D.  
 
As observed in previous sections kinship ties influence migrant’s performance more than 
any other variable. All the relationship types, with the exception of friendship, have 
significantly positive effects on migrant’s performance.  And quite expectedly households in 
which the migrant is the head or spouse have the highest marginal effects on performance, 
about twice the effects from other types of relationship.  The strong but varying effects of 
kinship ties on migrant performance, perhaps resonates effects of altruism as explained by 
Stark and Lucas (1985).  Altruism is a more powerful force among close relations than 
distant ones. There may be some exceptions, of course, but generally altruism within the 
family should prevail over nonrelatives. If altruism is behind the positive effects of 
relationships on migrant performance at home of origin, then poor families should command 
more performance from the migrants.  But the positive effect of wealth on migrant 
performance shows that a unit increase in household wealth increases migrant performance 
by about 6%, perhaps confirming the explanation from the tempered altruistic model of 
remittance theories that the wealthier households wield their power over the migrants to 
make them perform.  A more plausible explanation though should be that wealthier 
households have the trust of the migrants for housing and business investment as observed 
and explained in the previous section. Also the fact that they tend to have more number of 
migrants than the poor (Table 4.4 in Chapter Four), wealthier households are more likely to 
have good performance from at least one of their migrant relations. It should therefore not be 
surprising that they would have more migrants sending home. 
 
Demographic factors such as age of household head, number of children and adults are not 
significant determinants of migrant total performance. This is not surprising because as seen 
in the previous section, the demographic factors generally have weak effects on household’s 
likelihood of receiving something.  Probably these factors would have to interact with other 
factors such as relationships and wealth before they could have any significant impacts on 
migrant total performance.  
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6.3 Remittance and information flow  
In the preceding section, we saw that kinship ties and household wealth are quite important 
in influencing the flow of remittances and migrant performance. It will therefore not be 
surprising to find family members left behind use experience of past performance to form 
their remittance expectations. But whether or not the past performance of a migrant can 
strongly influence these remittance expectations largely depends on the type of information 
relations left behind get from the migrants or other sources.  It will also depend on whether 
or not the information is enough. This is because as we discussed in Chapter Two, people 
form expectations based not only on experience of past event of the variable but also on 
other relevant information about the entity available to them. Information flow determines 
the level of knowledge families at home have about the socioeconomic conditions of their 
migrant relations.  Both the quantity and quality of information flow about current 
socioeconomic conditions of the migrants have profound effects on the structure of the 
household’s subjective remittance expectations. This is because information opens the 
windows for those left behind to know what is going on at the destination country while 
shaping their general thinking around what to expect and further migration intentions. The 
flow of this information also helps agents to monitor the environment within which their 
expectations are formed.   
 
6.3.1 Impact of remittance flow on private and public information flows  
The multivariate analyses from this and the next section would either confirm or dispel the 
findings emerging from the descriptive analyses.  I estimate the impact of remittance flow 
on both private and public information flows. As described in Chapter Four, instrumental 
variable (IV) technique is used to control for possible effect of endogenous relationship 
between remittance and information flows.  The test for exogenous relationship between 
remittance and both types of information flows is not significant (See Appendix 6Eii), 
indicating that there is no basis to suspect endogenous relationship between them, so perhaps 
focusing on OLS and probit estimates will do. Table 6.3 below presents only the results 
from OLS and probit estimates.  (See Appendix 6Ei for the estimates from the IV technique 
as compared with the OLS probit models).  
 
From the OLS estimate remittance flow is a significant factor in influencing private 
information flow. However, when the model is run for only households that have access to  
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Table 6.3 Determining impact of remittance flow on private and public 
information flows with OLS and probit models  
Private information  
 
Public information  
  Coef. 
Std.  
Error 
 
 
Coef. 
 
Std. 
error  
 
  
Remittance flow  0.656*** 0.139 0.104** 0.043  
Kinship ties       
Migrant is head  -0.061 0.187 -0.181 0.223  
Migrant is a spouse 0.093 0.126 -0.039 0.161  
Migrant is a son/daughter -0.056 0.057 -0.132* 0.072  
Migrant is in-law -0.156 0.091 0.043 0.117  
Migrant is a brother/sister -0.149*** 0.054 -0.095 0.068  
Migrant is other relation -0.193*** 0.061 -0.134* 0.074  
Migrant is a friend -0.218* 0.131 -0.189 0.173  
Household characteristics       
Household  education level  -0.012 
-0.020 
0.053 
0.053 
-0.145** 0.065  
Household wealth 0.154*** 0.032 0.009 0.040  
Household size of age 15+ -0.003 0.022 -0.093*** 0.027 
No. of children  -0.068* 
-0.074** 
0.035 
0.035 
-0.126*** 0.053 
Years of migration experience 0.038** 0.017 0.023* 0.007 
Age of household head 0.006 0.001 -0.011 0.001 
Age of hh head squared -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Main financial contributor to 
travel - migrant 
 
-0.002 
 
0.095 
 
-0.018 
 
0.117 
Main migration decision maker -
migrant 
 
0.041 
 
0.123 
 
-0.030 
 
0.152 
Attitude  0.086 
 
0.183 
 
0.485** 0.205 
Constant  3.071*** 0.386 1.151** 0.448 
 No. obs. =938 No. obs. =938  
 F(19, 910) = 4.69 LRchi2(18) =57.52  
 Prob > f= 0.000   Prob > chi2= 0.000   
 Adj. R2= 0.070    Pseudo R2=0.051  
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
high private information flow, remittance flow has no significant effect on information flow 
(See Appendix 6F). This means that the positive effect of remittance flow on access to 
private information is limited to only lower levels of the latter.  Remittance flow has positive 
effect on public information flow about migrants in place of origin. This positive effect is 
irrespective of whether or not the model is estimated for families with low or high private 
information flows (See Appendix 6F). This is expected because what migrants do at home 
generates lots of ‘gossip’ within the community, and this becomes a source of information 
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about the migrant to many families.  It is these ‘gossips’ that Tsikata (2006) observes in 
Ghana as some families cutting ties with their migrant relations because the latter have “not 
been able to remit them as Johnny has been doing for his parents.” 
 
The other variables in the model exhibit varying, but largely expected effects on information 
flow. All types of kinship ties have negative albeit some insignificant effects on both types 
of information flows.  While the negative effect of children under the age of 15 years is not 
surprising as they may be too young to get any relevant information about migrant relations, 
the negative effect of number of adults in the household, especially in seeking public 
information is quite surprising since one would expect that increasing number of adults in 
the household would lead to more people in the household seeking information from this 
source. Education is not a significant factor in determining private information. It however 
has a significant negative effect on public information flow. This is also expected given that 
more educated people are more likely to deem information from nonmigrant as unreliable 
and would rather trust what they get from the migrants themselves. Household wealth has 
also got this opposing effect. While wealth is positively associated with private information 
flow, it has a negative effect on public information flow. With time, though, families would 
hear something about the migrant, be it public or private information as the significant 
positive effect of migration years shows.  
 
There are two important findings here that have important implications in the next chapter. 
One, though remittance flow seems to have some positive effect on private information 
flow, there is no endogenous relationship between them.  And two, the positive effect of 
remittance flow on private information seems to be limited to low levels of the latter, though 
we will have to confirm this in the next section 
 
 
6.3.2 Determinants of higher levels of private information flow  
Table 6.4 presents the estimates from the generalised ordered logic (gologit2) model with 
alternative parameterization and gammas (i.e deviations from the parallel assumption).  The 
first panel (Gamma 1) contrasts “Very low” category with all the other three higher 
categories, the second panel (Gamma_2) contrasts categories “Very low” and “Low” 
categories with those of “High” and “Very high”, while the third panel contrasts the first  
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Table 6.4 Determining higher levels of private information flow with 
generalized ordered logit model 
Gamma 1 
 
Gamma 2 
 
Gamma 3 
  Coef. 
Std.  
Error 
 
Coef.  
 
Std. 
error  
 
Coef. 
 
Std. 
error  
Gamma_1      
Migrant performance at home 0.876*** 0.107 -0.652*** 0.103 -0.487*** 0.137  
Kinship Ties         
Migrant is head  0.104 0.318      
Migrant is a spouse 0.020 0.217      
Migrant is a son/daughter 0.160** 0.126 -0.210** 0.102 -0.683*** 0.238  
Migrant is in-law -0.153 0.152      
Migrant is a brother/sister -0.200** 0.097      
Migrant is other relation -0.168 0.106      
Migrant is a friend -0.201 0.239    
Household Characteristics         
Household  education level  -0.232** 0.101 0.272*** 
0.211*** 
0.083 
0.08 
0.393**     0.203 
0.203 
 
Household wealth 0.279*** 0.057      
Household size of age 15+ -0.004 0.038     
No. of children  -0.092 0.061     
Years of migration 0.066*** 0.029     
Years of migration squared -0.001 0.001     
Age of household head 0.011 0.013     
Age of household head 
squared  
 
-0.000 
 
0.000 
    
Main financial contributor to 
travel - migrant 
 
0.017 
 
0.165 
    
Main migration decision 
maker -migrant 
 
-0.059 
 
0.203 
    
Attitude   0.122 0.315     
Constant        
Alpha       
_cons_1   0.221 0.669     
_cons_2 -1.407*** 0.664     
_cons_3 -4.366*** 0.943     
Number of obs   =        938     
 LR chi2(25)     =     168.28     
 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000     
Pseudo R2       =     0.0727     
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
three categories with the “Very high” category. Since the coefficient of constrained variables 
are the same for all the panels, they are not repeated in gamma 2 and gamma 3; only the 
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different effects exhibited by unconstrained variables – level of household education, 
performance of migrant and brother or sister – are presented.   
 
As found in the descriptive statistics, with the exception of son/daughter, brother or sister, 
all the other relationship variables measuring kinship ties are not statistically significant 
determinants of higher levels of information flow. That is they do not significantly increase 
or decrease the likelihood of a migrant family moving to higher categories of private 
information flow. Even the significant ones have negative effects on higher flow of 
information.  When the migrant is a son or daughter to the household head, it initially 
increases the likelihood of the household getting more information from him or her. 
However, increasing number of migrant sons or daughters for the household does not lead to 
corresponding increase in private information. This is surprising because one would expect 
that the strength of social norms and obligations which characterise kinship ties would 
bridge any gap in information flow created by distance as argued by Young (2007) and 
Mazzucato (2009) and also assumed by the network and NELM and network theories of 
migration. Thus the strength of social norms, customary rules and values of kinship network 
is not enough for families to get information from the migrants in spite of the fact that they 
are key determinants of remittance flow.  If anything at all these ties seem to have negative 
effects confirming the results from OLS in the previous section. Other insignificant factors 
are number of children under the age of 15 years, age of household head, and decision 
around migration.  
 
For families to get higher levels of private information from migrants they may need to rely 
on other factors than the kinship ties. Major significant determinants of higher levels of 
private information flow from migrants to relations back home are years of migration, 
household wealth and level of education. Increase in the number of years of migration in the 
family increases the likelihood of knowing more about the migrants.  Thus the longer the 
migrant has been away the more it seems the family can have dedicated information flow. If 
families cannot wait for time to bring them the information then they must have the wealth.  
It is not surprising to find that wealth has significant positive effect on private information 
flow at all levels. Wealth does not only enable the household to have the resources for 
communication, it also has a possible effect of making the migrant feel more relaxed in 
giving more information as the fear of excessive demand may not be very strong with 
wealthy family relations left behind.  
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Migrant performance/remittance flow has an initial positive effect on information flow. But 
as observed in kernel density plot of Figure 5.1 in Chapter Five, increasing flow of 
remittance does not necessarily lead to increasing flow of dedicated information about the 
socioeconomic conditions of the migrant. Results from the generalised ordered logit model 
show that migrant performance also has positive effect on information flow on in the lower 
levels of the latter. Thus remittance flow can only help those who are left behind to know 
just a little about the socioeconomic conditions of the migrant. This result confirms the first 
hypothesis that remittance flow has only a limited positive effect on dedicated information 
flow from the migrant. It is rather the education level of the household that has significant 
positive effect on dedicated information from the migrants. Families begin to get more and 
more information flow with increase in average level of household education.  The most 
important effect of education is its ability to pull families away from more negative flow of 
private information to highly positive ones. Perhaps this is expected because as explained 
earlier, migrants are likely to find it more comfortable to communicate with educated 
relations as the latter would be more likely to understand the migrants’ socioeconomic 
conditions. Education can have huge impacts on household’s ability to get information from 
various sources and be able to use it differently to generate more interaction with the 
migrant. Also the highly educated families are more likely to be the wealthy ones who can 
afford the cost of finding information about the migrant relation abroad. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
FORMATION OF SUBJECTIVE REMITTANCE EXPECTATIONS AND FAMILY 
MIGRATION INTENTIONS 
 
7.1 Introduction   
.... with youth unemployment rates sky-rocketing on the continent of Africans under the age 
30 unemployed, migration, legally or illegally, still remains very attractive to most African 
youths despite the dangers involved.  The thinking is that one may be the fortunate one to 
scale the barb fences successfully to the promise land where the pastures are green, so that 
one can also extend a helping hand to relations at home to free them from the devastating 
and disgraceful effects of poverty – Tsikata (2006). 
 
 
Having examined the nature of migrant performance, private and public information flows – 
the two most important factors in formation of remittance expectations – we can now turn 
the central point of the thesis: formation of remittance expectations and perpetuation of 
migration within the family.  Chapter Six gave detailed accounts of these two factors and the 
various household demographic and socioeconomic characteristics that determine them. It 
emerged that kinship ties, though important in influencing migrant performance at home of 
origin, are not that important in influencing them to have more information about 
socioeconomic conditions. And unless they have wealth and a good average level of 
education, families left behind may not be able to get dedicated information flow from the 
migrant. Receipts of remittance cannot be viable source for higher dedicated or private 
information either as flow of remittance only comes with low levels of information flow. 
This leads to some level of uncertainty about the socioeconomic conditions of the migrants. 
It is therefore puzzling to know how those left behind come up with various levels of 
subjective expectations of remittance flow under this condition of limited access to 
dedicated information.  It is this also puzzle that the first part of this chapter tries to answer 
as it examines formation of remittance expectations. 
 
Specifically, in this chapter, I estimate how information flow, performance of migrants and 
kinship ties affect subjective remittance expectations while controlling for the same 
household demographic socioeconomic characteristics. The main objective is to find the 
relative importance of these three factors in the formation of remittance expectations.  The 
hypothesis as illustrated in Chapter Two is that under low levels of private information flow, 
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the effects of migrant performance and public information flow would be significantly 
positive on remittance expectations, and the reverse would be the case under high flow of 
private information flow.  In other words under conditions of uncertainty families left behind 
would rely on what they see or hear about the performance of migrants to form their 
remittance expectations. This is the first test to be performed in this chapter. 
 
The second test deals with the implications of remittance expectations thus formed for 
perpetuation of migration with the family is the focus of test in the second part of this 
chapter. The implication is that household’s intention or desire to continue migration process 
would also largely be based on expectations formed from inadequate information. And 
should information be adequate the effect of expectations on migration intentions would be 
greatly reduced. The main questions for investigating remittance expectations and migration 
intentions are: What are the effects of expectations, information flow and performance of 
migrants on (a) intentions of families or relations left behind to continue the migration 
process and (b) the strength of these intentions?  Following the thinking of De Jong (2000), 
van Dalen et al (2005) and Avato (2008), these questions assume that remittance 
expectations should lead to intentions to perpetuate migration.   
 
However, not all households who have positive remittance expectations do have the 
intention to perpetuate migration as a livelihood strategy.  Investigating the factors behind 
this deviation will help us to better understand the effects of subjective remittance 
expectations on perpetuation of migration.  So the third major objective of this chapter is to 
find the factors that account for the differentiation between households that have positive 
remittance expectations and desire to continue migration process on one hand and the three 
other possible choices which are: 
(a) positive remittance expectations and desire not to continue migration process,  
(b) negative expectations but desire to continue the migration process, and  
(c) negative remittance expectations and no desire to perpetuate migration in the 
household.    
But the focus of discussion in this section will be on (a), because that investigation will 
reveal whether or not there are peculiar factors that select families into this group. And more 
importantly this investigation will give us an indication of why some migration chains are 
likely to fail to gather momentum at the household level. 
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7.2.1 Exploring expectations for individual items  
In order to understand the nuances behind the expectation index we saw in Chapter Four and 
to equip us with better understanding of how remittance expectations are formed, we need to 
explore the determinants of individual expected items. Table 7.1 presents results from the 
probit model estimating the probability of a family expecting something or nothing from 
migration.  Unlike migrant performance and public information flow, private information is 
not a significant factor in determining whether or not a family would generally expect 
something from migration. In terms of relationships having a migrant who is the head or a 
spouse of the family back home has significantly positive effect on the likelihood of the 
family expecting something just as we saw with probability of receiving something in 
Chapter Six. But the rest of the kinship ties, though significant in influencing receipt of 
remittances as observed in Chapter Six, are not significant in influencing general expectation 
status.   
 
Expectation status of individual items gives details about the general expectation status.  
Performance of migrant and public information have positive significant effect on  
likelihood of expecting money, but none of the types of kinship ties is significant. As 
regards expectation status of house two factors stand out. Private information flow becomes 
significant only in expectation of a house with a positive effect. This is may not be 
surprising given that a lot of private information has to go with big investment like 
establishment of a house. The other factor that stands out here is household wealth. Earlier 
in Chapter Six we saw that household wealth has a significant positive effect on likelihood 
of having a migrant build a house. But it has negative effect on the likelihood of expecting a 
house. This confirms to the earlier interpretation that positive effect of household wealth on 
likelihood of having a house could be due more to the fact that migrants feel more secured to 
deal with wealthy households than the latter actually in need of a house. In other words 
wealthy households may not expect a house, but they may offer a secured channel through 
which migrants may send money for investment. Generally the most consistent factors that 
have significant positive effects on remittance expectation of all the three items are migrant 
performance, public information and positive attitude to migration.  
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Table 7.1: Probit model estimating expectation probabilities of  individual items  
 
Expect something  Expect Money  Expect a house Expect business 
 
Coef std. Error Coef 
std. 
Error Coef 
std. 
Error Coef 
std. 
Error 
Private information  -0.042 0.053 -0.050 0.055 0.089** 0.043 0.016 0.040 
Community dynamics          
Past performance  0.191** 0.079 0.267*** 0.084 0.274*** 0.057 0.095** 0.045 
Public information  0.482*** 0.122 0.475*** 0.125 0.475*** 0.102 0.259*** 0.099 
Kinship ties  
        
Migrant is head 0.756* 0.458 0.619 0.458 0.206 0.250 0.003 0.222 
Migrant is a spouse 0.318*** 0.227 0.124 0.227 0.715*** 0.196 0.094 0.151 
Migrant is a 
son/daughter 
-0.064 0.088 -0.126 0.088 -0.106 0.075 -0.074 0.070 
Migrant is an in-law 0.124 0.161 0.034 0.165 -0.025 0.120 -0.068 0.106 
Migrant is a 
brother/sister 
-0.039 0.082 -0.123 0.082 -0.159** 0.066 -0.010 0.062 
Migrant is other 
relation 
0.117 0.100 0.046 0.098 -0.109 0.075 0.093 0.070 
Migrant is a friend 0.156 0.200 0.127 0.207 -0.442** 0.189 -0.062 0.164 
Household characteristics  
       
No. of adults 0.039 0.035 0.043 0.036 0.063** 0.029 0.054** 0.027 
Household Wealth -0.049 0.051 -0.013 0.053 -0.139*** 0.042 0.096** 0.039 
HH education level 0.018 0.081 -0.003 0.083 0.078 0.068 0.088 0.063 
Age of household head 0.004 0.013 0.002 0.013 0.001 0.010 -0.012 0.009 
Age of HH head  sq. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 
No. of children -0.029 0.054 -0.005 0.057 -0.001 0.044 0.072* 0.041 
Migrant main 
contributor 
0.311** 0.139 0.522*** 0.141 -0.005 0.121 -0.276** 0.110 
Migrant makes decision 0.378** 0.193 0.485*** 0.193 0.179 0.161 0.016 0.143 
Family migration  
attitude 
1.221*** 0.221 1.239*** 0.223 1.103*** 0.239 0.149 0.216 
Constant -0.730 0.601 -0.660 0.614 -1.938*** 0.514 -0.908* 0.473 
Number of obs 938 938 938. 938 
LR chi2(20) 90.29 103.15 157.57 64.51 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2  0.129 0.155 0.139 0.052 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
 
 
7.2.2 Determinants of remittance expectation levels without interaction effects of 
private information  
Having seen the major determinants of expectation status of individual items, we can now 
turn to what determines levels of remittance expectations. I do this first with estimates in 
absence of interaction effects from private information. As Table 7.2 shows the (rho=0) 
from the maximum likelihood estimates is weakly significant with Prob > chi2 = 0.099  
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Table 7.2:  OLS and Heckman selections models estimating  determinants  of remittance 
expectations 
 
OLS Heckman Marginal Effects 
 
Coef. Std. 
error Coef Std.Error Coef Std.Error 
Outcome: Levels of remittance expectations  
Private information flow  0.019 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.015 0.023 
Community dynamics        
Migrant  performance  0.083*** 0.025 0.06** 0.026 0.093*** 0.026 
Public information flow 0.117*** 0.058 0.051 0.058 0.106 0.057 
Kinship ties        
Migrant is head 0.531*** 0.122 0.485*** 0.126 0.551*** 0.124 
Migrant is spouse 0.670** 0.085 0.650** 0.087 0.673*** 0.084 
Migrant is son/daughter 0.417*** 0.040 0.433*** 0.042 0.430*** 0.041 
Migrant is an in-law 0.448*** 0.061 0.448*** 0.063 0.457*** 0.061 
Migrant is brother/sister 0.449*** 0.038 0.468*** 0.040 0.465*** 0.039 
Migrant is other relation 0.504*** 0.041 0.501*** 0.043 0.520*** 0.043 
Migrant is a friend  0.181* 0.110 0.175* 0.096 0.197** 0.094 
Household characteristics        
Household wealth  0.007 0.022 0.012 0.023 0.005 0.022 
HH level of education  0.049 0.036 0.051 0.037 0.057 0.036 
Migration experience  0.008** 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.008** 0.004 
Age of household head -0.003 0.005 -0.004 0.005 -0.003 0.005 
Age of hh hold head squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Household size  0.044*** 0.014 0.040*** 0.014 0.016*** 0.013 
HH Contribution to 
movement  
0.215*** 0.073 0.202*** 0.075 0.213*** 0.072 
Main decision maker -0.080 0.103 -0.040 0.087 -0.081 0.083 
Attitude to migration 0.113 0.157     
Constant  0.578** 0.280 0.834*** 0.221   
athrho   -0.675*** 0.215   
lnsigma   -0.321*** 0.036   
rho   -0.588 0.141   
Sigma   0.725 0.026   
lambda   -0.427 0.114   
N. obs. 823  938    
F( 19,   803)       30.26  Censored  115   
Adj. R-squared 0.404  Uncensored 823   
Root MSE         0.699  Wald Chi2(18) 540.51   
LR test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0):   chi2(1) =     2.72   Prob > chi2 = 0.099;   *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
indicating some level of selection bias, though not a serious one. The table also show 
estimates from the OLS regression model and estimates of marginal effects from the 
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Heckman model to aid interpretation.  See Appendix 7A for the formula used to estimate the 
marginal effects and Appendix 7B for the results from selection equation which estimates 
whether or not the household expect something from the migrant. I have omitted the results 
from the selection model, because it is not different from what we have already seen in the 
previous section  as regards determinants of expectation status. Compared with the estimates 
from OLS, marginal effects of the Heckman model presents more upward estimates for all 
the significant variables except for kinship categories. Generally though, estimates from 
both models are a close. This is expected given the fact that the correlation between errors of 
outcome equation (εi) and selection equation (ui) is significant only at 10% level, indicating 
a minimal impact of selectivity.  Nevertheless I will mostly base my comments on the results 
from the Heckman selection model.    
 
In the previous section we saw that kinship ties do not do particularly well in influencing 
expectation status. That is whether or not families expect something is not mostly 
determined by kinship ties.  But once expectations are formed, kinship ties, be it close or 
distant, become quite important in determining the levels of remittance expectations in 
absence of interaction effect from private information flow. And among the kinship ties, 
families in which the migrant is a spouse, head of the household or other relation stand out 
as major factors determining higher levels of remittance expectations.  For example, having 
a migrant who is a spouse raises the remittance expectation levels by about 67%, but just 
around 20% if the migrant is a friend.  Interestingly, after spouse and head of family, other-
relation comes as the next major factor with a marginal effect of about 52%. This perhaps 
could be a testimony of the strength of bonds between uncles and aunts on one hand, and 
nephews and nieces on the other in Akan matrilineal lineage systems. As discussed in 
Chapter One, among the Akans, uncles and aunts have strong impacts on the livelihood 
decisions concerning nephews and nieces (Nunkunya, 2003).  
 
As Section 7.2.1 showed, migrant performance is one of the few factors that consistently and 
positively determine the expectation status of families left behind for all the items. But the 
positive effect of migrant performance is not equally strong in the continuous choice of 
expectation levels. The marginal effect of migrant performance, 9.6%, lags far behind the 
marginal effects of any of the kinship variables, 46.5% of brother or sister, for example.  
Private information flow between the migrants and relatives at home is not significant both 
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in the selection into expectation status and expectation levels, confirming the observation 
from descriptive statistics.  As observed by McKenzie et al (2007), and confirmed in the 
Chapter Six, the generally low and perhaps poor quality of information flow from migrants 
to relations at home could be an explanation for the insignificant effect of private 
information flow.  And as we saw in Chapter Four, very few of the relatives left behind have 
current information about the type of job (37%) and salary (19%) of the migrants. This is the 
type of information one would expect to have major influence on levels of expectations, 
because it gives an indication of income and hence the financial ability of the migrant to 
fulfil the expectations of those left behind. Public information has a significant effect in the 
OLS model. But when selection effects are controlled, public information is not significant.  
 
Pre-migration involvement of families in the movement of the migrant is measured by 
whether or not the family made a major contribution to meeting the cost of movement and/or 
the household was the main decision maker. A financial contribution to movement has 
positive effects on expectation levels. Obviously people would want some returns for their 
investment as the NELM makes us to understand.  On the other hand, when the family only 
plays a major role in the decision making without any financial commitment, the effect is 
not significant.  With the exception of household size most of the other household 
characteristics such as wealth, education level, age of household head and migration 
experience are neither significant in predicting the probability of expectation nor expectation 
levels.  Household size has significant effect on household expectation as well as remittance 
expectation levels.  This is also expected as there is a likelihood of more demands by various 
members in the family. 
 
 
7.2.3 Determinants of remittance expectation levels with interaction effects of 
private information  
The results from the previous section clearly indicate that in absence of interaction effects 
from private information flow, kinship ties, public information and past performance of 
migrants in the community have major significant effect on formation of remittance 
expectation levels. I run the same model, but with interactions between private information 
flow and key variables of interest such as past performance of migrant, public information, 
kinship ties and others that were found in the previous section to have significant effects on 
remittance expectations. The ovtest procedure did not reject the assumption of no omitted 
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variables (see Appendix 7B). Hence a simple OLS was used to determine the interaction 
effects. To ease comparative processes I have reproduced the marginal effects of the 
Heckman procedure in the previous section, and the percentage difference between estimates 
from the two type of models (i.e estimates with and without interaction effects of private 
information) as shown in Table7.3.  The results clearly demonstrate that when interacted 
with private information flow, kinship ties, past performance of migrant and public 
information flow, though still have positive significant effects on determination of 
remittance expectations, have severely reduced effects on the latter. For example, on  
 
Table 7.3: Comparing determinants of remittance expectations  with and without interaction terms 
 
OLS  Coef. 
Std 
error  
Heckman 
marg.eff.  Difference  
Percent 
difference  
Private information  -0.380*** 0.051 0.015 
  Community dynamics  
     Migrant  performance * private information  0.001*** 0.000 0.093 -0.092 -98.41 
Public information flow* private information 0.079*** 0.018 0.106 -0.027 -25.13 
Kinship ties  
     Migrant is head* private information 0.165*** 0.038 0.551 -0.386 -70.04 
Migrant is spouse* private information 0.176*** 0.026 0.673 -0.497 -73.83 
Migrant is son/daughter* private information 0.090*** 0.013 0.430 -0.340 -79.13 
Migrant is an in-law* private information 0.113*** 0.020 0.457 -0.344 -75.34 
Migrant is brother/sister* private 
information 0.097*** 0.012 0.465 -0.368 -79.14 
Migrant is other relation* private information 0.136*** 0.014 0.52 -0.384 -73.93 
Migrant is a friend * private information 0.049 0.033 0.197 -0.148 -74.91 
Household characteristics  
     Household wealth  0.001 0.028 
   HH level of education  0.043 0.044 
   Migration experience  0.006 0.005 
   Age of household head -0.003 0.006 
   Age of household head squared 0.000 0.000 
    Household size  0.055*** 0.017 
   HH Contribution to movement * private 
information 0.049** 0.023 0.213 -0.164 -76.94 
Main decision maker* private information -0.058** 0.026 -0.081 0.023 -28.62 
Attitude to migration* private information 0.159*** 0.040 
   Constant  1.368*** 0.269 
   N. obs. 938 
    F( 19,   918)       18.92 
    Adj. R-squared 0.267 
    Root MSE         0.933 
    *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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average, the effects of kinship ties on remittance expectations reduce by 74%, while past 
performance takes on a whopping 98% reduction on its effect. Even when family members 
left behind contribute financially to the movement of the migrant the decreasing effect of 
private information is still huge with about 77%.  Private information flow now has 
significantly negative effect on remittance expectations.  These results support the claim that 
remittance expectations are largely formed under conditions of low information flow. And 
that should families left behind be exposed to high levels of private or dedicated information 
from migrants, the influence of the past, or what goes on in community would not be so 
important factors in formation of remittance expectations.  
 
 
7.3.1  Family intentions to support migration of its members 
This section begins the analysis of effect of remittance expectations on migration intentions. 
As stated earlier in beginning of the chapter, the first part of this section investigates the 
implications of various forms of remittance expectations on intention to perpetuate 
migration. Table 7.4 presents the results from the first of the three main models of this 
section: the probit with Heckman selection model estimating the determinants of a family’s 
intention to support migration of at least one member in the next five years. The likelihood 
test of independence of the outcome and selection equations is significant at 10% level (see 
Appendix 7C) indicating some level of selection effect, though not very strong. The output 
from the selection equation is not presented here since we have already discussed the factors 
that select families into having expectations or not in the previous chapter. The outputs from 
both probit  and heckprob procedures are presented.  And to aid interpretation I have  added 
the estimated marginal effects from the selection model. See Appendix 7D for estimation 
procedure of the marginal effects. 
 
Remittance expectation is a highly significant determinant of migration-support intentions of 
families, confirming the findings from expectation studies involving individual migrants (De 
Jong, 2000; van Dalen et al, 2005; Avato, 2008). However, for those left behind, kinship ties  
and public/general information  seem to be more important than their own expectations in 
their decision to support migration of other members. As evidenced by the marginal effect 
estimates in Table 7.4 if the pioneer migrant is the head in the family left behind the desire 
to support migration of another member of the family increases by almost 30%, which is  
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Table 7.4 Probit with  Heckman selection model estimating determinants of family 
intention to support migration of a member 
  
 
Probit Heckprob   
 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std error   Marg.eff-std         
Remittance expectations 0.215*** 0.048 0.229*** 0.055 0.083 0.019 
Private information 0.051 0.041 0.054 0.034 0.019 0.012 
Migrant performance 0.063 0.055     
Public information 0.236** 0.100 0.392*** 0.096 0.141 0.033 
Migrant is hh head 0.615** 0.247 0.820*** 0.241 0.296 0.085 
Migrant is a spouse 0.065 0.160 0.250 0.156 0.090 0.056 
Migrant is a son/daughter 0.146* 0.079 0.072 0.073 0.026 0.026 
Migrant is an in-law 0.061 0.115 0.109 0.112 0.039 0.040 
Migrant is a brother/sister  0.095 0.073 0.103 0.071 0.037 0.026 
Migrant is other relation 0.181** 0.088 0.168** 0.084 0.061 0.030 
Migrant is a friend 0.073 0.154 -0.005 0.163 -0.002 0.059 
Household wealth 0.046 0.039 0.039 0.032 0.014 0.012 
HH level of education -0.149** 0.063 -0.132** 0.056 -0.001 0.001 
Migration experience -0.005 0.007 -0.005 0.007 -0.002 0.002 
Age of household head -0.004 0.003 -0.001 0.003 -0.047 0.020 
Household size 15-35 0.025 0.029 0.033 0.026 0.012 0.010 
children -0.048 0.042 -0.052 0.038 -0.019 0.014 
Migration attitude 0.344 0.217 0.046 0.267 0.017 0.096 
_cons -0.170 0.415 -0.429 0.414   
 
NO. of obs 937 No. of obs 938   
 
LR chi2(18) 86.11 Censored obs 115   
 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 Prob > chi2 0.0000   
 
Pseudo R2 0.0718 Wald chi2(17) 75.82   
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
    
  
 
 
almost four times the marginal effect a unit increase in remittance expectations bring.  In the 
same way, the effect of public information is also about twice that of expectations. These 
findings are generally expected. When the migrant is the head of the household, it is 
expected that he or she takes at least the wife and the children abroad. So it is not surprising 
that this kinship tie would have a highly significant and positive effect on intention of those 
left behind to support migration. Interestingly, the only other variable measuring kinship ties 
that significantly and positively affect household decision to support migration is other-kin. 
Having a pioneer migrant who is a niece, nephew, aunt or uncle increases the decision to 
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support migration by about 6%, much higher than effects from other relations such as 
brother/sister, son/daughter, etc. As detailed in Chapter One and echoed in previous 
discussions, there is usually a strong relational bond between individuals and their uncles, 
aunts, nephews or nieces in Akan matrilineal system.  It is this bond that makes people left 
behind believe that, perhaps they can reap some support from the migrant in their decision to 
support other members of the family to migrate. Most probably, the financial support would 
come from the migrant who is the head of the family.  
 
The insignificant effect of private information on intention to support further migration in 
the family should not be surprising. As previous sections revealed there is not much 
information flow between the migrant and those left behind. In addition, since this private 
information has a negative effect on expectations (as we observed in the previous section), 
people left behind perhaps do not take into consideration what they hear from migrants when 
deciding whether or not to support other members to migrate.  They would rather depend on 
information from other sources such as the one that goes around in the community. Thus left 
to those left behind, public information is more important in their decision to support 
migration than what they probably hear from the migrants.    
 
Other household demographic characteristics generally do not play significant role in 
intentions to perpetuate migration when other factors are controlled in both models, 
including those found to be significant at the descriptive level. Factors such as age of 
household head, number of children, and number of youths are all not significant even 
though they have the expected sign.  The only household characteristic factor that has a 
significant effect is average level of household education. Surprisingly level of education, 
which has consistently been found to be positively associated with individuals’ intention to 
migrate (van Dalen et al, 2005; Avato, 2008; Fourage and Ester, 2008), has a significantly 
negative impact on the likelihood of the household supporting migration in all the models.  
In Chapter Six, household average level of education was found to be a very important 
factor in determining information flow. Increasing levels of education enables the household 
to have access to information that perhaps becomes a discouraging factor for the household 
to perpetuate migration. These other studies have not considered remittance expectation and 
information flow in their models. Nevertheless, more studies with similar sampling strategy 
are needed to confirm this negative effect of education.  
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7.3.2 Factors influencing the strength of household migration-support intentions  
From the preceding section, it is clear that remittance expectations, public information, and 
cases where the pioneer migrant is the head of the family are the most important factors that 
determine the likelihood of a family’s intention to perpetuate migration. But what factors 
explain why some families want to support more than one person within the same period for 
international migration?  Is it because they expect more benefit from migration than those 
who intend to support only a member within the same period?  Table 7.5 presents the results 
from the generalised ordered probit technique used to answer this question. All the 
coefficients that are not significantly different across the categories of the dependent 
variable (intention to support 1, 2, 3 or more) are constrained to be equal, and allow only 
unequal coefficients, the deviations (migrant is a spouse, and migrant is a brother or sister)  
to vary. As explained in Chapter Four, these are the two variables for which the constant-
threshold assumptions are rejected.  I do the estimates for two conditions: no interaction 
with private information flow and interaction with private information. 
 
Generally the results from the ordered probit estimates are consistent with a priori 
expectations, but also reveal some intriguing behaviours of the covariates at various 
categories of migration-support intentions. Taking the level of significant and standard error 
into consideration, one can see that remittance expectation is the most important factor that 
influences families to support higher number of people for migration. Higher values of 
remittance expectations increase the likelihood of a family supporting more members for 
international migration.  However if this support is to be mainly financed by a migrant 
relations abroad then, the likelihood reduces by the same margin with every additional 
person the family at home of origin adds.  Past performance of migrant is insignificant when 
it comes to determining the intensity of migration intentions.  As indicated earlier, this 
should not be surprising, because the demonstrative effect of past performance of migrants 
can only affect the desire to support or send another member if this effect translates into 
expectations. In other words expectations of getting what has been achieved by other 
migrants are more important than the achievement itself in migration decisions.  
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Table 7.5: Results from generalised ordered probit  model estimating  strength of migration 
 support intentions with and without private information interactions  
 
No interaction  
 
 
With information interaction  
 
Gamma 1 
 
Gamma 2 
 
Gamma 1                Gamma 2  
 
Coef 
Std 
Error  
Coef( Std 
Error) 
 
Coef Std Error  Coef( Std err)           
Remittance expectations † 0.335*** 0.058 
  
0.080*** 0.015 
 Private information  -0.072 0.050 
  
-0.344*** 0.055 
 Migrant performance  0.032 0.053 
  
0.044 0.056 
 Public information  -0.086 0.122 
  
-0.100 0.121 
 Migrant is hh head † 0.508** 0.226 
  
0.114** 0.056 
  Migrant is a spouse† -0.121 0.207 0.518(0.242)** 
 
-0.015 0.050 0.114(0.058)** 
 Migrant is a son/daughter† 0.162** 0.081 0.346(0.084)*** 
 
0.042* 0.021 0.095(0.023)*** 
 Migrant is an in-law† 0.106 0.122 
  
0.020 0.032 
  Migrant is a brother/sister † 0.276*** 0.076 
  
0.076*** 0.019 
  Migrant is other relation† 0.213*** 0.082 
  
0.055*** 0.021 
  Migrant is a friend† 0.110 0.190 
  
-0.001 0.063 
  Household wealth  0.047 0.048 
  
0.032 0.049 
  HH level of education  -0.144* 0.081 
  
-0.152* 0.081 
  Migration experience  0.014* 0.008 
  
0.015** 0.008 
  Age of household head 0.004 0.004 
  
0.004 0.004 
   Household size 15-35 0.142*** 0.036 
  
0.153*** 0.036 
  children 0.027 0.050 
  
0.028 0.050 
  migraton attitudes  -0.372 0.317 
  
-0.312 0.313 
  Migrant will contribute  -0.341*** 0.108 
  
-0.361*** 0.108 
  Constant  -0.681 0.547     0.355 0.535 
  Number of obs    620 
   
620 
   Wald chi2(21)   175.150 
   
168.49 
    Prob > chi2   0.000 
   
0.000 
   Log likelihood  -468.569       -470.62   
  *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; †Variables that interact  with private information in the second model 
 
 
One of the factors that should determine the success of potential migration is the level of 
human capital present in the family as this may increase the probability of not only getting a 
job, but also adapting well at the destination community.  However, the negative coefficients 
of average level of household education and private information flow from migrants show 
that increase in these variables is likely to put the household at lower categories of 
migration-support intentions, echoing what was found earlier:  negative impact of education 
on migration intention probabilities.   Having increasing number of members within the ages 
15 and 35 years significantly increase the likelihood of the household having intention to 
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support higher number of members for migration obviously because of the availability of 
potential members.  Also as expected, all kinship ties increase the household’s likelihood of 
supporting more members for international migration. But the marginal effects differ 
according to type of relationship as closer relations such as cases where the migrant is the 
head of household or a spouse has much higher marginal effects than other types.  The effect 
of having a migrant who is a spouse is quite interesting as it is able to move the household 
from negative number to positive ones. Friendship is not a significant factor in this 
migration-intention behaviour.   
 
However when kinship ties and expectations interact with private information from 
migrants, the effects of the former on strength of migration-support intentions are reduced 
even though still significant.  Perhaps the most telling finding here is that under high level of 
information flow, the effect of private information on migration support intentions of those 
left behind is negative. This shows that with high levels of information flow the degree to 
which people desire to support migration could be moderated, or perhaps it could cancel out 
the highly positive effect of remittance expectations on these intentions as we see a 
drastically reduced effect of remittance expectations when interacted with information flow. 
The effects of kinship ties such as head of family, spouse, son or daughter are lower in 
determining the number of members a family wants to support for migration. As we saw in 
Chapter Six, kinship ties have negative effects on high levels of private information flow, a 
condition that can discourage a household from the desire to support more family members 
to migrate. What emerges from these two models is that remittance expectations, migrant 
performance and having a migrant who is a spouse or head of the family are quite strong in 
determining both the desire to perpetuate migration and the strength of this desire. But the 
strong effect of these factors can be effectively moderated if the families have access to high 
levels flow of private/dedicated information from the migrant.  Thus the third major 
hypothesis is also confirmed.  
 
From the descriptive analysis in Chapter Five it was clear that families that have remittance 
expectations and intend to support migration do generally have the better side of most of the 
household characteristics and kinship ties. All these variables are included in the 
multinomial logit model to find the main determinants of why a household would have 
expectations but do not intent to support migration of other members. The main reason for 
this exercise is to confirm the findings of the preceding section.  Table 7.6 presents the 
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results from these estimates Group 1 (families that have remittance expectations and 
intentions to support migration of a member) is the base or reference group to which all the 
other three groups are compared.  
 
Years of migration experience is significant in distinguishing the group of families that have 
remittance expectations but no intention to support migration from those families that have 
both remittance expectations and intentions. But the effects of years of migration is minimal 
as the odds of being in this group (expectation but no support for migration) only increases  
Table 7.6: Result from multinomial logistic  regression explaining choices of expectation-migration- 
support intentions 
Remit. expectations but no 
intention to support 
migration 
Intention to support 
migration  but no remit. 
expectations  
No remit. expectations & 
no intention to support 
migration 
Coef. 
Std. 
Error Odds Coef. 
Std. 
Error Odds Coef. 
Std. 
Error Odds 
Past performance of migrants  -0.22** 0.11 0.81 -0.58*** 0.21 0.56 -0.32 0.21 0.73 
Household wealth -0.08 0.07 0.93 0.12 0.12 1.13 0.07 0.14 1.07 
Private information   -0.06 0.07 0.94 0.14 0.13 1.15 -0.06 0.14 0.94 
Age of household head 0.01 0.01 1.00 0.00 0.01 1.00 0.02* 0.01 1.02 
Years of migration experience  0.01** 0.01 1.01 -0.01 0.02 0.99 -0.06** 0.03 0.94 
Public information about migrants -0.38** 0.18 0.68 -0.99** 0.30 0.55 -1.53*** 0.33 0.22 
Household level of education  0.22** 0.11 1.25 -0.09 0.20 0.91 0.25 0.23 1.28 
No.  hh members age 15-35 -0.06 0.05 0.94 -0.11 0.09 0.90 -0.13 0.11 0.88 
Number of children  (< 15 years)  0.10 0.07 1.10 0.15 0.13 1.16 0.00 0.16 1.00 
Attitude to migration  -0.15 0.49 0.86 -1.32** 0.60 0.27 -2.78*** 0.47 0.06 
Migrant is head of family -1.30*** 0.43 0.27 -1.68 1.06 0.19 - - - 
Migrant is a spouse -0.53* 0.28 0.59 -1.60** 0.77 0.20 -0.02 0.60 0.98 
Migrant is a son/daughter -0.39*** 0.14 0.68 0.10 0.19 1.10 -0.05 0.26 0.95 
Migrant is an in-law -0.32 0.20 0.72 -0.42 0.40 0.66 -0.09 0.47 0.97 
Migrant is a brother /sister -0.46*** 0.14 0.63 -0.32 0.24 0.73 0.36 0.22 1.43 
Migrant is other relation  -0.58*** 0.17 0.56 -0.37 0.30 0.69 -0.07 0.25 0.93 
Migrant is a friend  -0.04 0.27 0.96 0.08 0.41 1.08 - - - 
Constant -0.18 0.79 0.27 1.26 0.58 1.28 
Base outcome (Reference group): Remittance expectations and intention to support or perpetuate migration) 
Number of obs   =        937 
LR chi2(51)     =     178.71 
Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
 Pseudo R2       =     0.095 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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by just 1% for every unit increase in years of migration.  Another significant factor that 
positively distinguishes this group from the reference group is average levels of household 
education.  Every unit increase in average education levels in the family increases the odds 
of the family having expectations but no intention to support migration by 25%.  This really 
confirms the findings from the earlier sections of this chapter. In Chapter Six we found that 
education is one of the few variables that have a positive and significant effect on private 
information flow. And since high levels of private information has negative effect on both 
remittance expectations and intentions to perpetuate migration, it is not surprising that 
education has positive effect on not having any intention to support migration in spite of 
expectation of some benefits.  
 
As expected almost all the other factors that have strong positive effect on likelihood of a 
family perpetuating migration, as observed in the preceding section, have negative effects on 
selecting families into the group that have expectations but no intentions to perpetuate 
migration.  Performance of migrants has a negative impact of the likelihood of a family 
being the group of those who expect but have no intention to perpetuate migration; the 
decrease is about 19% for a unit increase in migrant performance at home. But prominent 
among factors that exhibit negative impacts are the ones measuring kinship ties. All the 
types of relationship with the migrant show that a unit increase in any of them leads  to a 
decrease in the likelihood of a family being in the group that has remittance expectations but 
no intention to support migration, when compared with the reference group.  If kinship ties 
are defined by a situation where the migrant is the head of the family, for example, the 
likelihood decreases by 73%, and 63% if the migrant is other relation such as nephew, uncle 
or aunt. Generally these results are in line with a priori expectations that all things being 
equal families back home would want to continue sending out members abroad based on the 
kinship ties they have with the pioneer migrant members.   
 
All the factors that have positive effects on the likelihood of families being in the group that 
has intention to perpetuate migration, but with no remittance expectations are not 
statistically significant.  However those that impact negatively on likelihood of being in this 
group are significant statistically.  Families whose migrant performance is high are less 
likely to be in the group of families who have intention to support migration of a member 
with no remittance expectations than the reference group. This likelihood decreases by 44%. 
In the same way, those who have higher positive attitude to migration and have access to 
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higher levels of public information would not want to support migration for nothing.  The 
only factor that significantly increases the likelihood of a family being in the final group (i.e 
no remittance expectation and no intention to perpetuate migration) rather than the reference 
group is increasing age of the household head.  This is probably because older household 
heads would have older children who perhaps have accomplished their migration desires; or 
it could be that the children are too old to even entertain any migration desires.  But factors 
such as flow of public information and general attitude towards migration show that a unit 
increase in either of these two significantly decreases the likelihood of any family being 
found in this group. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
DISCUSSIONS CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.1 Introduction  
Migration, especially international migration, in developing countries can involve the whole 
family.  Whenever a member of the family migrates there are expectations of those left 
behind that the migrant would remit or do something for them to improve their livelihood 
conditions. For this reason and for their own wellbeing many young men and women risk 
their lives through dangerous routes to travel abroad with some help of kin, expecting to 
reap some benefits from migration.  This means in every act of migration there are two 
sources of expectations: the migrant’s own expectations and also the expectations of those 
left behind.   Some limited work has gone into the former on how subjective expectations 
influence the decisions of individual potential migrants’ migration choices.  As regards the 
latter the literature does not have much to tell. The best that has been done is to use revealed 
data to look at observed flow of remittances and how socioeconomic and demographic 
characteristics of the family members left behind influence these flows of remittances.   This 
approach therefore assumes that revealed or observed flow of remittances is in line with the 
expected flow of those left behind. But revealed data are inadequate in helping us 
understand subjective remittance expectations because they do not always represent what is 
expected, let alone how the expectations are formed. The consequence of this assumption is 
the neglect of subjective expectations that go into migration decisions of those who support 
the individual members to migrate. Thus even though these subjective remittance 
expectations are with us, the literature is often silent on how they affect migration decision 
and how they are formed. If subjective expectations inform or influence migration decisions, 
as they do with every other socioeconomic decision, then knowing how those who support 
migration of relations from their expectations is important to help us understand better the 
migration decisions individuals and households undertake. This is what this thesis was set 
out to do – to investigate the determinants of remittance expectations of families left behind 
and how these expectations influence migration decisions within the family.  
 
For the rest of this chapter, I first discuss the main findings of the thesis and their 
implications in a broader context. I do this by first addressing the specific research questions 
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outlined in Section 1.3 of Chapter One and how the preceding chapters, especially chapters 
Six and Seven, have dealt with them.  I start with reviewing the degree of support for the 
three hypotheses from each of the tests I have conducted in these two main chapters. While 
this may be viewed as somewhat of a formality, it will give us the opportunity to compare 
the results across chapters and other studies, a process that will yield some additional 
insights. The second section of this chapter builds on these insights and places the formation 
of subjective remittance expectations within a larger theoretical explanation of international 
migration namely, the new economics of labour migration and perpetuations theories of 
migration such as cumulative and network theories. I argue that the above analyses not only 
cast doubt on a core claims made by NELM and cumulative/network theories, but also place 
subjective remittance expectations at the centre or as a bridge between the so-called 
initiation and perpetuation theories of migration. These analyses give us insights into why 
understanding formation of remittance expectations can help us explain why some networks 
fail to generate full-blown perpetuation of migration, especially within the household.  The 
third section of this chapter begins with notes on some implication for future research, and 
possible policy implications that can emanate from these results.  
 
 
8.2 Discussions   
From Chapters Five and Six we found that while descriptive statistics do not show much 
significant effect of kinship ties, demographic and socioeconomic characteristics on whether 
or not families receive remittances, the probit and Heckman selection models show the 
opposite.  Kinship ties are more important in influencing migrant’s performance than any 
other socioeconomic or demographic factors when it comes to receipt of at least some 
money for living expenses.  Closer relations such as spouse and head of family expectedly 
stand a much better chance of helping those left behind to receive than more distant and 
unrelated people. They also stand a much better chance of having the migrant perform well. 
All these generally conform to what has been observed elsewhere (Arhinful, 2001; GLSS 
2008).  However when it comes to performance in items such as house or business 
investment, a household cannot rely only on kinship ties with migrant. It also has to have 
some wealth. The theoretical explanation for this has been that the wealthy are able to wield 
bargaining power to influence flows (Lucas and Stark, 1985). This would help the migrant 
allocate money meant for living expenses into investment in housing and business. This also 
148 
 
shows that the influence of kinship ties on observed flow of remittances or performance is 
mostly limited to monetary transfers for living expenses. 
 
Generally  the lower levels of explanatory power of the models, notwithstanding the 
cautions attached to interpreting the R-squared of probit models,   perhaps also confirm that 
when it comes to remittance flow and migrant performance, socioeconomic and 
demographic characteristics of family members left at home of origin have limited 
influence.   A lot also has to do with the socioeconomic conditions of the migrant in the 
destination country, which unfortunately are not included in the analysis. But as stated 
earlier, and echoed by Tsikata (2006), those left at home do not care much about that; all 
that they know is that their migrant relations have not been able to remit or perform as 
Johnny has been doing within the same period. In other words migrant performance, as long 
as those left behind are concerned, has to do with kinship ties and socioeconomic conditions 
at home, perhaps much more than those abroad.  If observed receipts of remittance and 
migrant performance at home of origin is greatly influenced by type of kinship ties and if 
subjective remittance expectations are  influenced by past events, then all things being equal, 
one would expect that relationship of the migrant to the household will be a key factor in 
determining level of remittance expectations.  However the extent to which past 
performance can influence remittance expectations is most likely to be checked by 
knowledge of some socioeconomic conditions of the migrant, the private information flow, 
especially.  This is what the second part of Chapter Six set out to do.  
 
Family members left behind have two sources of information about their migrant relations 
abroad. One is the information through communication with the migrants – private 
information flow, and the other is the information they gather through interactions with 
nonmigrant friends and relations at home of origin – public information flow. Remittance 
flow may come with communications of various forms. And this communication with 
migrant may reveal certain socioeconomic information that can encourage those left behind 
to form their own expectations. But increasing flow of remittances does not necessarily lead 
to increasing flow of information from the migrants. The results from the main models in  
the second part of Chapter Six show that the assumption of information flow accompanying 
remittance flow held by cumulative causation theories of migration may hold only to a 
certain extent – that is to the extent that, this information does not include economic factors 
such as employment status, type of job and salaries.  In other words the flow of remittance 
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leads to the increasing flow of information only at the lower levels of private information 
flow. Even the kinship ties cannot enable families left behind to access high levels of 
information about the socioeconomic conditions of the migrant.  To get the high levels of 
private information flow, families would have to rely on wealth and to some extent 
education.   As explained earlier positive effects of wealth and education are not just the 
economic power to afford the communication cost, but also the easiness that migrants feel to 
communicate with these types of families as there is little fear of being asked to remit.  If the 
members of the families left behind are not financially sound and do not have good level of 
education, then perhaps they just have to hope that with time they will be able to get some 
high levels of information about their migrant relations.  
 
The positive effects of length of time (i.e years of migration) on private information flow 
contrasts the view that migrants may refuse to share information because being migrants for 
many years they might have had most of their close relations to live with them in the host 
nation, hence little or no urgency in the desire to exchange information with other relations 
at home who may be distant from them. It also refutes the argument that after many years  
migrants might just be so integrated with the culture of the host country that they may attach 
little or no importance to interactions with those left at home of origin (Morduch and 
Sharma, 2002).  This positive effect may also not be because of the claim that no matter how 
long they have been away migrants still have strong link with those left behind in terms of 
sheer kinship ties (Young, 2007; Mazzucato, 2009),  but probably with their peculiar long 
duration of remitting home (Bump, 2006).  Migrants from Ghana may eventually reveal 
more and more private information especially if the purpose of these remittances involves 
investments such as housing and business that require more communication and monitoring. 
In other words if remittance flow interacts with years of migration, it has a potential positive 
effect of helping families left behind to get more private information from the migrant.  
 
The fact that most of these characteristics, including the strength of kinship ties, do not 
significantly have any positive effects on flow of information from migrants, shows that no 
matter the strength of kinship ties, information flow from migrants to members left behind 
could most probably be explained by factors determined by the migrants themselves much 
more than those determined by any kinship ties people at home claim to have with migrants.  
That is migrants may have control of whether or not they should share information with 
those left behind.  Looking at this finding from another angle, it might be expected, because 
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in addition to the problem of distance, there are other reasons why migrants do not share 
much information with those left behind.  As we discussed in Chapter Two, people, 
including migrants, in the kinship network may refuse to share information in order to have 
some short- or long-run utility gains (Morduch and Sharma, 2002) or they may do so in 
order to increase their bargaining power (Nelson, 1970; Doss, 1996).  When migrants take 
on these attitudes of noncooperation, the cost of obtaining the relevant information become 
increasingly expensive for those left behind to bear.  
 
If the people left behind are not doing well in getting information about the socioeconomic 
conditions of the migrants, the private information, would they rely on information from 
friends and relatives in the community of origin – the general or public information?  The 
result from Chapter Six tends to give affirmative answer to this question.  About 72% of the 
families left behind try to get information about the migrants through other sources. Probit 
and OLS regression analysis of this behaviour shows that there are reverse effects of the 
most important factors except for kinship ties and migration years. Specifically, factors such 
as education and wealth that help families to get more and more private information from 
the migrants, reduce the probability of these families’ relying on public information. On the 
other hand remittance flow which was found to have a negative effect on levels of private 
information increases the likelihood of household seeking information from other sources.  
One can therefore deduce that the more families are able to access information from the 
migrants themselves, the less they rely on migration information from nonmigrant sources or 
the general public in the community of origin.  
 
With the flow of crucial information such as the economic conditions of the migrants 
lacking or being inadequate, it may be concluded that there would be some level of 
uncertainty about knowledge of migrant’s socioeconomic conditions. Would information 
from the public sources, therefore becomes an important factor in the formation of 
remittance expectations?  Would their inability to access crucial information on economic 
conditions of the migrants “push” them to rely on information reaching them from other 
sources in the community of origin to form their subjective remittance expectations?  Also if 
the wealthy and the more educated families are more likely to know more about the 
migrants’ conditions, and if knowing more about the migrant is most likely to temper high 
expectations with realism as hypothesized in this study, would it be fair to conclude that 
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wealthier and more educated families may have modest expectation levels? The answers to 
these questions were provided by Chapter Seven.  
 
In the first part of Chapter Seven, I analysed relative importance of migrant performance, 
public information and kinship ties in the formation of remittance expectations conditioned 
on high and low flows of private information given various socioeconomic and demographic 
characteristics of the families left behind. What emerges from the Heckman models is that, 
in absence of private information, remittance expectations are mostly determined by kinship 
ties and community past experience of migrant performance in the community of origin. 
Migrant performance is the only factor that positively and significantly translates remittance 
expectation status into expectation levels.   Families would use their experience of what 
migrant performance as a starting point in their decision to whether or not they should 
expect something. But once their expectation status is assured, families members left behind 
are influenced by other factors than past performance in their subjective formation of 
remittance expectation levels.  These other factors are led by types of kinship ties people left 
behind have with the migrant. Kinship ties are the major factor on which people left behind 
rely to form their various levels of remittance expectations.  And the levels vary 
significantly according to the type of relationship people have with the migrant. Families in 
which the migrant is much closer – household head and spouse, for example – have the 
highest marginal contribution to the expectation levels. The literature makes us understand 
that relationship define kinship obligations to towards one another (Brunie, 2009; De Varies, 
2009, Mazzucato, 2009). And the strength of this relationship is quite strong in the 
formation of remittance expectation levels, especially in absence of interaction effects from 
private information flow.  But the major explanation for this strong influence of kinship ties 
on remittance expectation should be provided by what we found in Chapters Six. In Chapter 
Six we found that past performance of migrants in the community of origin is mostly 
influenced by kinship ties much more than any other socioeconomic characteristics of those 
left behind. This experience with past flows of remittance or performance, together with 
what they hear in the community about the migrants, becomes the bases upon which they 
build their expectations.  
 
Information flow is an important part of formation of expectations as reported in various 
economic and migration literature (Tegene et al, 2003; Curtin, 2003; Chen, 2006; McKenzie 
et al, 2007). The essence of adequate information flow is to enhance realistic expectations 
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that can predict actual occurrence of any phenomenon as people can use the current 
information to monitor, at least to some extent, how the migrant is doing economically and 
socially. From the interaction effects of the OLS model we find that should family members 
left behind be exposed to more private information about the socioeconomic conditions of 
the migrants the strong effect of kinship ties, past performance and public information on 
remittance expectation levels will be seriously checked, with average reduction in effect of 
about 74%. But is it private information that generates this decreasing effect on expectation 
levels? The main explanation is that private information does contain the real stories of 
socioeconomic conditions of the migrants.  As we saw in Chapter One, irrespective of their 
qualification, a good number of Ghanaian migrants do engage in jobs that will be considered 
downgrading at home (Peil, 1995; Owusu, 1998). Mazzucato (2005) found that a good 
number of Ghanaian migrants in Netherland take up two hard jobs as cleaners and machine 
workers.  Others live in not-so-good homes so that they are able to send something home 
every now and then. So if such stories should get to those left behind at home of origin, they 
put some reality check on the levels of remittance expectations.  
 
 However, from Chapter Six we noticed that information people get from migrants is not 
adequate as it mostly relates to social issues such as marital status, number of children, etc. 
Many of the people left behind do not even know the type of jobs migrants do in the 
destination country.  For various reasons the literature indicates that most migrants do not 
tell their relations left behind much about how they make their money ( Peil, 1995; Owusu, 
2000). All this makes it quite difficult for people to get more private information about the 
migrants’ socioeconomic conditions. Perhaps it is this difficulty that has made them resigned 
not to bother to “hear their stories.”  If people left at home do not have access to crucial 
information such as type of job of the migrants then the decreasing effect of private 
information on remittance expectations would not affect them.  Those in the kinship network 
who may find it difficult to access information from the migrant will therefore resort to 
alternative sources of ‘relevant’ information such as public information and rely on their 
past experience of remittance receipts to form their remittance expectations. For these 
people Tsikata (2006) may probably be right to state that it does not matter whether the 
migrant is employed or not. Whether the stories do not come to them or whether they “do 
not care to hear any other stories,” what is clear is that remittance expectations are largely 
formed with little private information, and therefore lacks the reality check which the latter 
can potentially contribute.   
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Expectations about remittance flows give us the opportunity to evaluate individual 
household’s intention to continue migration process as an integral part of its livelihood 
strategies.  From the cumulative theory of migration “each act of migration alters the social 
context within which subsequent migration decisions are made” and the improvement in 
livelihood conditions and relative deprivation of some families in the community through 
migration induce others to participate in migration (Massey et al, 1993). The basic 
assumption under this ‘inducement’ to participate in migration is that those left behind also 
expect or “hope they may be the fortunate ones to scale the barb fences successfully to the 
promise land where the pastures are green” (Tsikata, 2006).   The intention of families left 
behind to support migration of other members was used as proxy for desire to perpetuate or 
participate in migration. And the strength of these intentions was measured by the number of 
people the family intends to support within five years.  I then used probit and generalised 
ordered probit models to estimate effects of the remittance expectations on migration-
support intentions and the strength of these intentions respectively. The main hypothesis was 
that remittance expectations are important in having positive influence on both the intention 
and the strength of intentions to perpetuate migration because people left behind only have 
low levels of information about the socioeconomic conditions of their migrant relations 
abroad.  The third objective of the chapter was to explain why remittance expectations 
would not lead to perpetuation of migration in the household and other choices of migration-
support intentions, using multinomial logistic regression. 
 
The generalised ordered probit showed that when families really want to continue migration 
process in terms of supporting more than one of their members to migrate; it is not private 
information flow; it is not the human capital available, not their own positive attitude or 
even the assurance of financial support from migrant relations abroad that are important.  
The crucial factors are, however, network of kinship ties with migrants abroad and public 
information flow.  It is not just any migrant but those who are either the head of the family 
the spouse of the household head. This is in line with the network theory of migration which 
suggests that once begun, what sustain migration process are the established interpersonal 
ties that “connect migrants, former migrants and non-migrants in origin and destination 
areas through ties of kinship, friendship and shared community of origin” (Massey et al, 
1993).  
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Accompanying these ties is the assumption that there is a flow of information between 
migrants and relations left behind to facilitate and lower the risk of movement of the latter as 
well as providing enabling environment for monitoring the informal contract.  However 
what has emerged from this chapter is that when ties people at home have with the migrant 
interact with this presumed private information flow from migrants the effects of these ties 
on perpetuation of migration is greatly reduced even though they still significantly have 
positive effect on intention to support migration. Avato (2008) observed that good 
information flow is much more an important factor in turning migration intentions to reality 
than expectations in terms of actual movement. That is improved and better information 
flow is an important factor in influencing intentions to migrate as it helps in reducing risks 
that otherwise migrants would encounter without crucial information.  And perhaps this is 
what is emerging from this study with reduced effects of expectations and kinship ties when 
information from pioneer migrants is considered. Unfortunately not many of those left 
behind do get this adequate information as we observed. Hence kinship ties, subjective 
expectations and the public information in the community will perhaps continue to be the 
dominant factors people left behind will rely on to perpetuate migration.  
 
In absence of private information from the migrants, a factor that has the potential of 
perhaps putting desire to perpetuate migration in perspective is education. Increase in 
average level of household education has significantly positive effect on selecting 
households into the group that have positive remittance expectations but no intention to 
support migration.  This is a bit of a surprise because higher levels of education have 
consistently been linked to individuals’ migration intention,  and that international migration 
is selective of the educated (van Dalen et al, 2005; Avato, 2008; Fourage and Ester, 2008). 
But the models used in these studies hardly control for the effect of remittance expectations 
and information flow. We observed in Chapter Six that education is a key factor in 
determining higher levels of information flow from migrants to those left behind.    It is 
therefore not far-fetched to conclude that having remittance expectations would lead to 
intention to perpetuate migration in households in which average levels of education is low 
and hence are unable to access higher levels of information about the socioeconomic 
conditions of the destination country. In other words remittance expectations would not lead 
to massive intention to perpetuate migration if those left behind have good average level of 
education and have adequate information.    Also studies that have come up with this 
conclusion, and rightly so, involve the general population in which international migrant 
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households are generally found to be a selection of the educated and relatively wealthier 
than non-international migrant households.  When analysis is limited to international 
migrant households, as I have done here, in an area where international migration is not 
limited to a selected few households but has become part of social norm, the selection effect 
of education that helped initiate migration, finally gives way. This is because, as the network 
theories and cumulative causation theories help us to understand, the cost of international 
migration becomes more and more affordable or appears to be so through networks. The 
seemingly decreasing cost makes it possible for families, including the less educated, that 
otherwise would not have participated in international migration, now think they could 
through their relational association with pioneer migrants. And therefore they would support 
members to migrate. But as we have seen from the study relational association, though it 
facilitates migration networks, does not necessarily lead to increasing flow of important 
information from the pioneer migrants. It is only education and wealth that do so.  Families 
who are well educated will often not want to perpetuate migration, because their exposure to 
private information from pioneer migrants and real stories that come with this exposure, tells 
them it takes more than just subjective expectations and kinship ties with migrants to engage 
in international migration successfully.   
 
 
 
8.3 Conclusions: Subjective remittance expectations - the centre of 
migration decision `theories   
Be it a household or an individual decision process, the fundamental drive for migration is 
expectations – expectation of some benefits, because expectation of any kind is the 
fundamental source of action, an allocative principle in both the present and future (Young, 
2007).  Neoclassical economic theories view this decision process as a difference between 
individuals expected benefits and cost of movement, while the new economics of labour 
migration looks at the decision process as differentials in relative wealth in the community. 
Households participate in migration with the ‘hope’ or expectation of reaping “relative 
income gains” to improve their socioeconomic standings in the community (Massey et all, 
1993). In this case if households or families feel relatively deprived they would express their 
level of deprivation in their subjective expectation of remittance flows, in what they think 
they ought to have in relation to others in the community. It is this expression that would 
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‘propel’ them to either begin (in the case of nonmigrant households) or continue (in the case 
of migrant households) migration as livelihood strategy.  From the cumulative theory of 
migration “each act of migration alters the social context within which subsequent migration 
decisions are made.”  The changes in social conditions are basically brought about by 
improvement in livelihood conditions resulting in relative deprivation of some families in 
the community. And aided by reduction in cost through network connections, these changes 
in social context further induce others to participate in or continue the migration process 
either as individuals or households (Ibid). The basic idea under this ‘inducement’ to 
participate in migration is that those left behind also expect to gain something and hence 
their support for a member with the “hope they may be the fortunate ones to scale the barb 
fences successfully to the promise land where the pastures are green” (Tsikata, 2006). So 
expectations form the core of migration behaviour.  
 
As discussed extensively in Chapter Two, very few empirical works have incorporated 
expectations in the study of migration decisions and the few that have done so have not 
investigated the exogenous determinants of subjective remittance expectations. So if we do 
not know much about the central motivator of migration movements, how can we deal with 
it in terms of predicting the flow and the quality of the flow? I have shown that the 
expectations people left behind have are largely influenced by past performance, public 
information and mere kinship ties, and not private information from the migrants. 
Unfortunately most of those who still want to support migration are the ones influenced by 
this low level of information flow. The essence of adequate private information flow from 
migrants is to enhance knowledge of real situation at the destination country, at least to some 
extent, how the migrants do economically and socially and thereby acquaint themselves with 
the conditions of the destination. The diminishing effect of private information flow on 
expectations and intention to support migration could be due to the fact that people at home 
get to know more about the reality of what a potential migrant is likely to face and hence a 
need to put any decision to further support migration in perspective. Otherwise the support 
people give is based on guesses of what they can get. 
 
The centrality of expectations in socioeconomic decisions makes us wonder why household 
migration decision studies have paid very little attention to remittance expectations.  This 
study expands our understanding about migration decisions as regards the role plaid by 
subjective remittance expectations. The study also expands our understanding about how 
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these expectations are formed. In doing so the study comes up with a simpler way of 
estimating expectations than the traditional Manski model.  
 
 
8.4 Recommendations   
Investigation into formation of subjective expectation are yet to take firm roots in migration 
studies, in spite of the fact that these expectations form crucial part in individual as well as 
household migration decisions. Some work has been done incorporating subjective 
expectations in the study of individual migration decision (McKenzie et al, 2007). What I 
have done is to extend this to household migration decision without following the tradition 
of Manski’s elicitation of subjective probabilistic expectations (2004). As Delavande et al 
(2010) rightly point out, there is still a lot to do as regards coming up with a standardised 
methodology to measure subjective expectations. One way of doing this will be to compare 
elicitation of subjective remittance expectations in Manski’s tradition with the one employed 
in this study.  If the two are similar, then the method employed in this study saves a lot of 
time and constraints experienced when attempts are made to adopt Manski’s method. The 
major task for future research, however, is to incorporate subjective remittance expectations 
in longitudinal research. This could be done at the household level by eliciting household 
subjective migration expectations and follow this over time to find how these expectations 
translate into observed migration behaviours. This has been found to work in internal 
migration (De Jong, 2000).  But unlike internal migration, international migration involves 
lots of factors that are likely to prevent household from realising their expectations.   
 
Hundreds of young men and women use various means, including dangerous ones, to travel 
abroad for ‘greener pastures’. Together with their family members left behind they have 
their own formed subjective expectations of what they hope to reap from these movements.  
Various policies have been developed at home of origin to inform households and individual 
potential migrants to discourage them from supporting or embarking on unnecessary 
movements. At the destination country such has been the idea that immigrants are desperate 
people who as Massey (2006) puts it “unless they are forcibly blocked or at least strongly 
discouraged, will surely improve their lot by moving to developed countries.”  Such policy 
approach has been informed by the neoclassical economic approach to explaining 
international migration decision. With the relative deprivation being at the centre of their 
158 
 
arguments, the new economics of labour migration and cumulative theories also make policy 
makers think of migrants or immigrants as people who move because they cannot achieve 
the subjective expectations in their countries of origin. That people move because of 
differences between economic development of the origin and the destination countries, and 
hence it is only by raising the cost of movement would unwanted immigrants stop coming.  
Such policy approach has failed as people continue to move through various means 
irrespective of the cost and dangers involved, because the assumptions underlying the 
theories are not plausible. The assumption is that there is an information flow that informs 
people about these dangers and the high cost involved in the movements.  
 
From this study we have found that expectations that make people move are founded on 
inadequate information flow between them and migrants abroad. And the study has shown 
that if people are exposed to adequate information flow from the migrants the desire to 
support more members for further migration reduces. In fact this information flow even 
reduces and puts expectations in a more realistic perspective. If subjective expectations are 
heavily influenced by past events and kinship ties, then the decision to continue migration 
process in the family is difficult to be checked. This is because those left behind would not 
see any justification for not continuing to support members to migrate from the family, if 
they know that pioneer migrants had the same or even lower qualification before his or her 
departure.  On the other hand if subjective remittance expectations are heavily influenced by 
current flow of information about the socioeconomic conditions of migrants then the 
possibility of perpetuating migration in the family is likely to be put in a more realistic 
perspective. It is therefore a suggestion from this study that emphasis should perhaps be put 
on encouraging migrants to communicate with their relations back home. This 
communication should not be limited to simple social issues but also the realities of 
economic livelihood at the destination.  This will let them know the realities in the 
destination country.  Migrant relations carry messages that those at home trust based on the 
kinship ties or bond they have with them. The information they carry is more powerful than 
any information from the public or formal media sources. So Tsikata (2006) may be wrong; 
it is not that people left behind do not “care to hear the stories” but rather the stories have 
not been coming to them. And empirical results from this study have shown that should the 
stories come, and taken into consideration, people’s subjective expectations would be either 
moderated or reduced and the consequent effect these expectations on migration desires 
would also be either reduced significantly or considered with realistic approach. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 3A 
Appendix 3A: Ghana  Map 
 
Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/ghana_pol96.jpg 
 
                                 Sunyani                                                               Berekum 
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Appendix 3B  Map of Berekum 
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Appendix 3C  Sunyani District 
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APPENDIX 4 
 
 
Appendix 4A:  Cronbach test of internal consistency and factor analysis test for Unidimensionality  
 
Cronbach Alpha 
   
Factor analysis 
Obs Sign  
Item-test 
correlation  
Item-test 
correlation  
Average 
Inter-item 
correlation  Alpha Eigenvalue Difference Proportion 
Household wealth index  
Fridge 943 + 0.536 0.429 0.155 0.733 
 
3.082 1.901 0.471 
Television  943 + 0.461 0.345 0.160 0.741 
 
1.181 0.612 0.180 
Car 943 + 0.557 0.453 0.153 0.731 
 
0.569 0.193 0.087 
Bicycle  943 + 0.278 0.147 0.173 0.758 
 
0.377 0.037 0.058 
Telephone 943 + 0.407 0.285 0.164 0.746 
 
0.340 0.110 0.052 
Radio  943 + 0.313 0.184 0.170 0.755 
 
0.229 0.012 0.035 
cell phone  943 + 0.452 0.334 0.161 0.742 
 
0.218 0.050 0.033 
Fan 943 + 0.558 0.453 0.153 0.731 
 
0.168 0.010 0.026 
Stereo/Hifi 943 + 0.437 0.318 0.162 0.743 
 
0.158 0.067 0.024 
Sat. dish 943 + 0.447 0.329 0.161 0.742 
 
0.091 0.023 0.014 
Cooker  943 + 0.587 0.487 0.151 0.728 
 
0.068 0.028 0.010 
Computer  943 + 0.560 0.456 0.153 0.731 
 
0.040 0.023 0.006 
Tractor  943 + 0.273 0.142 0.173 0.759 
 
0.017 0.007 0.003 
Motor bike  943 + 0.424 0.303 0.163 0.745 
 
0.010 0.008 0.002 
Video deck 943 + 0.572 0.470 0.152 0.729 
 
0.001 0.002 0.000 
Microwave  943 + 0.513 0.402 0.156 0.736 
 
0.000 . 0.000 
Test scale 943 
   
0.160 0.753 
    Private information index  
Education 943 + 0.804 0.696 0.405 0.773 
 
3.050 2.464 0.862 
Marital  943 + 0.824 0.724 0.396 0.767 
 
0.586 0.311 0.166 
HH size 943 + 0.820 0.719 0.398 0.768 
 
0.275 0.331 0.078 
Job type 943 + 0.680 0.525 0.459 0.809 
 
-0.056 0.423 -0.016 
Employed 943 + 0.837 0.744 0.390 0.762 
 
-0.098 0.119 -0.028 
Salary 943 + 0.408 0.193 0.578 0.873 
 
-0.217 . -0.061 
Test scale 943 
   
0.438 0.824 
    Migrant Performance index  
Money 943 + 0.586 0.373 0.315 0.697 
 
2.037 0.909 0.656 
House 943 + 0.682 0.500 0.278 0.658 
 
1.128 0.886 0.363 
Business 943 + 0.628 0.428 0.298 0.680 
 
0.242 0.126 0.078 
Years mon 943 + 0.621 0.418 0.301 0.683 
 
0.115 0.295 0.037 
Years hse 943 + 0.708 0.536 0.268 0.646 
 
-0.179 0.060 -0.058 
Years bus 943 + 0.622 0.420 0.301 0.682 
 
-0.239 . -0.077 
Test scale 
   
0.293 0.714 
    Subjective remittance expectations index  
Money 943 + 0.583 0.346 0.217 0.581 
 
1.591 0.231 0.551 
House 943 + 0.637 0.417 0.198 0.553 
 
1.361 0.939 0.471 
Business 943 + 0.521 0.269 0.239 0.611 
 
0.422 0.437 0.146 
Years mon 943 + 0.577 0.339 0.219 0.584 
 
-0.015 0.176 -0.005 
Years hse 943 + 0.637 0.417 0.198 0.553 
 
-0.191 0.089 -0.066 
Years bus 943 + 0.575 0.336 0.220 0.585 
 
-0.280 . -0.097 
Test scale 
   
0.215 0.622 
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ApAppendix 4B-2: Proportion of variance explained in the polychoric 
PCA 
k Eigenvalue Difference Proportion 
 
1 3.082 1.901 0.471 
2 1.181 0.612 0.180 
3 0.569 0.193 0.087 
4 0.377 0.037 0.058 
5 0.340 0.110 0.052 
6 0.229 0.012 0.035 
7 0.218 0.050 0.033 
8 0.168 0.010 0.026 
9 0.158 0.067 0.024 
10 0.091 0.023 0.014 
11 0.068 0.028 0.010 
12 0.040 0.023 0.006 
13 0.017 0.007 0.003 
14 0.010 0.008 0.002 
15 0.001 0.002 0.000 
16 0.000 . 0.000 
 
 
 
Appendix 4B-1: Polychoric correlation matrix 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Fridge  (1) 1 
Television (2) 0.81 1.00 
Car (3) 0.28 0.27 1.00 
Bicycle (4) 0.31 0.34 0.09 1.00 
Phone (5) 0.14 0.06 0.54 0.06 1.00 
Radio (6) 0.70 0.74 0.21 0.38 0.05 1.00 
Cell phone (7) 0.47 0.51 0.38 0.38 0.16 0.48 1.00 
Electric fan (8) 0.69 0.74 0.36 0.29 0.15 0.61 0.56 1.00 
Stereo/Hifi (9) 0.15 0.18 0.34 -0.04 0.15 0.08 0.30 0.32 1.00 
Satellite dish (10) 0.23 0.17 0.56 0.17 0.55 0.14 0.26 0.26 0.22 1.00 
Gas/electric cooker 
(11) 0.42 0.41 0.50 0.13 0.31 0.33 0.43 0.49 0.40 0.39 1.00 
Computer (12) 0.28 0.25 0.54 0.21 0.44 0.23 0.42 0.37 0.33 0.55 0.51 1.00 
Tractor/Plough (13) 0.13 0.03 0.46 0.12 0.47 
-
0.04 0.07 0.09 0.21 0.26 0.14 0.36 1.00 
Motor bike (14) 0.21 0.20 0.37 0.22 0.33 0.18 0.33 0.26 0.27 0.35 0.42 0.42 0.50 1.00 
Deck/DVD player 
(15) 0.75 0.79 0.27 0.32 0.15 0.70 0.51 0.72 0.22 0.23 0.49 0.31 0.04 0.22 1.00 
Microwave (16) 0.24 0.19 0.60 0.07 0.46 0.11 0.36 0.33 0.48 0.57 0.51 0.60 0.28 0.37 0.25 1.00 
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Appendix 4C: Detailed descriptive statistics of migrant performance  index  
Percentiles Smallest 
1% 0 0 
5% 0 0 
10% 0 0 Obs 943 
25% 0.102 0 Sum of Wgt. 943 
50% 0.937 Mean 0.972 
Largest Std. Dev. 1.088 
75% 1.361 6.218 
90% 1.963 9.586 Variance 1.185 
95% 2.477 9.688 Skewness 5.350 
99% 4.073 17.424 Kurtosis 66.697 
 
Appendix 4D: Detailed descriptive statistics of information flow index 
Percentiles Smallest 
1% 1 0 
5% 2 0 
10% 2 .4 Obs 943 
25% 3 .5 Sum of Wgt. 943 
50% 4 Mean 3.851 
Largest Std. Dev. 1.137 
75% 5 6 
90% 5 6 Variance 1.293 
95% 5.2 6 Skewness -0.387 
99% 6 6 Kurtosis 2.669 
 
  
Appendix 4E: Detailed descriptive statistics of  household  subjective remittance 
expectation index  
Percentiles Smallest 
1% 0 0 
5% 0 0 
10% 0 0 Obs 943 
25% 1.813 0 Sum of Wgt. 943 
50% 3.358 Mean 4.527 
Largest Std. Dev. 4.643 
75% 5.730 27.438 
90% 9.782 31.414 Variance 21.560 
95% 13.749 33.884 Skewness 2.230 
99% 21.818 34.391 Kurtosis 10.342 
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Transformation reduces the variance in the data. 
 
Appendix 4G:  Statistical tests for appropriateness of the instruments used instrumental variable 
regression  
Summary results for first-stage regressions 
Variable Shea Partial R2         Partial R2            F(1,   920)    P-value 
Remittance flow                  0.054               0.054  18.74     0.0000 
 
 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):               52.24 
Chi-sq(1) P-val =              0.0000 
  Ho: matrix of reduced form coefficients has rank=K-1 (underidentified) 
Ha: matrix has rank>=K (identified) 
 
Weak identification test 
 Anderson-Rubin test of joint significance of 
endogenous regressors B1 in main equation, Ho:B1=0 
  F(1,920)=      2.08      P-val=0.1496 
  Chi-sq(1)=     2.12      P-val=0.1454 
  
  
  NB: Anderson-Rubin stat heteroskedasticity-robust 
  
        Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):         0.000 
                                                                                         (equation exactly identified) 
 (equation exactly identified) 
     
        Instrumented:        remittance flow  
 Included instruments: human capital household size  children Years of migration, Age of household 
head, Age of household head squared, Migrant as main contributor, Migrant as 
decision maker, migrant is a head, migrant spouse, migrant is a son, migrant is an in-
law, migrant is a brother/sister, migrant is a friend, household wealth,  
  
    Excluded instruments: attitude towards migration  
    
        
Appendix 4F: Basic statistics of performance estimates  
 
Before transformation After transformation 
Obs 939 939 
sum of weights 939 939 
Mean 0.972 0.828 
Std. dev 1.080 0.535 
Variance  1.1667 0.286 
Skewness  5.162 0.250 
Kurtosis 63.260 4.114 
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Appendix 4H: Kernel Density plot of  information flow 
 
The kernel density plot demonstrates four peaks around 2, 3, 4 and 5 on the information flow 
index.  
Appendix 4I: Testing parallel-lines assumption using the .01 level of significance 
 Variable  P-Value Constrained for Parallel line 
 Migrant performance at home 0.000 Not imposed 
Step  4 Migrant is head  0.696 Imposed 
Step  6 Migrant is a spouse 0.612 Imposed 
 Migrant is a son/daughter 0.009 Not Imposed 
Step  7 Migrant is in-law 0.612 Imposed 
Step 10 Migrant is a brother/sister 0.528 Imposed 
Step  3 Migrant is other relation 0.788 Imposed 
Step  2 Migrant is a friend 0.847 Imposed 
 Education level  0.003 Not imposed  
Step  9 Household wealth 0.562 Imposed 
Step  14 Household size of age 15+ 0.219 Imposed 
Step  15 No. of children  0.020 imposed  
Step  8 Years of migration 0.806 Imposed 
Step  16 Years of migration squared 0.033 imposed  
Step  11 Age of household head 0.231 Imposed 
Step  12 Age of household head squared  0.293 Imposed 
Step  1 Main financial contributor - migrant 0.940 Imposed 
Step  5 Main decision maker -migrant 0.695 Imposed 
Step  13 Attitude toward migration 0.205 Not imposed  
An insignificant test statistic indicates that the final model does not violate the proportional odds 
/parallel assumption line. 
 Wald Test  of  parallel line assumption  for the final model  
  chi2( 32) =   32.40;         Prob > chi2 =    0.4471 
 
0
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Information flow
Kernel density estimate
Normal density
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.2601
Kernel density estimate
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Appendix 4J: Predicted Probability for each category of information flow 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
k1 943 0.337 0.121 0.087 0.805 
k2 943 0.295 0.076 -0.045 0.513 
k3 943 0.317 0.085 0.075 0.570 
k4 943 0.051 0.037 0.000 0.225 
The average of predicted probabilities of the four categories of the response variable  
(current information flow) correspond to the original sample distribution, indicating that 
there is no negative in-sample predicted probabilities. Hence the model is appropriate. 
 
Appendix 4K: Test for multicollinearity  
 
VIF Tolerance Squared 
Eigen 
value  
Migrant is head  1.07 0.9351 0.0649 1 7.725 
Migrant is a spouse 1.2 0.8324 0.1676 2 1.236 
Migrant is a son/daughter 1.56 0.6409 0.3591 3 1.116 
Migrant is an in-law 1.11 0.897 0.103 4 1.052 
Migrant is a brother/sister 1.42 0.7034 0.2966 5 1.022 
Migrant is other relation 1.15 0.8701 0.1299 6 0.932 
Migrant is a friend 1.07 0.9331 0.0669 7 0.894 
Household Size 1.59 0.6289 0.3711 8 0.854 
Wealth 1.31 0.7632 0.2368 9 0.814 
Information flow 1.06 0.9431 0.0569 10 0.555 
Household education level 1.26 0.7936 0.2064 11 0.288 
Age of household head 1.62 0.6167 0.3833 12 0.214 
No. of children 1.12 0.8945 0.1055 13 0.123 
Migrant main contributor  1.59 0.6275 0.3725 14 0.067 
Migrant main decision 
maker  1.5 0.6654 0.3346 15 0.056 
Family migration  attitude  1.05 0.9561 0.0439 16 0.045 
Mean VIF     17 0.009 
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Appendix 4L: Distribution of Levels of expectation before and after square root transformation 
                                                                             
Before                                                                                             After  
 
 
Appendix 4M: Test for omitted variables in OLS model without information interactions  
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of remittance expectations  
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 915) =      3.87 
                  Prob > F =      0.0091 
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Appendix 4N: Heckman selection model without identification specification 
 
 
Outcome equation  Selection equation  
 
Coef.  Std error  Coef.  Std. error  
Past performance  0.066** 0.026 0.233*** 0.078 
Private information flow  0.021 0.024 -0.064 0.052 
Migrant is head 0.440*** 0.124 0.897 0.484 
Migrant is spouse 0.642*** 0.088 0.200 0.224 
Migrant is son/daughter 0.432*** 0.042 -0.026 0.095 
Migrant is an in-law 0.442*** 0.063 0.082 0.161 
Migrant is brother/sister 0.467*** 0.040 -0.016 0.090 
Migrant is other relation 0.501*** 0.043 0.164 0.116 
Migrant is a friend  0.163* 0.097 0.189 0.201 
Household wealth  0.016 0.023 -0.062 0.050 
HH level of education  0.047 0.037 0.055 0.079 
Years of migration experience  0.006 0.004 0.012 0.009 
Age of household head 0.000 0.005 -0.004 0.011 
Age of household head squared  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Household size  0.040*** 0.014 0.032 0.031 
Contribution to migration 0.198** 0.075 0.101 0.178 
Decision maker -0.035 0.087 -0.310 0.190 
Public information flow  0.054 0.062 0.380*** 0.130 
Attitudes  -0.124 0.165 1.240*** 0.219 
Constant  0.882*** 0.294 -0.498 0.557 
/athrho -0.714*** 0.203 
 
 
/lnsigma -0.316*** 0.036 
 
 
rho -0.613 0.127 
 
 
sigma 0.729 0.026 
 
 
lambda -0.447 0.104 
 
 
LR test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0):   chi2(1) =     2.46   Prob > chi2 = 0.1169  
 
Attitude clearly identifies the selection of households that expect something, but it does not 
have any significant effect on expectation levels. 
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Appendix 4O: Test for multicollinearity  
  SQRT VIF VIF Tolerance R-Squared Eigenvalue Index 
Remittance expectations  1.440 1.200 0.693 0.307 1 10.03 1.00 
Past performance of migrants  1.320 1.150 0.755 0.245 2 1.16 2.94 
Household wealth 1.310 1.140 0.765 0.236 3 1.09 3.03 
Private information from migration  1.140 1.070 0.880 0.120 4 1.04 3.11 
Age of household head 1.360 1.170 0.737 0.263 5 0.97 3.21 
Years of migration experience  1.220 1.100 0.819 0.181 6 0.94 3.27 
Public information about migrants 1.090 1.050 0.914 0.086 7 0.88 3.37 
Household level of education  1.270 1.130 0.788 0.212 8 0.85 3.43 
Number of household members age 15-35 1.150 1.070 0.872 0.128 9 0.62 4.02 
Number of children under the age of 15 years  1.120 1.060 0.895 0.105 10 0.57 4.20 
Attitude to migration  1.090 1.040 0.918 0.082 11 0.48 4.59 
Migrant will contribute to support  1.110 1.050 0.905 0.095 12 0.35 5.37 
Migrant is head of family 1.130 1.060 0.885 0.115 13 0.31 5.70 
Migrant is a spouse 1.310 1.140 0.765 0.235 14 0.21 6.88 
Migrant is a son/daughter 1.760 1.330 0.568 0.432 15 0.17 7.65 
Migrant is an in-law 1.200 1.090 0.836 0.164 16 0.14 8.36 
Migrant is a brother  1.760 1.330 0.568 0.432 17 0.08 11.14 
Migrant is other relation  1.410 1.190 0.707 0.293 18 0.06 13.49 
Migrant is a friend  1.070 1.040 0.931 0.069 19 0.04 15.34 
 Condition Number        33.6244  20 0.01 33.62 
 Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from scaled raw sscp (w/ intercept) Det(correlation)    0.1286 
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Appendix 4P:  Brant test for parallel assumption  
 
chi2 p>chi2 df 
All       25.42 0.147 19 
Remittance expectations  0.34 0.558 1 
Past performance of migrants  0.55 0.46 1 
Household wealth 0.01 0.904 1 
Private information from migration  0.65 0.419 1 
Age of household head 2.18 0.14 1 
Years of migration experience  0.34 0.56 1 
Public information about migrants 0.38 0.539 1 
Household level of education  1.99 0.159 1 
Number of household members age 15-35 0.21 0.647 1 
Number of children under the age of 15 years  3.12 0.077 1 
Attitude to migration  0.07 0.798 1 
Migrant will contribute to support  0.02 0.899 1 
Migrant is head of family 0.02 0.877 1 
Migrant is a spouse 4.75 0.029 1 
Migrant is a son/daughter 5.82 0.016 1 
Migrant is an in-law 0.16 0.689 1 
Migrant is a brother  0 0.977 1 
Migrant is other relation  0.99 0.319 1 
Migrant is a friend  0.69 0.406 1 
    A significant test statistic provides evidence that the parallel regression 
assumption has been violated.  Using 0.05 level, the test shows that two variables 
(migrant is a spouse and migrant is a son or daughter violate the parallel 
assumption. Hence these two variables are not constrained in the model.  
 
Appendix 4Q: Summary statistics of predicted probabilities for generalized ordered  
probit model 
 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Support 1 family member  937 0.627 0.217 0.004 0.982 
Support 2 family members  937 0.259 0.114 0.015 0.472 
Support 3 or more members  937 0.115 0.152 0.002 0.921 
 
The average of predicted probabilities of the three categories of the response variable 
corresponds to the original sample distribution, indicating that there is no negative in-sample 
predicted probabilities. Hence the model is appropriate. 
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Appendix 4R: Hausman test for  independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) 
assumption 
(b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
  full part Difference S.E. 
Past performance of migrants  -0.052 -0.048 -0.004 . 
Household wealth -0.031 -0.037 0.006 . 
Private information from migration  -0.069 -0.063 -0.006 0.004 
Age of household head 0.006 0.006 0.000 0.001 
Years of migration experience  0.015 0.014 0.001 0.001 
Public information about migrants -0.197 -0.187 -0.010 . 
Household level of education  0.228 0.229 -0.001 . 
Number of household members age 15-35 -0.099 -0.097 -0.002 0.004 
Number of children under the age of 15 
years  0.158 0.156 0.002 . 
Attitude to migration  0.079 0.041 0.038 . 
Migrant will contribute to support  -2.568 -2.566 -0.002 0.001 
Migrant is head of family -1.283 -1.272 -0.012 0.026 
Migrant is a spouse -0.360 -0.355 -0.005 . 
Migrant is a son/daughter -0.432 -0.423 -0.009 0.028 
Migrant is an in-law -0.370 -0.369 -0.001 . 
Migrant is a brother  -0.448 -0.447 -0.001 . 
Migrant is other relation  -0.685 -0.676 -0.009 . 
Migrant is a friend  -0.107 -0.106 -0.001 0.007 
           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from mlogit 
           B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from mlogit 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
                  chi2(18) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                            =        0.27 
                    Prob>chi2 =      1.0000 
                   (V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
Hausman test of IIA assumption cannot be rejected in 
the model 
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Appendix 5  
 
 
Average years  of migration and households size expectedly increase 
with increase in age of household head. 
 
Appendix 5A: Mean years of migration and household size by 
age of hh head   
Age of 
household head  Mean years of migration  
Average household 
size  
<=39 <=5 2.2 
40-59 6-10 2.6 
60+ 11+ 3.5 
All  10.3 2.7 
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Appendix Six 
Appendix 6A: Test for multicollinearity  
 
VIF Tolerance Squared 
Eigen 
value  
Migrant is head  1.07 0.9351 0.0649 1 7.725 
Migrant is a spouse 1.2 0.8324 0.1676 2 1.236 
Migrant is a son/daughter 1.56 0.6409 0.3591 3 1.116 
Migrant is an in-law 1.11 0.897 0.103 4 1.052 
Migrant is a brother/sister 1.42 0.7034 0.2966 5 1.022 
Migrant is other relation 1.15 0.8701 0.1299 6 0.932 
Migrant is a friend 1.07 0.9331 0.0669 7 0.894 
Household Size 1.59 0.6289 0.3711 8 0.854 
Wealth 1.31 0.7632 0.2368 9 0.814 
Information flow 1.06 0.9431 0.0569 10 0.555 
Household education level 1.26 0.7936 0.2064 11 0.288 
Age of household head 1.62 0.6167 0.3833 12 0.214 
No. of children 1.12 0.8945 0.1055 13 0.123 
Migrant main contributor  1.59 0.6275 0.3725 14 0.067 
Migrant main decision 
maker  1.5 0.6654 0.3346 15 0.056 
Family migration  attitude  1.05 0.9561 0.0439 16 0.045 
Mean VIF     17 0.009 
    
Appendix 6B: Kernel density estimates of residuals 
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Appendix 6C: Test for model fit 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of rtperf 
Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 918) =      0.35 
                  Prob > F =      0.7919  
 
 
Appendix 6D: Heckman Selection Equation: Probability of  household receiving 
at least one item 
   Coef Std. error   
Migrant is head    0.908*** 0.311   
Migrant is a spouse   0.402** 0.198   
Migrant is a son/daughter   0.634*** 0.081   
Migrant is an in-law   0.588*** 0.157   
Migrant is a brother/sister   0.474*** 0.076   
Migrant is other relation   0.344*** 0.099   
Migrant is a friend   -0.000 0.153   
No. of adults   -0.077** 0.032   
Household Wealth   0.023 0.047   
Household education level   -0.189* 0.079   
Age of household head   -0.024** 0.011   
Age of household head  sq.   0.000*** 0.000   
No. of children   -0.097* 0.053   
Migrant main contributor    0.050 0.138   
Migrant main decision maker    0.165 0.188   
Family migration  attitude   0.889*** 0.185   
Constant   1.128** 0.533   
/athrho  -1.815*** 0.203   
/lnsigma  -0.664*** 0.027   
Rho  -0.948 0.020   
Sigma  0.515 0.014   
lambda  -0.488 0.020   
 F( 17,   920)         =   16.01       
Prob. > F               =  0.000       
 Adj. R-squared    =  0.146      
 Root MSE             =  0.474      
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 Appendix 6Ei: Determining impact of  remittance flow on information flow  with IV-technique  
  Private information flow    Public information flow   
OLS  
 
IV-Reg(2SLS)  
 
Probit   IV-Probit  
  Coef. 
Std.  
Error 
 
 
Coef.  
 
Robust std. error  
 
 
Coef. 
 
Std. 
error  Coef. 
Robust  
Std. 
Error 
 
       
Remittance flow  0.656*** 0.139 0.901  0.553 0.104** 0.043 0.727*** 0.176  
Kinship ties           
Migrant is head  -0.061 0.187 -0.081 0.192 -0.181 0.223 -0.438** 0.213  
Migrant is a spouse 0.093 0.126 -0.065 0.130 -0.039 0.161 -0.482** 0.188  
Migrant is a son/daughter -0.056 0.057 -0.067 0.060 -0.132* 0.072 -
0.415*** 
0.095  
Migrant is in-law -0.156 0.091 -0.139 0.092 0.043 0.117 -0.203 0.127  
Migrant is a brother/sister -0.149*** 0.054 -0.158*** 0.054 -0.095 0.068 -
0.331*** 
0.083  
Migrant is other relation -0.193*** 0.061 -0.199*** 0.061 -0.134* 0.074 -
0.295*** 
0.074  
Migrant is a friend -0.218* 0.131 -0.210 0.139 -0.189 0.173 0.138 0.153  
Household characteristics           
Household  education level  -0.012 
-0.020 
0.053 
0.053 
  -0.008 
-0.020 
0.053 
0.053 
-0.145** 0.065 -0.117* 0.064  
Household wealth 0.154*** 0.032 0.154*** 0.032 0.009 0.040 -0.074* 0.045  
Household size of age 15+ -0.003 0.022 -0.001 0.022 -0.093*** 0.027 -
0.063** 
    
0.029 
 
No. of children  -0.068* 
-0.074** 
0.035 
0.035 
-0.065* 
-0.074** 
0.035 
0.035 
-0.126*** 0.053 -
0.101** 
0.042  
Years of migration experience 0.038** 0.017 0.010* 0.006 0.023* 0.007 0.018*** 0.006  
Age of household head 0.006 0.001 0.007 0.007 -0.011 0.001 -0.008 0.009  
Age of hh head squared -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000  
Migrant bears travel cost -0.002 0.095 -0.067 0.095 -0.018 0.117 -0.123 0.110  
Migrant makes  migration 
decision  
 
0.041 
 
0.123 
 
0.041 
 
0.123 
 
-0.030 
 
0.152 
 
-0.090 
 
0.139 
 
Attitude  0.086 
 
0.183 
 
  0.485** 0.205    
Constant  3.071*** 0.386 3.071*** 0.644 1.151** 0.448 1.049** 0.485  
 No. obs. =938 No. obs. =938 No. obs. =938 No. obs. =938  
 F( 19,   910) =  4.69 F( 17,   920) = 3.61 LR chi2(18) = 57.52 Wald chi2(17) 
=116.02 
 
 Prob > F   = 0.000 Prob > F  =   0.000 Prob > chi2= 0.000   Prob > chi2= 0.000   
 Adj R2 =  0.070 Centered R2=  0.078 Pseudo R2= 0.051        
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Appendix 6Eii: Test for exogeneity of remittance flow in information flow 
                 Coef.            Std. Err.               z         P>|z|               [95% Conf. Interval] 
/athrho     -.0716348     .3140867         -0.23        0.820           -.6872333        0.5439637 
/lnsigma   -.0115684     0.0230879      -0.50         0.616            -.0568197       0.03368 
rho           -.0715125     .3124804                                               -.5962017       0.4959825 
sigma         .9884983     .0228223                                                 .9447644      1.0342 
Wald test of exogeneity (/athrho = 0): chi2(1) =     0.05 Prob > chi2 = 0.8196 
 
2SLS  
H0: Regressor is exogenous 
Wu-Hausman F test: 0.25994 F(1,919) P-value = 0.61028 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test: 0.26524 Chi-sq(1) P-value =
 0.6065 
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Appendix 6F: Effect of remittance flow on low and high private and public information flow  
Private information Public Information  
Low High Low High 
Coef. 
Std. 
Error  Coef 
Std. 
Error  Coef 
Std. 
Error  Coef 
Std. 
Error  
Remittance flow  0.694*** 0.118 0.121 0.084 0.642*** 0.198 1.078*** 0.324 
Migrant is hh head  -0.219 0.182 -0.171* 0.092 -0.434 0.302 0.162 0.371 
Migrant is a spouse 0.150 0.116 -0.138*** 0.066 -0.188 0.202 0.402 0.286 
Migrant is a son/daughter -0.065 0.054 -0.129*** 0.029 -0.130 0.093 -0.048 0.114 
Migrant is an in-law -0.050 0.077 -0.171*** 0.055 0.097 0.145 -0.027 0.218 
Migrant is a brother/sis -0.076 0.047 -0.156*** 0.031 -0.155* 0.081 0.199 0.131 
Migrant is other relation -0.123** 0.052 -0.168*** 0.035 -0.040 0.091 -0.295** 0.134 
Migrant is a friend -0.098 0.111 -0.163** 0.082 0.565** 0.276 -0.307 0.361 
Average education of HH -0.063 0.047 0.051* 0.028 -0.144* 0.083 -0.224 0.118 
Household wealth  0.026 0.029 0.022 0.017 0.052 0.051 -0.049 0.069 
Household wealth  -0.015 0.019 0.022* 0.013 -0.093*** 0.033 -0.083 0.052 
No. of children  
-
0.100*** 0.031 -0.008 0.020 -0.101 0.054 -0.179** 0.079 
Years of migration  0.010 0.015 -0.001 0.011 -0.003 0.026 -0.004 0.047 
Age of household head  0.003 0.007 -0.008* 0.004 -0.007 0.011 -0.004 0.018 
Age of household head squared 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Migrant bears travel cost -0.020 0.087 0.020 0.049 0.051 0.151 -0.050 0.202 
Migrant makes decision to move  0.114 0.113 0.010 0.064 0.157 0.198 -0.252 0.254 
Attitude to migration  0.260 0.164 0.115 0.099 0.563** 0.275 -0.092** 0.394 
Constant  2.572*** 0.337 4.978*** 0.217 0.415 0.580 1.014 0.897 
No. obs 343 587 No. obs. 587 343 
F(19,567) 3.610 4.100 LRchi2(19) 58.430 43.390 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 Prob>chi2 0.000 0.001 
  Adj. R2 0.127   0.091 Pseudo r2 0.082   0.110 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
179 
 
 
Appendix 6C: Correlation  matrix of variables entered in the model  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1 Migrant is head  1 
2 Migrant is a spouse 9.5 1 
             
3 
Migrant is a 
son/daughter 
-
0.07* 
-
0.16* 1 
            
4 Migrant is an in-law -0.06 -0.06 -0.03 1 
           
5 
Migrant is a 
brother/sister 
-
0.10* 
-
0.16* 
-
0.28* 
-
0.15* 1 
          
6 Migrant is other relation 
-
0.07* 
-
0.08* 
-
0.16* 
-
0.08* -0.06 1 
         
7 Migrant is a friend -0.02 -0.04 
-
0.08* 0.06 
-
0.10* -0.04 1 
        
8 No. of adults -0.03 
-
0.25* 0.34* 0.04 
-
0.07* 0.07* 0.01 1 
       
9 HH  Wealth 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.11* 0.05 -0.05 0.08* 1 
      
10 Information flow 0.03 0.07* 0.03 -0.02 -0.06 
-
0.07* 
-
0.07* 0.00 0.17* 1 
     
11 HH education level 0.03 0.03 
-
0.11* -0.02 0.13* 0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.40* 0.05 1 
    
12 Age of household head 
-
0.07* 
-
0.19* 0.43* 0.02 
-
0.18* -0.06 
-
0.07* 0.53* 0.09* 0.00 
-
0.11* 1 
   
13 No. of children 0.04 0.08* 
-
0.14* 0.11* 0.09* -0.03 0.02 -0.25* -0.07* -0.08* -0.05 
-
0.19* 1 
  
14 Migrant bears costr  0.02 0.04 
-
0.21* -0.04 
-
0.10* -0.04 0.01 -0.21* -0.20* -0.02 
-
0.08* 
-
0.13* 0.05 1 
 
15 
Migrant main decision 
maker  0.02 0.01 0.10* 0.09* 0.13* -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.11* 0.02 0.07* -0.01 0.02 
-
0.55* 
16 
Family migration  
attitude  0.05 -0.02 0.06 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 
-
0.10* 0.04 -0.01 0.06 
-
0.12* 0.05 0.02 -0.03 0.05
*p<0.05 or better  
The correlation matrix shows that all the coefficients are below 0.5 except those of age of 
household head and number of adult children, and also main decision maker and financial 
contributor. But coefficient of 0.53 or 0.55 does not raise any serious problem as the 
multicollinearity test below also confirms. 
Following Vance and Buchheim ( 2005), a test for collinearity tool suggested by 
Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980) is used to assess presence of multicollinearity.  This tool 
employs the condition number as an index of the global instability of the coefficients.  A 
large condition number indicates collinearity and hence instability of the coefficients.  But 
there seems to be some disagreement on the threshold for the definition of  large condition 
number. While Stata Web Book advises a threshold of 10 for regression analyses, Belsley, 
Kuh, and Welsch (1980), and Vance and Buchheim (2005) have used a threshold of 30 as 
the cut-points.  For this analysis the condition number is 29.8  (Appendix 5D). And non of 
the variance inflation factors (VIF) is greater than 10 or tolerance value less than 0.1 
indicating none of the variables is a linear combination of other independent variables.  
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APPENDIX 7 
 
 
 
Appendix 7A: Results from the Selection Equation of the main Heckman 
Model  
   Coef  
 Std. 
Error  P-value   
Migrant performance  0.235 0.079 0.003 
Private information flow  -0.065 0.052 0.216 
Public information flow 0.407 0.130 0.002 
Migrant is head 0.809 0.488 0.098 
Migrant is spouse 0.204 0.225 0.365 
Migrant is son/daughter -0.028 0.096 0.768 
Migrant is an in-law 0.079 0.162 0.624 
Migrant is brother/sister -0.026 0.091 0.771 
Migrant is other relation 0.156 0.117 0.183 
Migrant is a friend  0.174 0.201 0.388 
Household wealth  -0.058 0.051 0.253 
HH level of education  0.050 0.080 0.530 
Migration experience  0.013 0.009 0.155 
Age of household head 0.004 0.012 0.744 
Age of hh hold head squared 0.000 0.000 0.351 
 Household size  0.032 0.031 0.306 
HH Contribution to movement  0.090 0.179 0.613 
Main decision maker -0.309 0.191 0.105 
Attitude to migration 1.184 0.209 0.000 
Constant  -0.603 0.561 0.282 
/athrho -0.675 0.215 
 /lnsigma -0.321 0.036 
 rho -0.588 0.141 
 sigma 0.725 0.026 
 lambda -0.427 0.114   
LR test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0):   chi2(1) =     2.72   Prob > chi2 = 0.0990 
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Appendix 7B: Test for omitted variables in OLS model with information interactions  
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of remittance expectations  
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 915) =      0.30 
                  Prob > F =      0.8278 
 
Appendix 7C: Output from selection equation in the heckprob procedure  
  Coef  std error  
Migrant performance  0.101 0.061 
Migrant is hh head  0.790 0.466 
Migrant is a spouse 0.350 0.218 
Migrant is a son/daughter -0.070 0.085 
Migrant is an in-law 0.155 0.156 
Migrant is a brother/sis -0.051 0.081 
Migrant is other reln 0.122 0.097 
Migrant is a friend -0.024 0.182 
Public information  0.479 0.115 
Years of migration  0.008 0.009 
Household size  0.044 0.027 
Relation contributed to migration  -0.321 0.105 
Constant  0.591 0.170 
athrho 6.174 82.437 
rho 1.000 0.001 
LR test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0):   chi2(1) =     3.27   Prob > chi2 = 0.0707 
    
Appendix 7D: Estimating the marginal effect from the Heckman model 
In the case of Heckman model, since the coefficients of the variables that appear both in the 
selection and outcome equations are affected by the former, marginal effects are estimated 
for those variables with the following formula, following Sigelman and Zeng  (1999):  
  
 
ghijklO
bg@A  /	 J αmnoλαp                 
 
where Beta is the coefficient in the outcome equation, alpha is the corresponding coefficient 
in the selection equation, rho is the correlation between the errors in the two equations and 
sigma is the error from the outcome equation and λαp is a function of the inverse mills 
ratio. The first part of the effect measurement, given by β, measures the effect of 
determinants on the remittance expectation levels, while the second part, represented by mnoqr2  shows the effect of a change in  each of the determinants on the probability 
expecting something from migrants. 
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Appendix X:Questionnaire 
 
Good day/etc. My name is --------------------------. I am working on a project which seeks to understand 
the role of migration in family or household economic strategies.  I am not working for the 
government or any agency in any country.  This is an academic student project. 
 
If you agree, I would like to ask you a series of questions about your opinion on migration. Please 
this is not a test or an examination and my questions do not have right or wrong answers. I only want 
to know about your family’s decisions on migration. Please tell me what you honestly think, and 
remember, you are free to not answer questions or to stop the interview  at any time. Your responses 
will help us to develop a better understanding of the needs and ideas of households/families and 
migration decisions. What you say will be kept confidential and will not be given to the government or 
any agency. You will not be quoted in any discussion or whatsoever. This is purely an academic 
exercise. 
 
All together, this interaction should take about 30-45 minutes. Do you agree to go ahead?  
 
Interviewer should sign in the appropriate box below: 
Yes   
No  
 
 
 
 
If the answer to the above question is yes, the interviewer should complete  
the following questions 
 
1     Household code: 
  
Code   
Name  
Phone number  
House address  
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2. 
 
 
100. Please what is your age, education level, marital status, type of job and relationship to the head 
of this household? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
101. Please including yourself, how many people are in this family?  
        ……………………………………............................... 
 
102. Could you please tell me the age, sex, relationship, education   and employment status of the 
members of the household in Ghana?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
103. How would you describe the type of house you live in? 
a b c d e f 
Sex  Age  Relationship to the 
household head 
Education level Type of 
job 
Marital 
status 
      
a b c d e f 
First name  Sex  Age  Relationship Education 
level 
Occupation(write 
type of job) 
1.      
2.      
3.      
4.      
5.      
6.      
7.      
8.      
9.      
10.      
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104. How many rooms do you and your household occupy? ……………… 
 
105. Does this household/family own the following items?  
 Items  Yes  Quantity  
1 Fridge   
2 Television    
3 Motor vehicle    
4 Bicycle    
5 Landline phone   
6 Radio    
7 Cell phones    
8 Electric fan   
9 Stereo/Hifi   
10 Satellite dish   
11 Gas/electric cooker   
12 Computer    
13 Tractor / Plough   
14 Motor Bike    
15 Video cassette recorder / DVD player   
16 Microwave   
 
 
Free-standing house 1 
Single-family apartment 2 
Multi-family apartment  3 
Bungalow 4 
Self-built informal (mud) house 5 
Other (please specify)……….  
185 
 
 
106 
a. Approximately how much does your family receive from all sources of income? 
.................................... 
 
(Use 106b if the respondent is not comfortable with 7a) 
 
106b. Approximately how much does your household/family receive per month from all sources of 
income (in GH). 
1 Nothing  701-800 9 
2 0-100 801-900 10 
3 101-200 901-1000 11 
4 201-300 1000-1500 12 
5 301-400 1501-2000 13 
6 401-500 2001-3000 14 
7 501-600 >3000 15 
8 601-700   
 
 
107. Who is the main wage earner of this household?   …………………….. 
 
Migration Expectations  
 
200. Please what is your general perception about migration of people from Ghana to other 
countries. 
Very Bad 1 
Bad  2 
Good 3 
Very good  4 
Excellent idea  5 
No comments  6 
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201. Generally, what are the main things you and your household/family expect from migration, and 
how long must a migrant take to fulfil these expectations? Choose as many as applicable 
 Expected items  Waiting period (in years) 
1 Nothing   
2 Remittances (Money for living expenses)  
3 To build a house  
4 Establish business  
5 Just the prestige attached to it  
6 A car  
7 To support other members of the family to 
migrate 
 
8 Other   
 
 
202. How much money do you expect migrant members to send you at least every year? 
 …………………………………………………… 
 
203. How did you come to know that you can get these things from migration? Choose as many as 
applicable. 
1 Through personal migration experience 
2 That’s what migrants members of our  family have been doing 
3 That’s what other migrants in this community do for their 
families 
4 Friends and relatives from this community  tell me we can get 
these things 
5 Other (please specify) 
 
 
 
204. Since when did you begin to know that you can get these things from migration?  
…………………… (write number of years) 
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205. Would these expectations be the same if the migrant is not a member of your household?  
  
Yes  1       Go to question  
No  2       
 
Why yes 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………. 
Why no 
 ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………. 
 
Migrant members related to the Household  
We have talked about people who used to live in this area, but now residing in other countries.  Now 
if you allow me, can we talk about people you used to stay with or relatives who are now staying in 
other countries? 
 
 
300. Do you have close relatives who stay abroad? 
Yes  1 
No  2   Go to question 500  
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303. What have these migrant members done for you? Tick as many as applicable. 
  
 Item From which of the 
migrant members? 
Waiting 
period before 
it started 
1 Nothing    
2 Money ( state amount).......................   
3 Built a house   
4 Established business   
5 Just the prestige attached to it   
6 Bought a car   
7 Supported migration of other members 
How many …………………………………   
  
8 Other (please specify)   
 
 
304. Approximately how much do they send you per annum? ..................... 
 
 Amount GH¢ From which of the migrant members? 
1 Nothing   
2 0-100  
3 101-200  
4 201-300  
5 301-400  
6 401-500  
7 501-600  
8 601-700  
9 701-1000  
10 1000+  
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305. On average how often do they send you something?   ........................................ 
 
306. Approximately since when did they start doing all this? Write the number of years ago. 
…………………………………………… 
  
 
307. Generally what do you use money sent  for? Tick as many as applicable 
 
 Item 
1 School Fees 
3. Utility bills(electricity bills, water bills) 
4. Building a House 
5. Business Investment 
6. Living expenses 
7 To finance migration of other members 
8. Other (please specify)……………………………… 
 
 
 
MIGRATION DECISION 
You have told me about relatives who are staying in other countries. Now I would like to know what 
goes into your migration decisions. 
 
 
400. Have you  been involved in migration decisions of some relatives of yours? 
  
Yes  1 
No 2          Go to question 500 
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401. Could you please tell me the age, sex, relationship, education   and employment status of the 
relatives in whose migration decisions you were involved?  
 
 
402. Kindly give the first names, relationship, region/country of residence and contribution by relatives 
who helped raise resources for the movement of these recent migrants.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a b c d e f g h i j k l 
First name / 
Christian 
name of the 
migrant  
Sex  Age  Relation
ship to 
you  
Educatio
n level 
before 
he/she 
left 
Ghana 
Occupati
on 
before 
he/she 
(write 
type of 
job) 
Purpose of 
movemen
t  
Countr
y of 
reside
nce 
now  
Level of 
educati
on 
now.  
Marital 
status  
Size of 
family 
Type of 
job 
1.            
2.            
3.            
a b c d e f g h i 
First name / 
Christian name  
Sex  Relationship 
to you  
Education 
level  
Type of job  Town/ 
Country of 
residence  
Marital 
Status  
Size of 
family 
Type of 
job 
1.         
2.         
3.         
4.         
5.         
6. Who contributed most of the resources?  ………….. 
7. Who was the main decision-maker?  ………………. 
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403. If the decision involved you and other relatives as indicated above, how did you communicate 
with one another? Tick as many as applicable 
  
1 Phone conversations 
2 Emails  
3 Letters 
4 During festive gatherings 
5 During funeral celebrations 
6 Errands 
7 Other (please specify) 
 
 
 
Future Migration Strategies: Intention to perpetuate Migration 
Now if you would allow me, I would like to know a bit about the future migration strategies of this 
household  
 
500. Do you have any plans of sending another relation abroad in the near future?  
  
 
 
501. How many relatives are you planning to send abroad in the near future (say next five years). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 1 
 No 2              End the interview 
a b c d e f g 
First name  Sex  Age  Relationship Education 
level 
Occupation 
(type of job) 
Country of 
destination 
1.       
2.       
3.       
4.       
5.       
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502. Will the decision to send this relation abroad depend on the agreement and contribution of other 
relatives? 
  
Yes 1 
 No 2               
  
503. How are these people who will be part of the decision-making process related to you and where 
are they residing?  
 
 
  
 a b c d e 
 First name  Relationship Education 
level 
Type of job Region/country of 
residence 
1      
2      
3      
4      
5. Who will contribute most of the resources? ……… 
6. Who will be the main decision-maker? ……………. 
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